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Abstract
The separation of ownership and control within companies cause agency problems.
Executive compensation is a tool to align the interests between shareholders and
top executives. This thesis studies the potential effects of executive compensation
packages on the firm value and other factors. I have three main findings in this
thesis. In the first paper, I show that when CEOs are probability weighting, the
optimal contracts are convex. This explains the existence of option components in
CEO’s compensation packages. In the second paper, I find that the wage of the
employee is increasing in the CEO pay. This relationship is found both across firms
and across time. I ascribe this relationship to the behindness aversion of workers.
The result suggests CEO compensation incurs extra costs to the firms. In the
third paper, I show that firms with low wage gaps between CEO and workers are
overpriced on the stock market. The effect should be even stronger in the presence
of inequality-averse investors. This finding suggests that investors do trade on the
pay inequality, and show that the mis-pricing comes from the overvaluation of low
wage gap stocks.
De scheiding van eigendom en controle binnen bedrijven veroorzaakt bureauprob-
lemen. CEO compensatie is een hulpmiddel om de belangen af te stemmen tussen
aandeelhouders en topbestuurders. Dit proefschrift bestudeert de mogelijke ef-
fecten van een vergoedingspakket voor bestuurders op de bedrijfswaarde en an-
dere factoren. Ik heb drie belangrijke bevindingen in dit proefschrift. Ten eerste
laat ik zien dat wanneer CEO’s kansen wegen, de optimale contracten convex zijn.
Dit verklaart het bestaan van optiecomponenten in de beloningspakketten van de
CEO. Ten tweede vind ik dat het loon van de werknemer stijgt in de CEO-beloning.
Deze relatie is bewezen, zowel binnen bedrijven als in de loop van de tijd. Ik schrijf
deze relatie toe aan de behindness aversie van arbeiders. Het resultaat suggereert
dat de vergoeding van de CEO voor de bedrijven extra kosten met zich mee kan
brengen. Ten derde laat ik zien dat bedrijven met lage loonverschillen tussen
CEO en werknemers te duur zijn op de aandelenmarkt. Het effect zou zelfs sterker
moeten zijn in de aanwezigheid van ongelijkheidsaverse investeerders. Deze bevin-
ding suggereert dat beleggers wel handel drijven in de loonongelijkheid en laten
zien dat de verkeerde prijsstelling voortkomt uit de overwaardering van aandelen
met een laag loonverschil.
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Chapter I
Introduction
The separation of ownership and control within companies causes agency problems. The top ex-
ecutives may increase their own benefits at the costs of shareholders. Executive compensation is
a tool to align the interests of shareholders and top executives. Studying executive compensation
is important to firms. On the one hand, an executive compensation package can give incentives
to executives, which directly affects the value of the firm. Not only the total amount but also the
structure of the compensation package plays a role in providing incentives. A well-designed execu-
tive compensation contract can provide high incentives at low costs. On the other hand, executive
compensation may also affect the decisions of other people, e.g., rank-and-file workers or investors.
The choices of these people can affect the firm value. Thus, the executive compensation package
indirectly affects the firm value.
The question then arises: what are the potential effects of the executive compensation packages on
the firm value and other factors? The answer to this question can reveal the direct and indirect
effects of CEO compensation packages on the firm value. It provides guidance to shareholders
for determining the CEO compensation. Previously literature provides abundant studies on the
optimal executive compensation contract and its effects on firm value. However, some phenomena
are not well explained by existing theories. For example, why stock option is a component of the
CEO compensation package? Why high CEO compensation causes strong opposition from rank-
and-file employees? Is the wage gap between CEO and workers correctly priced by investors in the
stock market? In my thesis, I dive into these questions. By incorporating behavioral theories into
the principal-agent problem, I give answers to the questions that are not answered by the models
introduced in the previous literature. The predictions are also supported by empirical tests.
In Chapter II, I discuss the shape of the optimal CEO compensation contract. A typical CEO
compensation package contains various components, e.g., fixed salary, bonus, shares, and stock
options. Whether stock options should be a part of the optimal CEO compensation package remains
debatable. If the CEO is risk-averse, her compensation packages should contain little fixed salary
and no options (Dittmann and Maug, 2007). Thus, alternative theories should be used to rationalize
the convexity of the CEO compensation contract.
I analyze a principal-agent model where the CEO is probability weighting. I approximate the
probability weighting function with parameters that shift the normal distribution. Using this ap-
proximation of the probability weighting function, I show that the optimal general contracts exhibit
convexity when firm performance is high. The model explains the considerable number of options in
the observed CEO compensation packages. To see whether my model fits the data well, I calibrate
the model with a wide range of parameters using the observed U.S. CEO compensation contracts. I
show that the probability weighting model performs better in explaining the shape of the observed
contracts than the traditional CRRA model.
The findings suggest that shareholders exploit probability weighting to provide cheap incentives that
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encourage CEOs to exert more effort. It provides an alternative theory for convexity in contracts.
My paper can act as a complement to the literature that tries to rationalize the positive options
pay in observed CEO contracts, e.g., the loss-aversion theory (Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt, 2010)
and risk-seeking incentive theory (Dittmann, Yu, and Zhang, 2017).
In Chapter III, we discuss the effect of CEO compensation on the employees’ pay, and the costs
associated with this. Some strongest opposition against high CEO compensation comes from normal
employees. This phenomenon cannot be rationalized with traditional theories because workers
should only care about their own wage. A potential explanation is that workers are behindness
averse, i.e., they suffer dis-utility from the wage gap between the CEO pay and their own pay.
This behavioral pattern increases the labor costs of the firm and influence the design of the CEO
compensation package.
We establish a principal-agent model where the principal designs a contract with two agents: the
CEO and the employee who is behindness averse. We find that the wage of the employee is increasing
in the CEO pay. This relationship is found, both across firms and across time, by statistical
testing on a matched CEO-employee panel data set for German firms. To alleviate the endogeneity
problems, we use the difference-in-difference setting. We find that the workers receive a significant
increase in wage when CEO compensation is made public for the first time. The implication of
the results is that the CEO compensation can affect the firm value indirectly. Envy of workers
associated with high CEO compensation brings extra costs to the firms.
The findings in this chapter contribute to the empirical studies which examine the relation between
CEO compensation and employee wages or productivity. This study is the first to show that there
exists a positive relation between CEO and rank-and-file employee pay and ascribes this relation to
the behindness aversion of employees.
In Chapter IV, we move further into the stock market and see how CEO-workers wage gap affects the
preferences and choices of investors. Despite populist anger towards high CEO compensation, the lit-
erature shows that the larger wage gap reflects higher CEO skills (Faleye, Reis, and Venkateswaran,
2013). However, this information is not correctly priced in the stock market. Mueller, Ouimet, and
Simintzi (2017) show that stocks with low pay inequality yield negative risk-adjusted returns.
We set up an asset pricing model with noise traders and short-sales constraints, in which the
optimal wage gap between the CEO and rank-and-file workers increases with managerial skills. In
equilibrium, we show that firms with low wage gaps should be overpriced, and the effect should be
even stronger in the presence of inequality-averse investors. To provide empirical evidence, we use
the data set of German firms. We find that a long-short portfolio of stocks with high and low wage
gaps yields positive and robust risk-adjusted returns.
The findings in this chapter confirm the previous literature that investors do trade on the pay
inequality and show that the mispricing comes from the overvaluation of low wage gap stocks. Our
findings also contribute to the recent literature that studies the impact of values on investor behavior.
Previous research shows that investors consider nonpecuniary factors in their trading strategies. The
findings in this chapter provide evidence that investors, much like the general public, dislike pay
inequality within firms.
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Other researchers also contribute to the completion of this thesis. Chapter III is a joint work with
Ingolf Dittmann and Christoph Schneider. Chapter IV is a joint work with Ingolf Dittmann and
Maurizio Montone. I would like to express my sincere thanks to them.
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Chapter II
Probability weighting CEOs and optimal
contracts
1. Introduction
In this paper, I analyze a principal-agent model where the CEO is probability weighting. I approxi-
mate the probability weighting and rank-dependent expected utility model (Quiggin, 1982; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992) with parameters that shift the shape of normal distributions. I show that,
using this approximation of the probability weighting function, the optimal general contracts exhibit
convexity when firm performance is high. This theoretically explains considerable option compo-
nents in CEO’s compensation packages. To see whether my model predicts the observed contracts
well, I calibrate the model with a wide range of parameters using the observed U.S. CEO contracts.
I show that the probability weighting model can explain the shape of the observed contracts better
than the normal constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) model without probability weighting.
A typical CEO compensation package includes multiple components, e.g., fixed salary, bonus, shares,
stock options, and other long-term incentives. The realization of incentive pay is contingent on the
future performance of the firms. Incentive pay not only incentivizes the CEOs to exert effort to
increase the stock prices of their firms, but also lead to a convex shape of the contracts. Whether
a convex contract structure is optimal remains debatable. Dittmann and Maug (2007) solve and
calibrate a standard principal-agent model with CRRA agents using observed U.S. CEO contracts.
Their solution is a general contract with concave shape. Therefore, Dittmann and Maug (2007) find
that neither positive option holding nor positive fixed salary is a part of the optimal scheme. A
reason for this concavity is driven by the decreasing marginal utility. It becomes inefficient to keep
the CEO pay sensitive to performance at high levels of firm value.
To explain the difference between observed contracts and theoretical optimal contracts, previous
literature adopts various behavioral models to rationalize the convexity of the CEO contracts.
Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010) incorporate the loss-aversion into the model. They find that the
loss-aversion model can better explain the positive option holding than the traditional CRRA model.
This is because the optimal contracts with the loss-aversion model are locally convex around the
reference point. Dittmann, Yu, and Zhang (2017) improve the CRRA model with the risk-seeking
incentives. They find that convex contracts can provide incentives to CEOs to implement projects
that are of higher risk. However, the analytical optimal general contracts in these models are only
locally convex. That means that when the firm performance becomes large enough, the theoretical
optimal general contract becomes concave. Thus, these models have explanatory power for the
shapes of the observed CEO compensation contracts only when firm performance is not too high.
Other behavioral models are also used to exploit the shape of the contracts for different types of
agents. Otto (2014) finds that when CEOs are optimistic, they tend to receive less options and
bonus.
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The paper by Spalt (2013), who shows that probability weighting model can explain the employee
stock option plan, can shed light on the convexity of CEO contracts. Although the study is on rank-
and-file employees, the idea can be borrowed to the study of CEO compensation contracts. The
probability weighting means that people tend to overweight the probability of the extreme outcomes.
It results in a different preference than traditional CRRA. When CEO exhibits probability weighting
in her preference, this trait can have two effects on her pay structure. The first effect is the income
effect. Options protect the CEO from bad outcomesand benefit the CEO from the good outcomes.
Therefore, probability weighting CEOs find options more valuable than its true expected value.
The firms can then substitute fixed salary with options of less expected value. This reduces the
expected costs for the firm. The second effect is the incentive effect. When a CEO attaches a higher
probability to very bad or very good outcomes, her marginal effort can then increase the probability
of extreme outcomes more than normal. Since she is protected in bad outcomes with options, she
tends to exert more efforts in her work. This effort increases the expected value of the firm.
In this paper, I suggest a new approach to explaining the convexity of the observed CEO compensa-
tion contracts. I introduce the probability weighting into the standard Hölmstrom (1979) principal-
agent model, and use the sigma-mu transformation (changing the shape of a normal distribution) to
approximate the probability weighting function. The paper makes three main contributions.
A potential challenge of incorporating the probability weighting feature into the model of CEO
compensation contract is that reaching the closed-form solution for the optimal contract is al-
most impossible. The probability weighting feature transforms the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the original distribution to a new one. This means that the new distribution cannot be
described by any typical distribution function. As the first contribution, I find that when stock
returns follow a normal distribution, probability weighting transforms the distribution into a sim-
ilar normal distribution with a different set of parameters, namely, σ and µ. This means that the
probability weighting feature can be approximated by transforming the parameters of the normal
distribution. For each probability weighting parameter δ, I can always find a set of parameters ηs
and ηm that transforms the original normal distribution into a new normal distribution with the
similar shape. This sigma-mu transformation helps me to reach the closed-form solution for the
optimal general contract.
I establish a principal-agent model with a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse and probability
weighting agent. After solving this model, I show that the optimal general contract is convex even
when firm performance is very high. The shape is different from the optimal contracts listed in
previous literature, which are concave when firm performance is high. The optimal contract of my
model gives theoretical evidence for the convexity of CEO compensation contracts.
After providing theoretical evidence for convex CEO compensation contracts, I continue with cali-
brating the probability weighting model with observed contracts of U.S. CEOs. I numerically solve
for the optimal piecewise linear contract using the observed contracts for a wide range of parameters,
i.e., combinations of ηs and ηm. The third contribution of my paper is the empirical evidence that
the probability weighting model performs better in predicting positive option holding and positive
fixed salary than the CRRA model.
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My finding suggests that shareholders exploit probability weighting to provide cheap incentives that
encourage CEOs to exert more effort. It provides an alternative theory for convexity in contracts.
My paper can act as a complement to the literature that tries to rationalize the existence of option
components in the observed CEO contracts, e.g., the loss-aversion theory (Dittmann, Maug, and
Spalt, 2010) and risk-seeking incentive theory (Dittmann, Yu, and Zhang, 2017).
My results can also be linked to a wide range of behavioral finance literature on CEO compensation.
For example, the probability weighting can be linked with CEO overconfidence. The effect of prob-
ability weighting on the normal distribution is equivalent to transforming the mean and volatility
to higher values. This is related to the theories on overconfidence. Previous literature defines that
a manager is “optimistic” if she thinks that the future average performance is higher than the true
mean. Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that overconfident CEOs tend to postpone the exercising of
their options. Optimism can be linked to a positive ηm in my paper. On the other hand, a manager
is mis-calibrated or overprecise if she underestimates the volatility of the future return (Ben-David,
Graham, and Harvey, 2013). This effect is similar to an ηs < 1 in my paper. My results suggest that
probability weighting effect may exceed the mis-calibration effect in shaping the CEO compensation
contracts.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, the sigma-mu transformation func-
tion, and the optimal general contract. Sections 3 introduces the calibration strategy. Section 4
summarizes the data set that is used for the calibration. Section 5 provides the empirical results of
the calibration. Section 6 concludes.
2. Model
The baseline model is the principal-agent model introduced by Hölmstrom (1979) with the hidden
efforts. The principal (firm) is risk-neutral while the agent (CEO) is risk-averse. There are two stages
in the model: the starting stage at time 0, and the paying stage at time T . At time 0, the contract is
signed between the firm and the CEO. According to the contract, the CEO receives certain payment
from the firm at time T . The payment WT at time T is contingent on the performance of the firm
at time T . The CEO can choose the effort level e that will influence the firm’s intrinsic value.
2.1 Production function
P0 is the intrinsic value of the firm at time 0. It can be seen as the expected discounted future
cash flow of the firm evaluated at the stock market. The intrinsic value is affected by the effort
level e of the CEO. When CEO exerts more effort, the income from future operation increases and
the firm value P0 increases. The stock return of the firm at time T follows a normal distribution,
which means that the future value of the firm follows the log-normal distribution. The firm value
at time T is equal to the firm value at time 0 multiplied by a stochastic factor that follows the
log-normal distribution. Denote rf as the risk-free rate, d as the dividend rate, σ2 as the yearly
volatility during between time 0 and time T . The production function of the firm at a fixed effort
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level e is given by:
P˜T =P0 (e) exp
{
(rf − d)T − σ
2
2
T + u˜σ
√
T
}
= exp {µ+ u˜σ} , (1)
where u˜ ∼ N (0, 1), and µ = lnP0 (e) + (rf − d)T − σ22 T . The firm value at time 0 should be the
principal’s unconditional expected long-term firm value P˜T discounted by the risk-free rate r and
the dividend rate d. That is, P0(e) = E
[
exp {− (rf − d)T} P˜T
]
. Throughout this paper, I put a
“tilde” on all random variables, e.g., P˜T , to distinguish them from normal variables1.
2.2 Utility function
I assume throughout the paper that the principal (shareholder) is risk-neutral, while the agent
(CEO) is risk-averse. I use the CRRA utility function2 for the CEO, that is:
V (W ) =
W
1−γ−1
1−γ , if γ 6= 1
ln(W ), if γ = 1,
(2)
where W is the wealth of the CEO at the time of evaluation. The aggregated utility function is the
utility derived from the personal wealth deducted by the loss of utility due to the cost of efforts.
That is:
U(W ) = V (W )− C(e) =
W
1−γ−1
1−γ − C(e), if γ 6= 1
ln(W )− C(e), if γ = 1,
where C(e) is the cost function of the effort. The functional form is not explicitly known, but is
increasing and convex, i.e., dC(e)de > 0 and
d2C(e)
de2
> 0.
2.3 Principal-agent problem
I extend the Hölmstrom (1979) principal-agent model by introducing the probability weighting
feature of the CEO. Namely, she assigns the original probability with decision weights. This feature
means that firm and the CEO have different views towards future outcomes. I assume that the
shareholders perceive the correct probability distribution of firm performance, but the CEO has
a biased, subjective probability distribution due to probability weighting. Therefore, The CEO
attaches a probability, different from that of shareholders, to each possible future outcome.
I use E to stand for the expectation of the principal, and use EA to stand for the subjective
1The differentiation between random variable and a normal variable is valuable when I want to define cumulative
probability distribution function. For example, Pr
{
P˜T 6 PT
}
= F (PT ). It causes no misunderstanding.
2The original CRRA utility function for the case when γ = 1 is V (W ) = W
1−γ−1
1−γ . I use V (W ) =
W1−γ
1−γ in
calibration for numerical simplicity. It does not affect the calibration result since it is monotonicity transformation.
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expectation of the agent. The principal-agent problem is formulated as follows:
max
WT (·),e
E
[
P˜T −WT (PT ) | e
]
(3)
s.t. EA
[
V
(
WT
(
P˜T
))
| e
]
− C (e) > U (4)
e ∈ arg max
e˜
{
EA
[
V
(
WT
(
P˜T
))
| e˜
]
− C (e˜)− U
}
(5)
where WT is the personal wealth at time T , which is determined by the stock performance P˜T .
The wealth of the agent at time T is the sum of the personal initial wealth ω0 exp{rT} and the
compensation piT . U is the reservation utility of the outside option for the CEO. Expression (3) is the
objective function of the principal. Expression (5) is the CEOs’ incentive compatibility constraint,
which can be re-written in the form of first-order condition ∂∂eEA
[
V (WT (P˜T )) | e
]
= ddeC(e).
To solve this principal-agent problem, a two-step method can be adopted. In the first step, we
fixed the effort level e to every possible value, and solve the principal-agent problem for the optimal
wealth structure WT (·) . In the second step, we search for the effort level that generate the highest
profit. Because I am more interested in the pay structure WT , I particularly focus on the first
step. For a given effort level e, the optimal wealth structure WT (·) can be calculated by solving
the equivalent cost-minimizing program:
min
WT (·)
E
[
WT
(
P˜T
)
| e
]
(6)
s.t. EA
[
V (WT (P˜T )) | e
]
− C(e) > U (7)
∂
∂e
EA
[
V (WT (P˜T )) | e
]
=
d
de
C(e) (8)
2.4 Generalized optimal contract
In this subsection, I solve the principal-agent problem (6) to (8). Denote the “true” cumulative
distribution function as F (·). This is the belief of the firm. The CEO transforms the objective
distribution function into the subjective distribution function by a probability transformation func-
tion Ψ (·). To simplify the calulation, I denote the subjective cumulative distribution function after
transformation as G (·). I use G (PT | e) to replace Ψ (F (PT | e)) in the equations. The principal-
agent problem (6) to (8) can be re-written in the integral form as follows:
min
WT (·)
∫ ∞
0
WT (PT ) dF (PT | e)
s.t.
∫ ∞
0
V [WT (PT )] dG (PT | e)− C (e) > U
d
de
[∫ ∞
0
V [WT (PT )] dG (PT | e)− C (e)
]
= 0 (9)
where F (·) is the objective probability distribution of the future stock price, i.e., F (PT | e) =
Pr
{
P˜T 6 PT | e
}
. Ψ (·) is the general probability transformation function. Because the stock price
is log-normally distributed, the integral domain is from 0 to infinity.
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Equation (9) can be written as:
d
de
[∫ ∞
0
V [WT (PT )] g (PT | e) dPT − C (e)
]
= 0
=⇒
∫ ∞
0
V [WT (PT )] ge (PT | e) dPT − C ′ (e) = 0,
where ge (PT | e) = ddeg (PT | e).
Construct the Lagrangian:
L =
∫ ∞
0
WT (PT ) f (PT | e) dPT − λo
[∫ ∞
0
V (WT (PT )) g (PT | e) dPT − C (e)− U
]
− λe
[∫ ∞
0
V (WT (PT )) ge (PT | e) dPT − C ′ (e)
]
Take the first order derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to the wealth WT at every point of
PT , we have:
0 =
dL
dWT (·) =f (PT | e)− λoV
′ (WT (PT )) g (PT | e)− λeV ′ (WT (PT )) ge (PT | e)
Rearrange it:
{
V ′ (WT (PT ))
}−1
=λo
g (PT | e)
f (PT | e) + λe
ge (PT | e)
f (PT | e) (10)
=
g (PT | e)
f (PT | e)
[
λo + λe
ge (PT | e)
g (PT | e)
]
(11)
Assume the utility function of CEO is CRRA, i.e., V ′ (WT (PT )) = (WT (PT ))−1. So the wealth of
the CEO at time T has the following structure,
WT (PT ) =
{
g (PT )
f (PT )
[
λo + λe
ge (PT | e)
g (PT | e)
]}1/γ
. (12)
2.5 Probability-weighting and sigma-mu transformation
To further solve the generalized optimal contract in Equation (12), I need to assume the explicit
functional form of Ψ (·). I use the weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
and the rank-dependent expected utility proposed by Quiggin (1982). In this paper, I do not use
the cumulative prospect theory. I use CRRA utility function instead of the loss-aversion utility
function. The reason is that loss-aversion alone have explanatory power in explaining the convexity
of the observed contracts in the central region Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010). I exclude loss
aversion from my model to see whether probability weighting can also explain the convexity of the
observed contracts.
If the CEO is probability weighting, he transforms the cumulative probability with a weighting func-
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tion. In other words, he attaches extreme outcomes with higher decision weight. The parametrized
form of weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is:
Ψpw(p) =
pδ(
pδ + (1− p)δ
)1/δ , (13)
where p is the original cumulative probability and δ is the parameter. I use this function in my
model as the probability weighting function that transforms the original cumulative probabilities
into decision weights when calculating expected utility. The green dotted curve in Figure 1 shows
the probability weighting function when δ is arbitrarily set to 0.6. The big curvature at the two
ends means an exaggeration of the probability of extreme outcomes. The relatively flat curve at
the middle part shows that the agent underestimate the probability of the middle outcomes. In
my model, the CEO transforms the original cumulative distribution function J (x) to a new cumu-
lative distribution function K (x) with the probability weighting function Ψpw (·). The subjective
cumulative distribution function K (x) is
K(x) = Ψpw(J(x)) =
J (x)δ(
J (x)δ + (1− J (x))δ
)1/δ .
The probability weighting is parametrized with a single parameter δ in Equation (13). However,
using parametrization with δ may cause inconvenience if I want to have an closed-form solution for
the optimal contract described in Equation (12). To be more specific, if the original distribution
function J (·) describes a normal distribution, after transformed by probability weighting function
Ψpw (J (x)), the new distribution function K (·) cannot be described by any popular or known
distribution function. This not only causes difficulty in theoretical analysis, but brings troubles in
empirical calibration. To solve this problem, I consider other probability transformation functions
with similar properties as the probability weighting function Ψpw(·).
One solution is to assume that the new distribution after being transformed is still a normal distri-
bution. That is to say that a function Ψsm (·) transforms the original normal distribution to a new
normal distribution. And the function Ψsm (·) is similar in shape with the probability weighting
function Ψpw (·). I call the function Ψsm (·) as “sigma-mu transformation”. Namely, only the mean
and variance of the objective distribution is changed.
Using the sigma-mu transformation as an alternative to the probability weighting function has three
advantages. First, the sigma-mu transformation function Ψsm (·) can transform normal distribution
to another normal distribution, which exhibits similar properties with the probability weighting
function. The red dashed curve in Figure 1 shows the transformation of normal distributions by
changing mean and variance. For certain sigma and mu, the sigma-mu transformation function
has the similar shape of a typical probability weighting function: It is concave and convex at
the two ends. It exhibits insensitivity in the central region. As the second advantage, after the
CEO applies probability weighting using sigma-mu transformation, the subjective stock price still
follows the normal distribution. Thus, the probability density function of the new distribution
can be explicitly written, which results in a closed-form solution for the analytical optimal general
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contract. Third, using sigma-mu transformation simplifies the empirical calibration of the model
because I do not need to numerically calculate the PDF of the new distribution after adopting the
probability weighting function Ψpw (·).
Now, I show how to sigma-mu transformation to approximate the probability weighting function.
J (x) is the cumulative distribution function of the random variable X˜ ∼ N (µ, σ2), which describes
the objective distribution of the stock return. The true mean is µ and the true variance is σ2.
So J (x) = Φ
(x−µ
σ
)
and J (p) = σΦ−1 (p) + µ, where Φ (·) is the CDF of the standard normal
distribution. K(y) is the cumulative distribution function of the random variable of Y˜ ∼ N (µA, σ2A),
which describes the agent’s subjective distribution of the future return. So J (y) = Φ
(
y−µA
σA
)
.
Because the true CDF, J (x), is transformed to a the subjective CDF, K (x), using the sigma-mu
transformation function Ψsm (·), we have,
Ψsm (J (x)) = K (x)
=⇒ Ψsm (J (x)) = K
(
J−1(J(x))
)
=⇒ Ψsm (J (x)) = Φ
(
σΦ−1 (J (x)) + µ− µA
σA
)
=⇒ Ψsm (J (x)) = Φ
(
σ
σA
Φ−1 (J (x)) +
µ− µA
σA
)
=⇒ Ψsm (p) = Φ
(
σ
σA
Φ−1 (p) +
µ− µA
σA
)
=⇒ Ψsm (p) = Φ
(
Φ−1 (p)− µA−µσ
σA
σ
)
To ensure that the transformation function Ψsm (·) has a fixed functional form, σAσ and µ−µAσA need
to be constant. Denote ηs =
σA
σ
ηm =
µA−µ
σ
.
The sigma-mu transformation transfer the subjective normal distribution to the agent’s objective
normal distribution by changing the parameters σ and µ:σA = ηsσµA = µ+ ηmσ (14)
In another words, if a random variable follows normal distribution X˜ ∼ N (µ, σ2), then the new
random variable after the sigma-mu transformation also follows normal distribution. The new
random variable is: Y˜ = ηsX˜ + µ − ηsµ + ηmσ, and Y˜ ∼ N
(
µ+ ηmσ, η
2
sσ
2
)
. I make a compari-
son between the probability weighting function Ψpw (·) and the sigma-mu transformation function
Ψsm (·). The yellow dotted curve in Figure 1 is the sigma-mu transformation function when ηs is
arbitrarily set to 1.5 and ηm is set to 0.3. It has similar properties with the probability weighting
function with δ = 0.6 shown by the green dotted curve. They are both curved at the two ends and
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Figure 1: The approximation of arbitrary probability weighting function
This figure shows the shape of the probability-weighting function in green dashed curve and the sigma-
mu transformation function in yellow dashed curve. The x-axis is the original cumulative probability of
the normal distribution, and the y-axis is the transformed cumulative probability. δ = 0.6, ηs = 1.5, and
ηm = 0.3.
relatively flat in the middle.
To approximate the probability weighting function using sigma-mu transformation, I minimize the
squared distance between the two curves, which is depicted in the Figure 1 as the red shadow. In
other words, when the probability weighting is parameterized by a given parameter δ, I search for
two parameters ηs and ηm that gives the similar shape.
I define the distance metrics as the squared distance between the probability weighting function
and the sigma-mu transformation function as:
E
[
(ψpm(P )− ψsm(P ))2
]
=
∫ 1
0
(ψpm(P )− ψsm(P ))2 dP (15)
I numerically search for the optimal pair of (ηs,ηm) that minimizes distance metrics defined in
Equation (15). For δ = 0.6, the optimal solution is that ηs = 1.7877 and ηm = 0.3576. Figure 2
shows the shape of the probability-weighting function with δ = 0.6 as the green dashed curve, and
the shape of the sigma-mu transformation function with optimized parameters as the yellow dashed
curve. We can see that the curves are very close to each other.
Table 1 shows the optimized pairs of (ηs,ηm) and the squared difference, corresponding to different
δ. δ takes values from 0.3 to 0.9. When δ is close to 1, the curve of the probability weighting tends
to be a straight line, so ηs is close to 1 and ηm is close to 0. When δ is smaller, the curvation of the
probability weighting is larger. There are larger distortion of the probability at the two ends. Both
ηs and ηm are decreasing in δ.
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Figure 2: The optimal approximation of the probability weighting function
This figure shows the shape of the probability-weighting function in green dashed curve with δ = 0.6, and the
sigma-mu transformation function in yellow dashed curve with ηs = 1.7877 and ηm = 0.3576. The x-axis is
the original cumulative probability of the normal distribution, and the y-axis is the transformed cumulative
probability.
Table 1: Approximation of probability weighting using ηs and ηm
This table shows the optimized pairs of (ηs,ηm), as well as the squared difference, corresponding to different
δ. δ takes values from 0.3 to 0.9. The (ηs,ηm) are optimized by minimizing the squared difference metrics
defined in Equation (15).
θ ηs ηm squared difference
0.3 3.86119 3.58262 0.00088
0.4 2.88477 1.65702 0.00071
0.5 2.23307 0.77908 0.00033
0.6 1.78775 0.35764 0.00011
0.7 1.47895 0.15139 0.00003
0.8 1.26259 0.05263 0.00001
0.9 1.10953 0.01061 0.00000
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2.6 Optimal general contract with sigma-mu transformation
After using sigma-mu transformation to approximate probability-weighting function, I derive the
closed form for the optimal general contract in Equation (12). The stock price of the firm follows
log-normal distribution:
P˜T ∼ lnN
(
µ (e) , σ2T
)
,
where µ (e) = lnP0 (e) + (r − d)T − σ22 T . Thus, the objective probability density functions of P˜T
is defined as:
f (PT | e) = 1
PT
√
2piσ2T
exp
[
−(lnPT − µ (e))
2
2σ2T
]
.
The parameters of the objective future stock price are transformed according to the sigma-mu
transformation, i.e., Equation (14). So the subjective the future stock price is:
P˜AT = exp
{
σA
√
T u˜+ µA (e)
}
= exp
{
ηsσ
√
T u˜+ µ (e) + ηmσ
√
T
}
= exp
{
σ
√
T (ηsu˜+ ηm) + µ (e)
}
= exp
{
σ
√
T v˜ + µ (e)
}
=P0 (e) exp
{
(r + d)T − σ
2
2
T + v˜σ
√
T
}
where u˜ ∼ N (0, 1), and v˜ ∼ N (ηm, η2s). The agent’s subjective P˜AT is equal to the firm value at time
0 multiplied by a different stochastic factor that follows the log-normal distribution. The CEO’s
subjective probability density function of P˜T can be written as:
g (PT | e) = 1
PT
√
2piσ2AT
exp
[
−(lnPT − µA (e))
2
2σ2AT
]
,
where µA (e) and σA (e) are calculated by Equation (14). The partial derivative of g (PT | e) with
respect to e is:
ge (PT | e) = 1
PT
√
2piσ2AT
exp
[
−(lnPT − µA (e))
2
2σ2AT
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
g(PT |e)
(
− 2
2σ2AT
(lnPT − µA (e))
)(
−dµA (e)
de
)
(16)
= g (PT | e)
(
lnPT − µA (e)
σ2AT
) d(lnP0(e) + (rf − d)T − σ22 T + ηmσ√T)
de
(17)
= g (PT | e)
(
lnPT − µA (e)
σ2AT
)(
dP0 (e) /de
P0 (e)
)
. (18)
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So the ratio between ge (PT | e) and ge (PT | e) is,
ge (PT | e)
g (PT | e) =
lnPT − µA (e)
σ2AT
· P
′
0 (e)
P0 (e)
(19)
The ratio between g(PT | e) and f(PT | e) is:
g(PT | e)
f(PT | e) =
PT
√
2piσ2T
PT
√
2piσ2AT
exp
[
(lnPT − µ)2
2σ2T
− (lnPT − µA)
2
2σ2AT
]
=
σ
σA
exp
[
(lnPT − µ)2
2σ2T
− (lnPT − µA)
2
2σ2AT
]
=
σ
σA
exp
[(
1
2σ2T
− 1
2σ2AT
)
(lnPT )
2 +
(
µA
σ2AT
− µ
σ2T
)
lnPT +
(
µ2
2σ2T
− µ
2
A
2σ2AT
)]
(20)
Insert Equation (19) and Equation (20) into the generalized optimal contract, i.e., Equation (12):
WT (PT ) =
{
g (PT )
f (PT )
[
λo + λe
ge (PT | e)
g (PT | e)
]}1/γ
=
{
σ
σA
exp
[
β2 (lnPT )
2 + β1 lnPT + β0
] [
λo + λe
lnPT − µA (e)
σ2AT
· P
′
0 (e)
P0 (e)
]}1/γ
=
{
σ
σA
exp
[
β2 (lnPT )
2 + β1 lnPT + β0
] [
λe
P ′0 (e)
σ2ATP0 (e)
lnPT + λo − λe P
′
0 (e)
σ2ATP0 (e)
µA (e)
]}1/γ
=
[
exp
(
β2 (lnPT )
2 + β1 lnPT + β0
)
(α1 lnPT + α0)
]1/γ
,
where 
α0 =
σ
σA
[
λo − λe P
′
0(e)
σ2ATP0(e)
µA (e)
]
α1 =
σ
σA
λe
P ′0(e)
σ2ATP0(e)
β0 =
µ2
2σ2T
− µ2A
2σ2AT
β1 =
µA
σ2AT
− µ
σ2T
β2 =
1
2σ2T
− 1
2σ2AT
Proposition 1 The optimal contract that solves the principal-agent problem (6) to (8) given CRRA
utility (Equation (2)) and an approximation to the probability weighting feature (Equation (14)) has
the following shape:
WT (PT ) =

[
exp
{
β2 (lnPT )
2 + β1 lnPT + β0
}
(α1 lnPT + α0)
]1/γ
if lnPT > −α0α1
0 if lnPT 6 −α0α1
(21)
The optimal general contract (Equation (21)) is increasing and convex when PT is large. To see
this, I show that limPT→∞
dWT (PT )
dPT
= ∞ for all of the CRRA parameters. The proof for this
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Figure 3: Shapes of contracts for different models
This figure compares the shapes of analytical optimal general contracts in different models. The red dashed
curve shows the optimal contract when CEO has CRRA utility but is not probability weighting. The blue
curve shows the optimal contract when CEO has both CRRA utility and is probability weighting. The x-axis
is the firm performance, and the y-axis is the CEO wealth at the time T .
feature is in Appendix A. An intuition for the convexity of the contract for large PT is that the
term exp
{
β2 (lnPT )
2 + β1 lnPT + β0
}
is not only convex when PT is large, but also dominates the
term (α1 lnPT + α0) in its power. Dittmann and Maug (2007) show that the optimal contract for
the CRRA model has the shape WT (PT ) = (α1 lnPT + α0)1/γ .3 Thus, the exponential component
is the key feature why my model can predict a convex contract shape of the contract. Notably,
when lnPT 6 −α0α1 , the contract should take value 0 because the term under the power 1/γ is
non-positive.
Figure 3 compares the shapes of optimal general contracts in different models. The red dashed curve
shows the optimal contract when CEO has CRRA utility but is not probability weighting. The blue
curve shows the optimal contract when CEO has both CRRA utility and is probability weighting.
We can see that the optimal contract for the CRRA model is globally concave and it becomes flat for
high performance. This cannot explain the observed positive option grants. However, the optimal
contract for the probability weighting model is convex when performance is high. This well explains
the positive option holding in observed CEO compensation contracts.
3. Calibration strategy
In the last section, I show that the optimal general contract features convexity when CEO is prob-
ability weighting. This provides theoretical evidence for the existence of positive options in CEO
3To be more specific, Dittmann and Maug (2007) show that the optimal general contract for CRRA model is:
WT (PT ) =
{
(α1 lnPT + α0)
1/γ if lnPT > −α0α1
0 if lnPT 6 −α0α1
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compensation. I then calibrate this model with observed CEO contracts in the U.S. firms so see
whether my model works empirically. This section introduces the methods for model calibration
with the observed data sets. The idea behind the calibration is as follows. If the observed contract is
optimal, then it must provide an incentive for the CEO to choose the optimal effort level e∗. Using
this assumption, I numerically solve the formulae (6) to (8) to search for a contract which provide
the same incentive to the CEO to choose the optimal e∗, but generates lower expected cost for the
shareholders. If the observed contract is optimal, then the new contract searched by the principal-
agent problem should generate similar shape with the observed contract. Dittmann and Maug
(2007) find that when the CEO has CRRA utility, the optimal piecewise linear contracts predict
no option holding and negative fixed salary. In this paper, when CEOs are probability weighting,
the optimal piecewise linear contracts should contain positive option holding and positive fixed
salary.
3.1 Pay-performance sensitivity
Because the production function P0(e) and the cost function C(e) are not known. I need to first
re-write the incentive constraint in another form. Equation (8) can be re-written as:
EA
dV
(
W˜T
)
dW˜T
· dW˜T
dP˜T
· dP˜T
dP0
· dP0
de

e=e∗
=
[
dC (e)
de
]
e=e∗
=⇒ EA
dV
(
W˜T
)
dW˜T
· dW˜T
dP˜T
· dP˜T
dP0

e=e∗
=
[
dC (e)
de
/
dP0
de
]
e=e∗
≡ UPPS
Because dP0de and
dC(e)
de have fixed values given the certain effort level e
∗, the expression
EA
dV
(
W˜T
)
dW˜T
· dW˜T
dP˜T
· dP˜T
dP0

should be constant if the new contract provides the same effort incentive. I denote this as utility-
adjusted pay-performance sensitivity (UPPS), which measures how the utility of CEO is reacted to
the firm’s intrinsic value. Using the analogy of option, this term can also be denoted as the Delta
of the contract.
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3.2 Calibration model
I restrict myself to the piecewise linear contract. The model corresponding to the principal-agent
problem (6) to (8) for my calibration can be formulated as:
min
φ,ns,no
E
[
WT
(
P˜T | φ, ns, no
)]
(22)
s.t. EA
[
V
(
WT
(
P˜T | φ, ns, no
))]
> EA
[
V
(
W oT
(
P˜T | φo, nos, noo
))]
(23)
UPPS
[
WT
(
P˜T | φ, ns, no
)]
> UPPS
[
W oT
(
P˜T | φo, nos, noo
)]
(24)
where W oT stands for the observed piece-wise contract which is determined by fixed salary φ
o,
number of share holding nos, number of option holding noo. The optimal piecewise linear contract
should provide at least the same utility-adjusted pay-performance sensitivity. It should also provide
at least the same expected utility as the observed contract so that the CEO will be willing to accept
the contract.
To numerically solve the principal-agent problem, Equations (22) to (24) should be written in the
integral forms. The wealth of the CEO at the time T for a piecewise linear contract is:
W˜T =(φ+ ω0)e
rT + nse
dT P˜T + no max
{
P˜T −K, 0
}
. (25)
The objective function (22) is the expected costs of the contract, which is evaluated with the
shareholders’ preference. It can be written in the integral form as
E
[
WT
(
P˜T | φ, ns, no
)]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
WTdF (u) ,
where F (u) is the CDF for random variable u˜ ∼ N (0, 1).
The expected utility of the CEO in the participation constraint (23) can be written in the integral
form as
EA
[
V
(
WT
(
P˜T | φ, ns, no
))]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
W 1−γT
1− γ dG (v) ,
where G (v) is the CDF for random variable v˜ ∼ N (ηm, η2s), i.e., the distribution after approxima-
tion to probability weighting.
To numerically calculate the utility-adjusted pay-performance sensitivity, I need to find explicit
expressions for the derivatives dV (W˜T )
dW˜T
, dW˜T
dP˜T
and dP˜TdP0 . The utility function of the CEO is V (WT ) =
W 1−γT
1−γ , so V
′ (WT ) =
dV (WT )
dWT
= W−γT . According to Equation (25), the derivation of W˜T w.r.t. P˜T
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is
dW˜T
dP˜T
=nse
dT + noIP˜T>K .
Since P˜T = P0 exp
{(
rf − d− σ22
)
T + v˜σ
√
T
}
, the derivation of P˜T w.r.t P0 is
dP˜T
dP0
= exp
{(
rf − d− σ
2
2
)
T + v˜σ
√
T
}
.
Now I have the the functional forms of the derivatives dV (W˜T )
dW˜T
, dW˜T
dP˜T
and dP˜TdP0 . Thus, the Utility-
adjusted pay-performance sensitivity in the incentive constraint (Equation (24)) can be written
as:
UPPS =EA
dV
(
W˜T
)
dP0
 = EA
dV
(
W˜T
)
dW˜T
· dW˜T
dP˜T
· dP˜T
dP0

=
∫ ∞
−∞
W−γT
[
nse
dT + noIPT>K
]
exp
{(
rf − d− σ
2
2
)
T + vσ
√
T
}
dG (v) .
3.3 Numerical solution
The calibration model is numerically solved by computer programs. For each observed CEO con-
tract, the input variables that need to be optimized are fixed salary, share holding, and option
holding, e.g., (φo, nos, noo). The parameters are strike price, maturity time, stock volatility and CEO
personal wealth, namely the tuple (Ko, T o, σo, ωo0). The notation o indicates the observed contracts.
The programs search for the optimal set of (φ, ns, no) that minimums the value of Equation (22)
with the constraints of Equations (23) and (24). Moreover, there are also bounds for the variables.
First, φ is set to be larger than minus CEO personal wealth ω0. This means that the firm can “pun-
ish” the CEO when the firm performance is bad, but still ensures that the CEO’s wealth at time
T will not be negative. Due to the non-negativity of the CEO’s final wealth, the utility function
of the CEO will always be defined. Second, ns is set to be between 0 and 1. It means that the
stocks held by the CEO cannot exceed the total shares outstanding of the firm. Third, no is set to
be non-negative, which means that the CEO cannot “sell” stock options of her own firm.
Because the integration is done numerically, the domain cannot be spanned to −∞ and ∞. In
my program, the integration domain is between -20 and 20. For a random variable following
standard normal distribution, the probability that it goes beyond the range (−20, 20) is smaller
than 5.51 × 10−89. So the error is very small. Because the utility function of the CEO takes
different functional forms when γ 6= 1 and when γ = 1, I use γ = 1.01 in the calibration so that the
function V (WT ) =
W 1−γT
1−γ are always used.
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4. Data
The data set for observed CEO compensation contracts is constructed on the basis of the compen-
sation databases from Execucomp. I select the year 2012 as the year of interest. This year provides
the biggest number of observations in the sample for my calibration. The selection of the observed
contracts follows several criteria. First of all, the executive must show up as the CEO in 2012.
Second, the CEO should work in the same firm for the full fiscal years of 2011 and 2012. Third, the
CEO should show up in the data set from the year 2007. This criterion is used for calculating the
personal wealth of the CEO. It does not require that the CEO work in the same firm during the
period.
In this paper, observed CEO pay packages are summarized as a stylized contract that consists of
three component: fixed pay, stock, and options. This stylized compensation contract has been used
in previous literature, e.g., (Dittmann and Maug, 2007; Dittmann, Yu, and Zhang, 2017). In this
three-component view, a CEO contract has a component that is not affected by firm performance,
a component that is highly correlated with firm performance, and a component that is correlated
with firm performance only when performance exceeds certain thresholds. The stylized CEO com-
pensation contract summarizes the complicated pay package and relates CEO wealth, to only to,
the stock price of the firm. This simplifies my calculation. Actual CEO compensation is more
complicated. For example, Bizjak, Kalpathy, Li, and Young (2017) shows that in 2012, 37.2% of
firms in their sample use relative performance awards. The award paid to CEO is based on firm
performance relative to peer companies. In this paper, I do not include relative performance awards
into stylized CEO compensation contract for two reasons. First, relative performance awards relate
CEO compensation to both firm performance and peer performance. This complicates the wealth
function and brings difficulties to solving the non-linear programming. Second, in this paper, I
mainly focus on option grants and convexity of CEO compensation contracts. Other long-term
incentive packages are of second-order importance and are not considered in the model.
The fixed salary φ of the CEO is composed of base salary, annual bonus, non-equity incentive
compensation, changes in pension provision, and other compensation. The stock holding ns is the
percent of the non-option shares held by the CEO in 2012. Data on the option holding is obtained
from the Outstanding Equity Awards database. This database records all stock option granted
after 2006 when the new format was adopted. Each CEO may receive multiple options historically.
These options have different numbers n0, strike prices K, and time to maturity T . That means, in
the year 2012, the CEO hold a bunch of a combination of many (ni0,Ki, T i). To calibrate for the
optimal contract, I need to find an option that is representative of all options held by the CEO.
Thus, I numerically solve for (K,T ) from the equation system
noBS(P0,K, T, σ, rf ) =
∑
i n
i
oBS(P0,K
i, 0.7T i, σ, rf )
no∆(P0,K, T, σ, rf ) =
∑
i n
i
o∆(P0,K
i, 0.7T i, σ, rf ),
n0 =
∑
i n
i
o
(26)
for the representative option (n0,K, T ). The first equation in equation system (26) indicates that
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the Black-Scholes value of the representative option should be equal to the aggregated Black-Scholes
value of all options currently held by the CEO. The second equation indicates that the Delta value
of the representative option should be equal to the aggregated Delta value of all options historically
received. The third equation indicates that the number of the representative option should be
equal to the total number of the options held by the CEO. The time to maturity is multiplied by
0.7 because the CEOs usually exercises his options before the expiration date (Huddart and Lang,
1996; Carpenter, 1998)4. The Black-Scholes value (BS) and the Delta value (∆) are defined as
follows.
BS = N (d1)P0 −N (d2)Ke−r(T )
∆ =
∂BS
∂P0
= N(d1),
where d1 = 1σ√T
[
ln
(
P0
K
)
+
(
r + σ
2
2
)
T
]
and d2 = d1 − σ
√
T . N (·) is the cumulative normal
distribution function.
For each CEO, the equation system (26) is solved once. The number of options n0 is rescaled by
the total outstanding shares of the firm so that it is expressed as a percentage of the firm value.
The strike price is multiplied by the total outstanding shares of the firm so that it is comparable to
the firm value.
The personal wealth of the CEO is calculated as the sum of the five-year historical fixed salary
income received by the CEO from 2007 to 2011, assuming that the CEO did not consume any
income received in this period. The tax rate is set to be 42%. The firm value P0 is the market value
of the firm on the last trading date of 2012. The annual standard deviation of the stock return
σ is calculated using the stock market performance of the firm in the year 2009, 2010 and 2011.
The risk-free rate is the 5-year bond of the US government on the last trading date of 2012. The
dividend rate d is the dividend per share of the firm in 2011 obtained from Compustat.
Table 2, Panel A summarizes the main variables in the sample that will be used in the calibration.
The sample consists of 622 U.S. CEOs contracts in the year 2012. These CEOs are those who work
in the same firm for two years and appear in the database for consecutive five years. The mean
firm value is 7,656 million dollars. The mean fixed salary is 3.15 million dollars. A CEO holds on
average 1.72% of the firm total shares. The average option holding counts for 0.87% of the firm
value. The average age of the CEOs is 57. To see whether these CEOs are representative, Panel B
summarizes the sample of 1385 U.S. CEOs appeared in the Compustat database. These CEOs are
not in the calibration either because they are not in the same firm for two years, or because they
are not in the database from 2007. For these CEOs, representative options and personal wealth are
not calculated. We can see that a CEO in the calibration sample holds on average 1.40% of the
firm’s total shares and 0.7% of the options. The numbers are close to the representative sample for
calibration. Moreover, the medians of the variables in the calibration sample are very close to the
medians of the variables in the bigger sample. This indicates that my calibration sample is a good
representative of all CEO contracts in that year.
4In the next version, I will calculate for each CEO how advanced they historically exercise their options in that
firm. It is the better measurement of the observed pay timing.
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Table 2: Summary statistics: sample of 622 U.S. CEOs
This table summarizes the variables. Panel A summarizes the variables for the sample of 622 U.S. CEOs
contracts in the year 2012 that is used in the calibration. Panel B summarizes the variables for the sample
of all 1386 U.S. CEOs contracts in the year 2012.
Panel A: sample of 622 U.S. CEOs contracts
Variable Description Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
P0 Firm value ($m) 622 7656.00 1924.54 18735.94 27.77 220107.40
φ Fixed salary ($m) 622 3.15 2.01 3.66 0.08 37.72
ns Shares held (%) 622 1.72 0.47 4.23 0.00 59.93
no Options held (%) 622 0.87 0.57 0.98 0.00 8.64
T Time to maturity 622 3.74 3.53 1.58 0.24 20.45
ω0 Personal wealth ($m) 622 6.46 4.88 6.26 0.00 72.51
σ Yearly standard deviation 622 0.49 0.47 0.18 0.17 1.79
Age Age of the CEO 622 57.39 57.00 6.62 39.00 85.00
Panel B: Sample of 1386 U.S. CEOs contracts in 2012
Variable Description Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
P0 Firm value ($m) 1,386 8581.04 1929.81 22384.49 1.89 233999.40
φ Fixed salary ($m) 1,386 2.99 2.02 3.24 0 37.72
ns Shares held (%) 1,386 1.40 0.32 3.85 0.00 59.93
no Options held (%) 1,386 0.70 0.38 0.96 0.00 13.31
σ Yearly standard deviation 1,386 0.51 0.47 0.24 0.15 2.76
Age Age of the CEO 1,384 56.30 56.00 6.80 35.00 85.00
5. Empirical results
5.1 Optimal linear contract
This section presents the empirical results from the calibration using the sample of 622 U.S. CEO
contracts. Table 3 shows the optimal linear contract obtained by numerically solving Equations (22)
to (24). Panel A shows the results where CEO is probability-weighting. The sigma-mu transforma-
tion function is used to approximate the probability weighting function with parameters ηs = 1.79
and ηm = 0.36. These values are the optimal approximation of δ = 0.6. Panel B presents the results
where CEO is only CRRA but not probability-weighting. For both panels, γ is the risk aversion
parameter, which takes values from 1 to 8. Both tables list the median and the mean value of
the optimal fixed salary, stock holding and option holding. The column no > 0 is the fraction of
the optimal contracts over the sample where CEO holds positive options of the firm5. The column
φ > 0 is the fraction of the optimal contracts where CEO receives positive fixed salary.
The risk-aversion of the typical CEOs are about 1 and 2. The results in Panel A shows that my
probability-weighting model predicts 94.53% of positive option holding when γ equals to 1. The
fraction of positive option holding decreases when γ increases. It converges to 1.77% when the CEO
has a risk aversion parameter γ ≥ 5. On the other hand, my model predicts the high fraction of
positive fixed salary for optimal contracts for all γ. The fraction converges to above 99% when
γ ≥ 5. The results in Panel A shows that when the CEO is more risk-averse, the optimal piece-wise
5Here I define that the CEO a positive fraction of the firm’s options if no > 10−8.
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Table 3: Calibration results for probability-weighting model and CRRA model
This table shows the optimal linear contract obtained by numerically solving Equations (22) to (24). Panel
A presents the results where CEO is probability-weighting. The sigma-mu transformation function is used
to approximate the probability function. ηs = 1.78775, ηm = 0.35764 are used in the calibration. These
pair of values can be the optimal approximation of δ = 0.6. Panel B presents the results where CEO is only
CRRA but not probability-weighting. γ is the risk aversion parameter, which takes values from 1 to 8. Both
tables list the median and the mean value of the optimal fixed salary, shares holding and option holding. The
column no > 0 is the fraction of the optimal contracts over the sample where CEO holds positive options
of the firm. The column φ > 0 is the fraction of the optimal contracts where CEO receives positive fixed
salary.
Panel A: Probability weighting model
φ ns no
γ obs. median mean median mean median mean no > 0 φ > 0
1 622 0.221 0.497 0.000 0.006 0.013 0.030 94.53% 95.82%
2 622 0.070 0.153 0.007 0.019 0.000 0.001 26.05% 84.08%
3 622 0.083 0.168 0.006 0.019 0.000 0.000 6.91% 93.73%
5 622 0.097 0.182 0.005 0.018 0.000 0.000 1.77% 99.36%
8 622 0.101 0.187 0.005 0.017 0.000 0.000 1.77% 99.84%
Panel B: CRRA model
φ ns no
γ obs. median mean median mean median mean no > 0 φ > 0
1 622 0.008 0.073 0.009 0.021 0.000 0.001 15.92% 53.38%
2 621 0.041 0.121 0.007 0.020 0.000 0.000 7.40% 71.22%
3 622 0.062 0.146 0.007 0.019 0.000 0.000 3.70% 84.08%
5 622 0.087 0.171 0.006 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.64% 93.73%
8 622 0.098 0.182 0.005 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.48% 98.87%
linear contracts become more “flat” in shape. It consists of fewer options and more fixed salary.
The intuition is that CEO with a high level of risk aversion requires more “safe money” for his
compensation packages.
If we compare the probability weighting model in Panel with the traditional CRRA model in Panel
B, we can see that the probability weighting model outperforms the CRRA model in predicting a
positive option holding of CEOs for all γ. It reflects the convexity of the optimal piece-wise linear
contracts. The probability weighting model explains the observed contracts particularly well when
the risk-averse parameter γ is low. For example, the probability weighting model predicts 94.53%
positive option holding when γ = 1, while the CRRA model only predicts 15.92% positive option
holding.
Moreover, the mean and median option holding in the probability weighting model are higher than
those in the CRRA model. The mean and median shares holding are smaller than those in the
CRRA model. The median and mean fixed salary is higher in the probability weighting model.
The results suggest that the optimal contracts contain more options and more fixed salary in the
probability weighting setting.
Figure 4 gives an intuitive comparison between the probability weighting model and the CRRA
model. The green curve depicts the shape of an observed contract with rf = 0.0197, d = 0.008,
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Figure 4: Shapes of contracts in different models
This table gives an comparison between the probability weighting model and the CRRA model. The green
curve is the shape of the observed contract where rf = 0.0197, d = 0.008, s = 0.3579, T = 3.5813, φ = 0.0763,
ns = 0.01086, no = 0.01486, K = 47.96, and ω0 = 0.2042. The firm size at time 0. P0 is re-scaled to 100.
The red dashed curve is the optimal piece-wise linear contract with the CRRA model, while the blue dashed
curve is the optimal piece-wise linear contract with the probability weighting model.
s = 0.3579, T = 3.5813, φ = 0.0763, ns = 0.01086, no = 0.01486, K = 47.96, and ω0 = 0.2042.
The total value of the stocks and options for this contract is close to the mean value of the sample.
The red dashed curve is the optimal piece-wise linear contract with the CRRA model, while the
blue dashed curve is the optimal piece-wise linear contract with the probability weighting model.
The observed contract features positive fixed salary and positive option holding. In the figure, the
observed contract is convex and has a kink at the strike price of the options. The optimal piecewise
linear contract with CRRA model contains only stock holding. The fixed salary and option holding
are both non-positive. Thus, the shape of the optimal contract is a straight line. The optimal
piece-wise linear contract with probability weighting model predicts positive fixed salary as well as
positive option holding. So the shape of the optimal contract is convex and has a kink at the strike
price.
5.2 Other values of probability weighting
To see whether my model is robust against the different level of probability weighting, I calibrate
the model with different sets of ηs and ηm as approximations of various δ that takes values other
than 0.6. I set δ to take values from 0.4 to 0.8. A lower δ means greater probability weighting.
When δ is higher, there is the less probability weighting. Table 4 presents the calibration results.
Panel A reports the case when δ is equal to 0.4, i.e., the greatest probability weighting, Panel B
reports the case when δ is equal to 0.5, Panel C reports the case when δ is equal to 0.7, and Panel
D reports the case where δ is equal to 0.8, i.e., the least probability weighting. We can see that the
probability model predicts higher option holding than the CRRA model for almost all δ and γ. The
only exceptions occur when γ = 3 and δ = 0.8 or δ = 0.9. This means that my probability weighting
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model can well explain the positive option holding in observed contracts, i.e., convex contracts, for a
range of probability weighting parameters. Moreover, the probability weighting model outperforms
the CRRA model in predicting positive fixed salary for all δ. This indicates that when the CEO
is moderately probability weighting, my model can explain the observed contracts better than the
CRRA in terms of both option holding and fixed salary.
5.3 Robustness checks
In the calibrations above, I use ηs and ηm to approximate the probability weighting parameter δ.
Probability weighting exaggerates of the probability of the extreme outcomes and attaches higher
dicision weights to them. Therefore, I am more interested in the effect of ηs in shaping the optimal
contract. My parametrization allows me to disentangle the effect of a transformed mu, i.e., ηm, and
the effect of a transformed sigma, i.e., ηs on the optimal contracts.
As a robustness check, I test whether my calibration results still hold when only the sigma is
transformed. To be more specific, I keep ηm = 0 and use different ηs in the calibration, and see
whether ηs alone can explain the observed positive option holding. Table 5 shows the calibration
results when the parameter ηm is set to be 0, and the parameter ηs takes values 2 and 3. Panel
A presents the results where ηs = 2 and ηm = 0. Panel B presents the results where ηs = 3 and
ηm = 0. Compared with the CRRA model where ηs = 1 (Table 3, Panel B), we can see that, a
larger-than-one ηs alone can explain positive option holding better than the CRRA model for all
γ. For example, in the CRRA model, the fraction of positive option holding is 15.92% when γ = 2.
In the contrast, the probability weighting model with ηs = 2 predicts a fraction of 20.58% and the
model with ηs = 3 predicts a fraction of 27.81%. The probability weighting model also performs
better in explaining larger fractions of positive fixed salary.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze a principal-agent model where the CEO is probability weighting and risk-
averse. In order to solve for the closed-form optimal contracts, I use a sigma-mu transformation to
approximate the probability weighting function. For each probability weighting parameter δ, I can
always find a set of parameters ηs and ηm that transforms the original normal distribution into a
new normal distribution with the similar shape. I derive the closed-form optimal general contract
which exhibits convexity when firm performance is high. It provides theoretical evidence for the
considerable number of options in CEO’s compensation packages.
To see whether my model fits the observed contracts well, I then calibrate the model with a wide
range of CRRA and Probability weighting parameters using the observed U.S. CEO contracts. I
show that the model with probability weighting can explain the shape of the observed contracts
better than the normal CRRA model. As a robustness check, I set the ηm to be 0 and only change
the value of ηs. I find that ηs alone can also explain positive option holding.
My finding suggests that shareholders exploit probability weighting to provide cheap incentives that
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Table 4: Calibration results for probability-weighting model with different parameters
This table shows the optimal linear contract obtained by numerically solving Equations 22) to (24) using the
probability-weighting model. The sigma-mu transformation function is used to approximate the probability
function. Panel A presents the results where ηs = 2.88477 and ηm = 1.65702 as the approximation of δ = 0.4.
Panel B presents the results where ηs = 2.23307 and ηm0.77908 as the approximation of δ = 0.5. Panel C
presents the results where ηs = 1.47895 and ηm = 0.15139 as the approximation of δ = 0.7. Panel D presents
the results where ηs = 1.26259 and ηm = 0.05263 as the approximation of δ = 0.8. γ is the risk aversion
parameter. The γ used for calibration ranges from 1 to 8. All tables list the median and the mean value
of the optimal fixed salary, shares holding and option holding. The column no > 0 is the fraction of the
optimal contracts over the sample where CEO holds positive options of the firm. The column φ > 0 is the
fraction of the optimal contracts where CEO receives positive fixed salary.
Panel A: ηs = 2.88477 and ηm = 1.65702 as the approximation of δ = 0.4
φ ns no
γ obs. median mean median mean median mean no > 0 φ > 0
1 622 0.100 0.000 0.019 0.268 0.001 0.043 99.68% 77.49%
2 622 0.096 0.006 0.000 0.177 0.019 0.004 45.34% 92.77%
3 622 0.091 0.006 0.000 0.177 0.018 0.001 14.31% 98.23%
5 622 0.099 0.005 0.000 0.185 0.018 0.000 3.54% 100.00%
8 622 0.101 0.005 0.000 0.188 0.017 0.000 2.57% 100.00%
Panel B: ηs = 2.23307 and ηm0.77908 as the approximation of δ = 0.5
φ ns no
γ obs. median mean median mean median mean no > 0 φ > 0
1 622 0.204 0.000 0.016 0.458 0.002 0.037 98.23% 93.89%
2 622 0.086 0.007 0.000 0.166 0.019 0.003 37.94% 89.07%
3 622 0.088 0.006 0.000 0.173 0.018 0.000 11.09% 97.11%
5 622 0.098 0.005 0.000 0.183 0.018 0.000 2.57% 99.84%
8 622 0.101 0.005 0.000 0.188 0.017 0.000 1.45% 100.00%
Panel C: ηs = 1.47895 and ηm = 0.15139 as the approximation of δ = 0.7
φ ns no
γ obs. median mean median mean median mean no > 0 φ > 0
1 622 0.151 0.363 0.003 0.013 0.006 0.017 81.51% 84.73%
2 622 0.055 0.141 0.007 0.020 0.000 0.001 15.11% 80.87%
3 622 0.078 0.162 0.006 0.019 0.000 0.000 3.38% 91.32%
5 622 0.095 0.179 0.005 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.80% 99.20%
8 622 0.101 0.186 0.005 0.017 0.000 0.000 1.13% 99.84%
Panel D: ηs = 1.26259 and ηm = 0.05263 as the approximation of δ = 0.8
φ ns no
γ obs. median mean median mean median mean no > 0 φ > 0
1 622 0.042 0.157 0.008 0.020 0.000 0.004 49.84% 64.79%
2 622 0.047 0.132 0.008 0.020 0.000 0.000 9.32% 76.05%
3 622 0.073 0.157 0.006 0.019 0.000 0.000 2.57% 88.42%
5 622 0.093 0.177 0.005 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.96% 97.43%
8 622 0.099 0.185 0.005 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.80% 99.52%
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Table 5: Calibration results for probability-weighting model with different ηs
This table shows the optimal linear contract obtained by numerically solving Equations (22) to (24) using the
probability-weighting model. The sigma-mu transformation function is used to approximate the probability
function. γ is the risk aversion parameter. The γ used for calibration is from 1 to 8. Panel A presents the
results where ηs = 2 and ηm = 0. Panel B presents the results where ηs = 3 and ηm = 0. All tables list
the median and the mean value of the optimal fixed salary, shares holding and option holding. The column
no > 0 is the fraction of the optimal contracts over the sample where CEO holds positive options of the firm.
The column φ > 0 is the fraction of the optimal contracts where CEO receives positive fixed salary.
Panel A: ηm = 0 and ηs = 2
φ ns no
γ obs. median mean median mean median mean no > 0 φ > 0
1 622 0.194 0.000 0.012 0.388 0.009 0.027 91.96% 94.69%
2 622 0.077 0.007 0.000 0.164 0.019 0.001 20.58% 90.19%
3 622 0.090 0.006 0.000 0.175 0.018 0.000 4.82% 97.59%
5 622 0.099 0.005 0.000 0.185 0.018 0.000 1.93% 99.84%
8 622 0.101 0.005 0.000 0.188 0.017 0.000 1.13% 100.00%
Panel B: ηm = 0 and ηs = 3
φ ns no
γ obs. median mean median mean median mean no > 0 φ > 0
1 622 0.184 0.000 0.016 0.327 0.004 0.035 98.55% 96.78%
2 622 0.094 0.007 0.000 0.177 0.019 0.002 27.81% 97.59%
3 622 0.096 0.006 0.000 0.183 0.018 0.000 7.72% 99.84%
5 622 0.101 0.005 0.000 0.187 0.018 0.000 2.25% 100.00%
8 622 0.102 0.005 0.000 0.189 0.017 0.000 1.29% 100.00%
encourage CEOs to exert more effort. It enriches the literature on the optimal CEO compensation
contract and provides an alternative theory in explaining the observed options pay in CEO contracts.
It is a complement to the loss-aversion theory (Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt, 2010) and the risk-
seeking incentive theory (Dittmann, Yu, and Zhang, 2017).
My results can also be linked to a wide range of behavioral finance literature on CEO compensation.
Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that overconfident CEOs exercise of their options late. Their re-
sults can be linked with the effect of a positive ηm in my paper. On the other hand, a manager
is mis-calibrated (overprecise) if she underestimates the volatility of the future return (Ben-David,
Graham, and Harvey, 2013). This is equivalent to an ηs < 1 in my paper. My results suggest that
probability weighting effect may exceed the mis-calibration effect in shaping the CEO contracts.
The sigma-mu transformation can be related, but not confused with CEO overconfidence. Overcon-
fidence concerns with the CEO’s belief over the future performance; the distribution of the future
performance is clearly known by CEO herself. On the contrary, probability weighting is about pref-
erence, namely how CEO evaluate the expected utility. She attaches higher psychological weights
to extreme outcomes.
In this paper, I do not endogenize project choice for CEOs in order to keep my model concise.
Dittmann, Yu, and Zhang (2017) show that when CEOs can select projects, convex contracts pro-
vides risk-seeking incentives to CEOs. If probability-weighting CEOs can endogenously choose
projects, then they might be even more risk-seeking. The reason is that probability weighting in-
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creases the volatility of a normal distribution. When a CEO chooses a project with higher risk σ, the
perceived risk ηsσ is propotionally higher. This increases the perceived value of stock options.
My research can be further extended in the following directions. First, in this paper, I calibrate
the model with the optimal piecewise linear contracts. As an improvement, the general optimal
non-linear contract can also be calibrated with the observed contracts.
Second, I use the sigma-mu transformation function to approximate the probability weighting func-
tion because it results in an closed-form solution for the optimal general contract. It also reduces
the difficulties in the calibration. In the future, researches can be done in calibrating the model
with the original probability weighting function. This means that the CDF of the random variable
after the probability weighting transformation should be numerically calculated.
Third, I use the CRRA utility function instead of the loss-aversion utility function in my model.
The reason is that the loss-aversion can explain the convexity of the observed contracts in the
central region (Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt, 2010). In the future, the complete prospect theory, i.e.,
loss-aversion utility function and probability weighting, can be incorporated into the principal-agent
model. This model may work well in explaining the convexity of the CEO contracts for the whole
domain of the firm performance.
Appendix A: Proof of the convexity for large PT
To show that the contract is convex when PT is large, I will show that the slope of the contract
tends to be infinitely large when PT goes to infinity, i.e., limPT→∞
dWT (PT )
dPT
=∞ for all γ > 0. The
optimal general contract is:
WT (PT ) =
[
exp
(
β2 (lnPT )
2 + β1 lnPT + β0
)
(α1 lnPT + α0)
]1/γ
.
The first-order derivative of WT w.r.t. PT is
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All terms with lower powers (little-o) are omitted in calculation of the limit, e.g., lnPT is omitted
if (lnPT ) 2 is in the presence. All positive coefficients, such as β2 and α1 are also omitted because
they do not affect the evaluation. Note that β2 = 12σ2 − 12σ2A =
1
2σ2
(
1− 1
η2s
)
> 0. Thus, the limit of
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the first-order derivative of WT w.r.t. PT equals:
lim
PT→∞
dWT
dPT
= lim
PT→∞
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exp
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2
}
lnPT
]1/γ ( lnPT
PT
)
+
[
exp
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(lnPT )
2
}
lnPT
] 1−γ
γ
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{
β2 (lnPT )
2
} 1
PT︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive
The second component must be positive, so we focus only on the first component:
lim
PT→∞
[
exp
{
(lnPT )
2
}
lnPT
]1/γ ( lnPT
PT
)
(Let x = lnPT )
= lim
x→∞
[
exp
{
x2
}
x
]1/γ
x
exp {x}
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x→∞ exp
{
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γ ln
[
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{
x2
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+ 1γ lnx+ lnx
x
}
= lim
x→∞ exp
{
1
γx
2
x
}
=∞
The slope of the WT (·) tends to be infinite when PT is infinitely large. This indicates a convex
shape of the optimal general contract.
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Chapter III
The real costs of CEO compensation:
the effect of behindness aversion of employees
“Wide pay gaps between CEOs and other employees are associated with higher employee
turnover, which can adversely affect a company’s performance and thereby shareowner
interests.”
Investors and investor organizations collectively representing $3 trillion in assets under
management in a letter to the SEC in support of the pay ratio disclosure.
1. Introduction
Some of the strongest opposition against high and increasing CEO pay comes from rank and file em-
ployees, in particular from employees within the same firm. It is difficult to explain this phenomenon
with normative preferences, because formally CEOs are employees and paid by shareholders, so reg-
ular employees should, in principle, not object to them being overpaid. A potential explanation
is that workers envy CEOs their higher pay, i.e., workers suffer disutility from the gap between
their own pay and the CEO’s pay. Formally, such preferences are called inequality aversion or,
more precisely, behindness aversion (see Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Neilson and Stowe (2010);
for empirical evidence see Card, Mas, Moretti, and Saez (2012)).6
We provide a principal-agent model where the principal designs a contract with two agents: the
CEO and the employee who is behindness averse. The employee represents all employees in the
firm. We find that the wage of the employee is an increasing function of the wage of the CEO. The
reason is that employees experience an additional disutility when the CEO pay is raised, so that
the firm raises the employees’ pay to compensate them for this disutility and to prevent them from
leaving the firm. We take this prediction to the data and ask whether an employee truly compares
himself to the CEO.7
There can be direct and indirect channels through which CEO compensation affects employee wages.
Through the direct channel, workers observe the compensation of CEOs from published reports.
They derive dis-utility directly from comparison. This means that workers near the bottom of the
hierarchy are more sensitive to increases in the CEO wage because the wage gap is larger. Another
6It is widely accepted that the feeling of happiness does not only rely on someone’s own material payoff, but also
on the payoff of others. Schmitt and Marwell (1972) show that subjects withdraw from profitable experiments if they
receive inequitable payoffs. Using data on British workers, Clark and Oswald (1996) show that the satisfaction levels
of workers are negatively related to their comparison wage rates. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) show that the fair wage of
workers is not only determined by the market clearing wage, but also by the comparison with salient others. Besides,
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) find that a simple model where someone’s true payoff consists of her own pecuniary and
own relative payoff explains many laboratory experiments.
7This paper adds another behavioral bias to Edmans, Gabaix, and Jenter (2017) who survey executive compen-
sation.
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channel is indirect, which can also be referred to as a trickle-down effect. Top managers compare
their wages to the CEO, and their dis-utility is compensated. Regular managers compare their
wages to top managers, lower managers to regular managers, and regular employees compare their
wages to lower managers. The effect of high CEO compensation gradually passes down to regular
employees. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) argue that a possible reference group to which employees can
compare their wages are agents with a higher income within the firm which is consistent with the
indirect channel.
The main challenge in studying the effect of high CEO compensation on workers’ pay is the availabil-
ity of data. We construct a matched CEO-employee panel data set for German firms by combining
a data set on the CEO compensation with a data set on employee wages. Data on the CEO com-
pensation is hand-collected from firms’ annual reports. Data on employee wages comes from the
Research Data Center (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment agency (BA). This agency has
established a complete record of employee wages in German establishments since 1975 (for East
Germany since 1992). The matched panel data set contains more than 200,000 establishment-year
observations, and is available from 2000 to 2011. This unique data set enables us to test several
hypotheses on the relationship of CEO compensation and employee wages.
We find evidence that higher CEO compensation is positively related to employee wages across firms
and across time. When the CEO compensation increases by 1%, the median employee wage increases
by 0.04%. This finding does not only hold in cross-sectional regressions but also when we control
for time invariant unobserved characteristics of the firm and the establishment. To further alleviate
potential endogeneity concerns, we adopt the difference-in-difference setting. In this analysis, we
find that when CEO compensation becomes publicly observable, employees receive significantly
higher wages. We also implement the triple-diff-in-diff approach where we find that a higher CEO-
board wage gap results in a higher increase in employees’ pay upon disclosure. Moreover, using
CEO abnormal compensation, we show that paying more than the fair wage to CEOs increases
employees’ envy, while paying less than the fair wage to CEOs mitigates employees’ envy.
The introductory quote (“Wide pay gaps between CEOs and other employees are associated with
higher employee turnover, which can adversely affect a company’s performance and thereby share-
owner interests.”) refers to Wade, O’Reilly, and Pollock (2006) who show that CEO overpayment is
related to higher turnover for other managers (see also Bloom and Michel (2002)). What does the
relation look like for rank-and-file workers? The investors from the introductory quote assume that
employees are behindness averse, compare themselves to the CEO, and if the disutility becomes too
large, draw the consequences and resign from the job. We do instead argue (with the principal-agent
model) that the firm anticipates the behindness aversion of the employees, pays them a larger wage,
and thereby prevents employee turnover. The data allows us to measure turnover. We show that an
increased wage for the employees overcompensates for their behindness aversion and the employee
turnover probability decreases in CEO pay. It is not surprising that highly paid CEOs might be
able to drive down employee turnover.
These findings have far reaching consequences for executive compensation. Behindness aversion
drives up the costs of executive compensation by increasing employee wages. Any additional dol-
lar paid to the CEO for providing incentives also leads to higher employee wages to compensate
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employees for their (perceived) losses from behindness aversion. The average CEO in our sample
receives e2.6 million a year. If a firm increases its pay by 1% (=e26,000) for the average CEO,
then the firm will pay an additional compensation of e14.4 to the median employee with an average
annual salary of e35,000. For the average firm in our sample with 50,000 employees, this sums up
to e720,000 per year, increasing the total wage bill by e746,000 per year.
We show that regular employee wages rise with lagged CEO compensation. This could be explained
by productivity dynamics and rent-extraction: In phases where productivity is high, the pressure
on wages decreases and all wages are increasing. We do several tests in the paper to reduce this
concern: First, we include ROA and market-to-book ratio as control variables which help capture
changes in productivity. Second, we introduce industry × year and state × year fixed effects into
the regression which filter out industry and state shocks. Third, changes in productivity cannot
explain our differences-in-difference results.
The model closest to ours is Dur and Glazer (2008) who analyze the agency problem and optimal
contracts when the employee feels envy toward his principal. They show that envy tightens the
employees’ participation constraint and causes higher pay or a lower workload. The authors also
show that workers and firms can benefit from profit-sharing programs because they reduce the
expected disutility from envy.
There exist a few empirical studies which examine the relation between CEO compensation and
employee wages or productivity. Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos (2009) work
with Swedish data and relate managerial entrenchment to the wages of regular employees. They
find that CEOs with more control pay higher employee wages, especially for employees close to
the CEO (geographically and hierarchically). They argue that CEOs derive private benefits from
treating colleagues in their vicinity nicely. Wade, O’Reilly, and Pollock (2006) regress the CEO
compensation on CEO’s personal traits and firm variables, and use the residuals as a proxy for
CEO over- or underpayment. They show that CEO overpayment is related to higher pay for other
managers (see also Bloom and Michel (2002)). Faleye, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2013) calculate the
wage gap between the CEO and rank-and-file employees. They investigate the determinants of the
pay gap, but they fail to find any significant effect of an increased pay gap on employee productivity
except for firms where the tournament incentives are high. This paper is related to the literature
which tries to understand what types of firms exhibit more pay inequality (see, for example, Mueller,
Ouimet, and Simintzi (2017)). Lin, Schmid, and Sun (2016) investigate how employee representation
on corporate boards of German firms affects executive compensation. They find that more employee
representation increases executive compensation and employment protection of workers. However,
they do not investigate employee wages. Our paper is - to the best of our knowledge - the first
to show that there exists a positive relation between CEO and rank-and-file employee pay, and we
ascribe this relation to the behindness aversion of employees.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the principal-agent model. Section 3 presents
the data. Section 4 documents the relation between CEO compensation and employee wages consis-
tent with our employee-behindness-aversion hypothesis. We also present evidence for the causality
of CEO compensation on employee wages and robustness checks in Section 4. Section 5 contains
our employee turnover results, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2. Principal-agent model
We model a principal (i.e., the firm) who contracts with two agents: the CEO and one employee.
The employee represents all employees in the firm. The employee is behindness averse:
U (WwT ,W
c
T ) = V
w (WwT )− αS (W cT −WwT ) , (27)
where WwT is the employee’s wage, W
c
T is the CEO’s wage, V
w (·) is a risk-averse utility function,
S (·) an inequality function, and α the inequality parameter.8 The employee’s effort is observable
and contractible. Hence, employees only add a participation constraint to the principal’s problem.
The CEO is rational and risk-averse. Her effort is not observable, so she adds a participation
constraint and an incentive compatibility constraint to the principal problem. Exerting effort e
leads to private costs C(e) that are increasing and convex in e.
The principal proposes a contract that is signed by the CEO and the worker at time t = 0. After that,
the CEO makes her effort decision e. At time t = T , the consequences of the CEO’s effort become
apparent in the distribution of the firm’s stock price g(PT | e). The principal maximizes:
max
e,W cT (·),WwT (·)
∞∫
o
(PT −W cT −WwT ) g (PT | e) dPT
s.t.
∞∫
o
V c (W cT ) g (PT | e) dPT − C(e) ≥ U c
∞∫
o
V c (W cT ) ge (PT | e) dPT − C ′(e) = 0
∞∫
o
[V w (WwT )− αS (W cT −WwT )] g (PT | e) dPT ≥ Uw,
where V c (·) is the CEO’s utility function and U cand Uw are the outside options of the CEO and
the employee, respectively. In Appendix A, we prove the following Proposition:
Proposition 1: If S (·) is convex, the employee’s wage increases with the CEO’s wage:
dWwT
dW cT
=
αS′′ (W cT −WwT )
αS′′
(
W cT −WwT
)− V w′′ (WwT ) > 0.
When S(.) is concave, then further assumptions are needed.
A limitation of our model is that it does not have an incentive compatibility constraint (IC) for
employees. Grund and Sliwka (2005) and Neilson and Stowe (2010) feature an additional (IC)
constraint for two identical agents that are inequality averse when analyzing tournament structures.
8The employee always earns less than the CEO, so W cT −WwT never becomes negative. Therefore, we need not
specify an extra parameter if the employee is ahead of the CEO. The results are the same notwithstanding if the
employee is compassionate (i.e., dislikes being ahead) or competitive (i.e., likes being ahead).
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They discriminate two different effects. On the one hand, an agent will work harder if she is envious
(incentive effect). On the other hand, the more inequality averse the agent is, the more the principal
needs to compensate the negative utility from inequality (participation effect). These papers find
that agents with inequality aversion exert higher efforts than those who are purely self-interested
under certain tournament structures. Faleye, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2013) find evidence for this
result.
3. Data
The sample contains all companies included in the two main German stock market indices, DAX and
MDAX, between 2000 and 2011. We hand collect data on executive compensation and corporate
governance from annual reports and Hoppenstedt company profiles. We do not include non-listed
firms, because information on executive compensation is usually unavailable. Stock market data
comes from Datastream and balance sheet and accounting data from Worldscope.
3.1 Workers’ compensation
Employment and wage data at the establishment level is obtained from the Institute of Employment
Research (IAB). The IAB is the research organization of the German federal employment agency,
the Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA). The BA collects worker and employer contributions to unem-
ployment insurance and distributes unemployment benefits. All German businesses are required to
report detailed information on employment and wages to the BA.9 Individual-level data is aggre-
gated at the establishment level, made anonymous, and offered for scientific use by the IAB (the
Establishment History Panel). An establishment is any facility having a separate physical address,
such as a factory, service station, restaurant, or office building. The IAB offers detailed estab-
lishment level data on industry, location, employment, employee education, age, nationality, and
wages, and provides this data in the form of establishment-level statistics, such as sums, medians,
and quartiles on wages and employment according to different classifications and breakdowns.
IAB does not have a firm identifier, which is why manual matching is necessary. At our request,
the IAB matched our sample of listed firms with their establishment-level database using an au-
tomatic procedure, based on company name and address information (city, zip code, street, and
house number). Additionally, we provided the IAB with names of major subsidiaries listed in the
annual reports of our sample firms in 2006. All cases not unambiguously matched by the automatic
matching procedure are checked by hand to avoid mismatching. The matching was performed for
2004, 2005, and 2006. Firms are dropped if they do not exist during the period 2004 through 2006.
All establishments are matched only once to our sample firms. This matching procedure does not
9German establishments are required to report salaries of their employees up to an upper earnings limit (social
security contribution ceiling) that is annually adjusted (West German states: e52,800 in 2000 up to e66,000 in 2011.
East German states: e43,600 in 2000 up to e57,600 in 2011). When this limit has been reached, establishments are
only required to report the ceiling. In our data set, we delete 5.23% of the observations because the median average
wage for the establishment was equal to the ceiling value for the respective year.
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Table 6: Sample
This table displays the number of firms and establishments in the sample for each year between 2000 and 2011.
Year Firms Establishments
2000 35 3,486
2001 47 7,261
2002 59 8,329
2003 66 16,471
2004 98 20,814
2005 100 23,783
2006 99 25,767
2007 97 24,436
2008 95 21,310
2009 83 19,246
2010 84 16,924
2011 84 15,607
allow us to identify changes in establishment ownership after 2006.10 Thus, if an establishment
is acquired before 2004 or sold to another firm after 2006, it will be treated as if it belonged to
the matched firm after the acquisition or before the sale. This will blur the match between firms
and establishments and potentially lead to an attenuation bias working against finding significant
results. Table 6 provides an overview of our matching process.
While fiscal years of German firms are mostly from January to December, establishment years for
IAB data are from July to June. Therefore, we lead all variables from Worldscope by six months
relative to IAB years. Effectively, we assign year-end values fromWorldscope to June 30 information
on employment and wages of the same year.
3.2 CEO compensation
We hand-collected data on compensation for CEOs and other members of the management board
from firms’ annual reports. Before 2006, most firms only disclose the total compensation of the
management board as a whole. Only a few firms reported the individual compensation. From 2006,
the German Corporate Governance Code required firms to disclose the individual compensation
of members of the management board in their annual reports.11 Hence, data on individual com-
pensation for the management board is available for most firms after 2006. If a firm discloses the
individual compensation, we record the payment for each executive, while for all other firms the
total compensation for the management board is recorded.
10At the time of matching establishments to firms, establishment data was not available for 2007 and subsequent
years.
11The German Corporate Governance Code (2006), Clause 4.2.4, requires that "The total compensation of each
member of the Management Board is to be disclosed by name, divided into non-performance-related, performance-
related, and long-term incentive components, unless decided otherwise by the General Meeting by three quarters
majority." This means that the disclosure of the compensation of each member of the management board is manda-
tory from 2006 as long as the general annual meeting has not decided otherwise with three quarters majority. Compare
that to the German Corporate Governance Code (2005), Clause 4.2.4, "Compensation of the members of the Man-
agement Board shall be reported in the Notes of the Consolidated Financial Statements subdivided according to
fixed, performance related and long-term incentive components." According to the Code, the word "shall" is used as
a recommendation but not a regulation.
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Managerial compensation consists of several components: fixed salary, remuneration in kind, annual
bonus, and compensation from long-term incentive programs. The long-term incentive programs
include stock options, stock appreciation rights, and other stock based instruments. All these
separate components of compensation are recorded if available. Our principle variable CEO total is
the aggregate compensation that is mentioned in the Table “Board of Management Compensation -
Aggregate Compensation” in the annual report. This is the aggregate value of the realized cash and
bonus payments and the promised long-term compensation. It seems natural that the employees
focus on this value because this is also usually reported in the press. Some executives in our panel
data set join or leave the management board during the year. Their remuneration is then adjusted
for the period in office to make them comparable to the standard annual compensation.
Table 7 presents summary statistics and variable definitions for firm-level variables (Panel A) and
establishment-level variables (Panel B). The average firm year in our sample has sales of e15.8
billion, which shows that our sample mostly consists of large firms. The average CEO has a total
annual compensation of e2.6 million and is 54 years old. The average median annual gross wage of
full-time employees for our sample is e35,167.
3.3 Institutional setting
Historically, wages in German firms were mostly set through collective bargaining agreements be-
tween trade unions and employers’ associations. However, in the last three decades, a major shift
away from industry-level agreements has taken place. Hassel (1999) reports that in 1995, 53.4%
of the plants were covered by industry-level wage agreements, 8.2% by firm-level agreements, and
38.4% were not covered at all. Although their sample may not be fully comparable to that of
Hassel (1999), Addison, Bryson, Teixeira, Pahnke, and Bellmann (2010) report that only 47.3% of
the German plants had industry-level agreements in 2000, a number that drops to 35.4% by 2008.
Firm-level agreements were almost stable with 2.5% in 2000 and 2.7% in 2008, whereas the plants
not covered by any collective bargaining agreement increased from 50.1% in 2000 to 61.9% in 2008.
Over the same period, unionization also decreased considerably in Germany. Based on survey data,
Schnabel and Wagner (2007) estimate it to be about 33% in 1992, declining to around 20% in 2004.
If industry- or firm-level agreements exist, these agreements are binding for all workers as German
law forbids discriminatory wage policies that disadvantage non-union members.
As a reaction to the declining popularity of collective bargaining agreements, trade unions and
employers’ associations are allowed so-called opening-clauses. Since the mid-1980s, labor regula-
tion (including wage setting) has become increasingly flexible even for firms covered by collective
bargaining agreements. Many areas of regulation are no longer determined at the industry level.
Instead, works councils at the establishment level directly negotiate agreements with employers
(Ellguth, Gerner, and Stegmaier (2012)). In particular, large firms (as in our sample) make use
of these opening-clauses. Hassel and Rehder (2001) show that 55 of the 120 biggest companies in
Germany negotiated a firm-level pact that deviates from the industry-level agreement during the
1990s.
However, even if firms do not use an opening-clause, they are free to deviate from the collective bar-
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Table 7: Summary statistics
Panel A displays definitions and descriptive statistics for the main firm-level variables used in our analysis. Panel B
displays definitions and descriptive statistics for the main establishment-level variables used in our analysis.
Panel A: Summary statistics for main firm-level variables
Variable name Definition Mean Std. Obs.
Compensation
CEO total Annual total compensation of the CEO 2,564,779 2,395,251 555
CEO cash Annual cash income of the CEO 2,002,491 1,657,132 555
Board total Average annual compensation for all management
board members: total compensation for the board
/ board size
1,411,901 1,096,341 939
Other total Average annual total compensation for manage-
ment board members excluding the CEO
1,421,626 1,073,914 554
CEO premium ln(CEO total - Other total) 13.43 1.21 524
CEO pay ratio CEO total / Other total 1.85 1.29 554
CEO-board ratio CEO total / Board total - 1 0.48 0.64 555
CEO characteristics
CEO tenure Time since first appointed as the CEO (year) 6.41 6.00 536
CEO ownership =1 if the CEO holds more than 1% of the firm
outstanding shares
0.01 0.07 551
CEO switch =1 if another person takes over the CEO position 0.09 0.29 555
CEO age Age of CEO (in years) 54.05 6.91 527
CEO out-hiring =1 if the CEO is hired from outside the firm 0.43 0.50 536
Firm-level characteristics
ROA Return on asset 0.10 0.12 910
ROE Return on equity 0.34 0.30 910
Market to book ratio Market to book ratio 2.33 2.45 931
Size (millions) Total sales of the firm 15,844 27,976 924
Leverage Total debt / total asset 0.63 0.20 932
# Firm employees Number of employees working for the firm in Ger-
many
49,899 90,643 934
Employee risk Standard deviation of change in number of em-
ployees at the firm level
0.13 0.09 935
Union =1 if one of the major German labor unions has
representatives on the firm’s supervisory board
0.95 0.22 939
Disclosure =1 if the compensation of the CEO is disclosed in
annual reports
0.59 0.49 939
Stock return Total annual stock return calculated using the re-
turn index provided by Datastream
0.15 0.49 838
Board size Number of members on the executive board 4.74 2.11 939
R&D to sales R&D to sales ratio 9.58 42.07 623
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Panel B: Summary statistics for main establishment-level variables
Variable name Definition Mean Std. Obs.
Wage structure
Wage Median gross average daily wage for full-time em-
ployees × 365
35,167 13,428 158,545
Q1 wage First quartile gross average daily wage for full-
time employees × 365
31,678 12,554 163,531
Q3 wage Third quartile gross average daily wage for full-
time employees × 365
37,301 13,967 142,865
Employee structure
# Establishment employees Total number of full-time employees at the estab-
lishment
64.79 691.72 203,434
Female % Proportion of full-time female employees 0.43 0.36 167,296
Low qualified % Proportion of full-time low-qualified employees 0.04 0.12 167,296
Qualified % Proportion of full-time median-qualified employ-
ees
0.73 0.33 167,296
Highly qualified % Proportion of full-time high-qualified employees 0.08 0.19 167,296
German % Proportion of German employees 0.97 0.10 167,296
Manager % Proportion of managers 0.03 0.13 167,296
White-collar % Proportion of white-collar workers 0.61 0.46 167,296
Employees age Median age of full-time employees at the estab-
lishment level
41.46 8.29 203,434
Other variables
Close to head =1 if the establishment is located in the same fed-
eral state as the firm’s headquarter
0.18 0.38 203,434
Outflow Outflow of employeest / # Establishment
employeest−1
0.21 0.22 76,616
Outflow white-collar Outflow of white-collar employeest / # Establish-
ment employeest−1
0.14 0.22 76,616
Inflow Inflow of employeest / # Establishment
employeest−1
0.42 5.68 76,616
Inflow of white-collar Inflow of white-collar employeest / # Establish-
ment employeest−1
0.29 4.33 76,616
Industry 2-digit NACE code (economic division) of the the
establishment (edition: 2003)
State Federal state where the establishment is located
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gaining agreement as long as they pay wages above the level stipulated in the agreement. Collective
bargaining agreements only determine minimum standards. Jung and Schnabel (2011) show that
more than 43% of the establishments covered by a collective agreement pay wages above the level
stipulated in the collective agreement. For these 43% of the establishments, average actual wages
exceed wages that were stipulated by the collective bargaining agreement by about 10%. Both
numbers increase with the size of an establishment, i.e. positive deviations are more likely for the
large firms in our data set. Taken together, these studies show that wage setting is rather flexible
(in both directions) at the firm level in Germany.
4. The relation between CEO compensation and employee wages
4.1 Baseline results
We start by analyzing the relation between CEO compensation and employee wages using the
following baseline regression model:
ln(Wage)ijt = αt + αk + αs + βln(CEO total)jt−1 + γXijt−1 + εijt (28)
The dependent variable, ln(Wage)ijt, is the logarithm of the median annual wage in establish-
ment i and year t, where j indexes firms. ln(CEO total)jt−1 is the logarithm of the CEO’s total
compensation over the prior year t − 1. In our benchmark regressions, we control for year fixed
effects, αt, industry fixed effects of the establishment, αk, and state fixed effects, αs. Xijt−1 is a
vector of control variables, which include establishment-level variables such as number, median age,
qualifications, and the nationality of employees, and firm-level variables such as profitability, size,
leverage, CEO ownership, and tenure. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. We run
fixed effects regressions and use White (1980) robust standard errors that allow for clustering at the
firm level.
Table 8 presents our results. Specification (1) only includes industry, state, and year fixed effects.
The following specifications slowly build the full model. First, adding establishment level controls
in specification (2) and then stepwise firm-level controls (specifications (3) to (5)). Across all
specifications, we observe that firms that pay their CEOs more also pay significantly higher wages
to their other employees. In specifications (3) to (5), we also include ROA and market-to-book ratio
which control for firm productivity.
In specification (6), which includes observations after 2005 and the full set of control variables,
the coefficient for ln(CEO total) is 0.041 (t = 2.93). This result means that if CEO compensation
increases by 1%, the median employee’s wage increases by 0.04%. This effect is economically sizable.
The average CEO in our sample receives e2.6 million a year. If a firm increases its pay by 1%
(=e26,000) for the average CEO, then the firm will pay an additional compensation of e14.4 to the
median employee with an average annual salary of e35,000. For the average firm in our sample with
50,000 employees that sums up to e720,000 per year, this increases the total wage bill by e746,000
per year.
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Table 8: CEO compensation and employee wages: Regression results
This table presents results for regressions with the log median annual wage of full-time employees as the dependent
variable. All independent variables are lagged by one year. See Table 7 for a detailed overview of variable definitions.
In specification (6), we consider the observations after 2005 only. We use the White (1980) robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level. The t-statistics are reported below the estimates. ***, ** and * indicate that the value is
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Dependent variable: ln(Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(CEO total) 0.051** 0.046** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.041***
2.14 2.22 3.6 3.71 3.71 2.93
ROA -0.303* -0.16 -0.109 -0.219*
-1.82 -1.2 -0.81 -1.87
Price to book ratio -0.019* -0.020* -0.024** -0.025**
-1.81 -1.97 -2.16 -2.13
ln(Size) 0.009 -0.03 -0.021 -0.039
0.5 -1.17 -0.83 -1.42
Leverage -0.133 -0.195* -0.268* -0.279*
-1.31 -1.83 -1.92 -1.81
Union 0.121* 0.127* 0.153**
1.91 1.93 2.32
ln(# Firm employees) 0.038* 0.032 0.049**
1.78 1.56 2.15
Employee risk 0.485** 0.505** 0.609**
2.25 2.42 2.62
CEO ownership -0.009 0.007
-0.19 0.14
CEO tenure 0.003* 0.004**
1.84 2.07
ln(# Estab. Employees) 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.050***
3.65 3.67 3.73 3.72 4.19
Female % -0.280*** -0.262*** -0.274*** -0.274*** -0.277***
-3.73 -3.68 -3.7 -3.67 -3.54
low qualified % -0.011 -0.013 -0.011 -0.008 -0.018
-0.19 -0.24 -0.2 -0.15 -0.33
Qualified % 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.212***
5.48 5.79 5.84 5.78 5.25
Highly qualified % 0.504*** 0.513*** 0.509*** 0.510*** 0.503***
11.2 12.49 13.37 13.41 12.9
German % 0.256*** 0.252*** 0.251*** 0.255*** 0.250***
5.33 5.25 5.38 5.43 5.05
Manager % 0.017 0.024 0.04 0.043 0.047
0.63 0.88 1.52 1.52 1.44
White collar % 0.167*** 0.161*** 0.175*** 0.176*** 0.190***
7.71 6.85 8.33 8.36 9.1
Employee age 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**
2.49 2.55 2.6 2.58 2.21
Close to head 0.031** 0.028** 0.029** 0.030** 0.031**
2.41 2.23 2.2 2.24 2.48
Industry, state, and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.618 0.61 0.613 0.615 0.622
Number of observations 108363 106341 103961 103960 103581 68356
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These results are obtained after controlling for observable characteristics known to influence em-
ployee wages. In particular, we control for establishment and firm size, employee characteristics,
profitability, leverage, and union presence. As expected, employee wages are higher when employees
are better educated, older, German, male, work in larger establishments or firms, have a higher risk
of losing their jobs, the leverage is lower, a union member has a board seat, and the establishment
is close to the headquarter (see, for example, Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos
(2009), Brown and Medoff (1989)). In an untabulated robustness check, we adjust all nominal
variables for inflation and find very similar results.
4.2 Difference-in-difference regression
The German regulation on mandatory disclosure of the CEO compensation was publicly discussed
in 2003 and 2004, enacted by the federal parliament in 2005 and became effective in 2006. This
regulation does not directly affect employee wages, but it changes the channel through which the
employees observe their firm’s CEO compensation. Before the regulation came into effect, the em-
ployees could generally only observe the aggregate remuneration of all members on the management
board. After the regulation was adopted by the firms, the employees have been able to directly
observe the CEO compensation, which is on average 44% more than the compensation of an av-
erage management board member in 2006. Under the employee-behindness-aversion hypothesis,
we expect that employees in those firms that disclose their CEO compensation for the first time
feel more disadvantaged and are paid more. Thus, we regard the change in policy as a natural
experiment.
In the difference-in-difference setting, we select the firms that disclose their CEO compensation
before 2003 (i.e., {2000, 2001, 2002}) as the control group. And we regard those firms that do not
disclose their wage before 2003 but do disclose it in the year 2006 as the treatment group.12 The
independent variable Treatment equals 1 when an observation is in the treatment group, and Post-
2006 equals 1 when the year is in or after 2006. Table 9 presents the results in specifications (1) and
(2). The coefficients on Treatment × Post-2006 in both specifications are statistically significant at
the 1% level. The results are also economically significant. When firms are required to make their
CEO compensation publicly observable, they pay 11.5% higher wages to their employees. This value
may seem large as compared to our baseline regression, where we found a coefficient on ln(CEO
pay) of 0.041. The most likely explanation for this difference is the selection bias.
Selection bias: One concern about the difference-in-difference setting is the assumption of a
random formation of the treatment and control groups. Before 2006, firms could choose whether
to disclose their CEO compensation or not. From 2006, firms are required to disclose their CEO
compensation, unless otherwise decided by the annual general meeting by a three quarters majority.
Therefore, our difference-in-difference method might suffer from a potential selection bias: firms
that did not expect any strong effects from publishing CEO salaries on employee wages might have
self-selected into the control group and disclosed individual salaries before this was required by
12Our analysis in 8 assumes that CEO compensation is always available and discards the observations without CEO
compensation. The difference-in-difference regression uses all of the data notwithstanding if CEO compensation is
available or not.
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Table 9: Difference-in-difference and triple-diff-in-diff regressions
This table presents results for regressions in a difference-in-difference setting (specifications 1 and 2) and a triple-
diff-in-diff setting (specifications 3 and 4) with the log median annual wage of full-time employees as the dependent
variable. All independent variables are lagged by one year. See Table 7 for a detailed overview of variable definitions.
The control group contains the firms which disclose the compensation of the CEO before 2003 (i.e., {2000, 2001,
2002}). The treatment group contains the firms which do not disclose the compensation of the CEO before 2003,
but do disclose it in the year 2006. The independent variable Treatment equals 1 when an observation is in the
treatment group. Post-2006 equals 1 when the year is in or after 2006. CEO-board ratio is the percentage that the
CEO earns more than the board average compensation. We use the White (1980) robust standard errors clustered at
the firm level. The t-statistics are reported below the estimates. ***, ** and * indicate that the value is significantly
different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Dependent variable: ln(Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment × Post-2006 × CEO-board ratio 0.303*** 0.348***
2.92 3.03
Treatment × Post-2006 0.124*** 0.115*** 0.000 -0.021
3.26 3.28 0.01 -0.36
Treatment × CEO-board ratio -0.279*** -0.307***
-3.32 -3.35
Post-2006 × CEO-board ratio -0.170** -0.229***
-2.39 -2.65
Treatment -0.029 -0.037 0.075*** 0.075**
-1.04 -0.99 2.77 2.23
CEO-board ratio 0.232*** 0.273***
3.33 3.48
ROA -0.124 -0.143 -0.088 -0.108
-1.05 -1.3 -0.59 -0.78
Price to book ratio -0.025** -0.020** -0.034*** -0.028***
-2.61 -2.22 -3.35 -2.94
ln(Size) 0.024* 0.009 0.022 0.015
1.86 0.32 1.49 0.48
Leverage -0.452*** -0.432*** -0.420*** -0.398***
-3.53 -3.2 -3.15 -2.91
Union 0.108* 0.124*
1.88 1.87
ln(#Firm Employees) 0.006 -0.006
0.19 -0.18
Employee risk 0.172 0.127
0.7 0.51
ln(#Branch Employees) 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.057***
4.55 4.59 4.21 4.22
Female % -0.382*** -0.387*** -0.379*** -0.384***
-9.21 -9.51 -8.29 -8.73
Low qualified % -0.008 -0.008 -0.014 -0.014
-0.11 -0.12 -0.19 -0.2
Qualified % 0.196*** 0.191*** 0.238*** 0.240***
4.71 4.77 3.94 4
Highly qualified % 0.510*** 0.509*** 0.511*** 0.509***
12.62 12.92 10.36 10.7
German % 0.222*** 0.222*** 0.194*** 0.188***
4.9 4.93 4.27 4.35
Manager % 0.05 0.053 0.071** 0.074**
1.61 1.64 2.24 2.27
White-collar % 0.176*** 0.180*** 0.160*** 0.163***
5.38 5.36 4.98 4.95
Employee age 0.003* 0.003* 0.003 0.003
1.77 1.8 1.46 1.49
Close to head 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.019
1.3 1.38 1.36 1.42
Time, region, industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.619 0.62 0.631 0.632
Number of observations 82751 82751 65517 6551743
the regulation. This leaves those firms which expected stronger effects on employee wages for the
treatment group. Therefore, the estimated 11.5% treatment effect is probably overestimating the
average effect on firms. However, the null-hypothesis is that employee wage and CEO compensation
are independent from one another and this independence is clearly rejected.
We provide two additional tests to support our conjecture that CEO compensation influences em-
ployee wages.
Triple diff-in-diff: Under the behindness aversion hypothesis, employees’ envy should be increasing
in the wage gap between CEO and other management board members. We expect that the increase
in employees’ wage is positively related to the CEO-board wage ratio upon disclosure of the CEO
compensation. To test this presumption, we adopt a difference-in-difference-in-difference (triple
diff-in-diff) approach. CEO-board ratio is the percentage by which CEO compensation exceeds
the average management board compensation for a given year. Table 9 presents the results in
specifications (3) and (4). The coefficients on Treatment × Post-2006 × CEO-board ratio are both
statistically significant at the 1% level. So we indeed find that, after the new disclosure regulation
has become effective, employee wages increase more in firms with a relatively higher CEO pay.
The results are also economically significant. When firms start disclosing their CEO compensation
publicly after the regulation change, they pay 0.35% higher wages to their employees if the CEO-
board ratio increases by one percentage point.
Parallel trends: If our presumption that the disclosure of CEO pay led to an increase in employee
wages is correct, we would expect no significant differences between the treatment and the control
group before 2006 (parallel trends assumption) and an increase in the difference between both groups
afterwards. We include yearly interaction effects with the treatment dummy in our regression. All
independent variables are lagged by one year, so we lose the year 2011. We use 2010 as our base year.
Table 10 presents the results. The coefficients on the yearly interaction effects become significantly
different from zero after 2007, i.e., Treatment × 2007, Treatment × 2008, and Treatment × 2009
are significant at the 1% level. Over the years 2007 to 2009, the coefficients increase and the results
become more significant. This might imply that the increase in workers’ wages is rather gradual.
Moreover, the insignificant coefficients on yearly interaction effects from 2000 to 2004 (except 2002)
imply that the parallel-trend assumption holds.
The difference-in-difference analysis also helps us answer the question of whether the positive re-
lationship between CEO pay and workers’ wage is driven by workers’ envy or by the CEO’s com-
passion. Because the CEO always knows the wage of workers, the disclosure of the CEO pay does
not affect the CEO’s compassion towards normal workers. In contrast, workers do not always know
the CEO pay, so the disclosure of the CEO pay will increase the workers’ envy towards the CEO.
The results from a difference-in-difference analysis confirm that the increase in the workers’ pay is
driven by the workers’ envy.
In sum, we interpret these results as strong evidence for a causal effect of CEO compensation on
employee wages consistent with the existence of the employee’s behindness aversion. These diff-
in-diff results cannot be explained by the production dynamics hypothesis which states that the
pressure on wages decreases if productivity is high.
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Table 10: Difference-in-difference with yearly interaction terms
This table presents results for regressions in a difference-in-difference setting with yearly interaction terms. The
dependent variable is the log median annual wage of full-time employees. All independent variables are lagged by
one year. See Table 7 for a detailed overview of variable definitions. The control group contains the firms which
disclose the compensation of the CEO before 2003 (i.e., {2000, 2001, 2002}). The treatment group contains the firms
which do not disclose the compensation of the CEO before 2003, but do it disclose in the year 2006. The independent
variable Treatment equals 1 when an observation is in the treatment group. Post-2005 equals 1 when the year is
in or after 2005. We use the White (1980) robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The t-statistics are
reported below the estimates. ***, ** and * indicate that the value is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels.
Dependent variable: ln(Wage)
(1) (2)
Treatment × 2000 0.042 0.051
0.84 0.99
Treatment × 2001 -0.084* -0.065
-1.8 -1.3
Treatment × 2002 -0.109** -0.103**
-2.32 -2.29
Treatment × 2003 -0.076 -0.069
-1.23 -1.2
Treatment × 2004 -0.034 -0.029
-0.79 -0.68
Treatment × 2005 0.029 0.035
0.9 1.02
Treatment × 2006 0.043 0.045*
1.6 1.67
Treatment × 2007 0.088*** 0.087***
3.43 3.14
Treatment × 2008 0.113*** 0.111***
4.97 4.94
Treatment × 2009 0.147*** 0.144***
6.14 5.56
Treatment 0.015 0
0.39 -0.01
ROA -0.114 -0.132
-0.97 -1.22
Price to book ratio -0.025*** -0.020**
-2.67 -2.28
ln(Size) 0.024* 0.009
1.86 0.3
Leverage -0.451*** -0.431***
-3.5 -3.17
Union 0.107*
1.87
ln(#Firm Employees) 0.007
0.2
Employee risk 0.174
0.71
Establishment variables Yes Yes
Industry, state, and year FE Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.619 0.62
Number of observations 82751 82751
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4.3 Unobservables and fixed effects
A specific concern might be that the relationship between CEO compensation and employee wages
is driven by firm-level or establishment-level unobservables. We address this concern using three
approaches in Table 11. First, we include firm fixed effects instead of industry fixed effects. Second,
we include both firm and industry fixed effects, which is possible since the industry differs across
establishments. Finally, we control for establishment fixed effects. These tests are demanding on
the data because the wages of both the CEO and the workers are rather sticky. The results are
nevertheless reassuring. While we lose economic significance, coefficients of ln(CEO total) are, on
average, about 50% smaller; however, the statistical significance remains intact.
Another concern may be that there are CEO-level unobservables. We investigate this possibility by
adding CEO and CEO-firm fixed effects. Once more, we observe a reduction in economic significance
but the statistical significance is largely unaffected.
Finally, we might be concerned that the reason why CEO compensation affects employees’ wages
might be driven by unobservable time-varying factors at the industry level, the firm level, or the
state level. We include industry × year fixed effects, firm × year fixed effects, and state × year
fixed effects. We find that neither economic nor statistical significance is materially affected. This
analysis suggests that time-varying industry level, firm level and state level unobservables are not
inducing our results.
4.4 Abnormal CEO compensation
It is possible that employees feel more envy towards CEOs who receive an abnormally high compen-
sation as compared to similar peers. To address this concern, we use CEO abnormal compensation
as an additional explanatory variable. CEO abnormal compensation is defined as the difference
between actual and expected CEO compensation. Our hypothesis is: If the CEO abnormal com-
pensation is positive, i.e., the CEO earns more than what she deserves to get, the employee is more
behindness averse. If the CEO abnormal compensation is negative, i.e., the CEO earns less than
what she deserves to get, the employee is less behindness averse.
The analysis takes three steps. In the first step, we calculate the CEO expected compensation.
We adopt the model used by Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino (2009). The CEO expected total com-
pensation is predicted by regressing the log CEO total compensation on log firms’ total assets,
the ratio of EBIT to assets (ROA), the ratio of assets to firm value (book-to-market ratio), CEO
tenure, as well as year and industry (2-digit SIC) fixed effects. In the second step, we calculate
the log CEO abnormal compensation. The log CEO abnormal total compensation is the difference
between the actual log total compensation and the expected log total compensation. In the third
step, we regress log workers’ median wage on log CEO abnormal compensation and our standard
set of control variables. Table 12 shows a statistically significant effect (1% level) of CEO abnormal
total compensation on employee wages. A 1% increase of CEO abnormal total results in a 0.03%
increase in the median employee’s wage.
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Table 11: Different sets of fixed effects
This table presents results for regressions with the log median annual wage of full-time employees as the dependent
variable. All independent variables are lagged by one year. See Table 7 for a detailed overview of variable definitions.
The table displays results for regressions with different sets of fixed effects. The unreported control variables are
the same as in specifications (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) of Table 8. We use the White (1980) robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level. The t-statistics are reported below the estimates. ***, ** and * indicate that the value is
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Dependent variable: ln(Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm, year and state fixed effects
ln(CEO total) 0.019** 0.018** 0.015** 0.016** 0.016**
2.14 2.45 2.45 2.45 2.36
Adjusted R2 0.401 0.553 0.550 0.550 0.550
Number of observations 108,589 106,538 104,150 104,149 103,770
Firm, industry, year and state fixed effects
ln(CEO total) 0.018* 0.017* 0.017** 0.017** 0.017**
1.91 1.93 2.17 2.10 2.16
Adjusted R2 0.566 0.646 0.638 0.638 0.638
Number of observations 108,363 106,341 103,961 103,960 103,581
Establishment and year fixed effects
ln(CEO total) 0.015** 0.016** 0.013* 0.013** 0.013*
2.18 2.26 1.98 2.00 1.96
Adjusted R2 0.922 0.926 0.927 0.927 0.927
Number of observations 108,589 106,538 104,150 104,149 103,770
CEO, year and state fixed effects
ln(CEO total) 0.021** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020***
2.03 2.70 3.25 3.21 3.22
Adjusted R2 0.401 0.553 0.550 0.550 0.550
Number of observations 108,547 106,496 104,108 104,107 103,770
CEO × firm, year and state fixed effects
ln(CEO total) 0.021** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020***
2.03 2.70 3.25 3.21 3.22
Adjusted R2 0.401 0.553 0.550 0.550 0.550
Number of observations 108,589 106,538 104,150 104,149 103,770
Industry × year and state fixed effects
ln(CEO total) 0.053** 0.048** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.037***
2.04 2.07 3.23 3.29 3.27
Adjusted R2 0.524 0.620 0.612 0.615 0.617
Number of observations 108,363 106,341 103,961 103,960 103,581
State × year and firm fixed effects
ln(CEO total) 0.018* 0.017** 0.015** 0.016** 0.015**
1.97 2.31 2.3 2.36 2.27
Adjusted R2 0.404 0.554 0.552 0.552 0.552
Number of observations 108,589 106,538 104,150 104,149 103,770
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Table 12: CEO abnormal total compensation
This table presents results for regressions with the log median annual wage of full-time employees as the dependent
variable. The independent variable is the logarithmic CEO abnormal total compensation. We measure the CEO
abnormal total compensation using the method adopted by Gillan et al. (2009). The logarithmic CEO abnormal
total compensation is the difference between the CEO actual logarithmic compensation and the expected logarithmic
total compensation calculated by regressing the logarithmic CEO total compensation on logarithmic firms’ total
assets, the ratio of EBIT to assets (ROA), the ratio of assets to firm value (book-to-market ratio), CEO tenure, the
two-digit SIC of the firm, and the year of the observation. All independent variables are lagged by one year. The
establishment variables are the same as in specification (5) of Table 8. See Table 7 for a detailed overview of variable
definitions. We use the White (1980) robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The t-statistics are reported
below the estimates. ***, ** and * indicate that the value is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels.
Dependent variable: ln(Wage)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(CEO abnormal total compensation) 0.028*** 0.027** 0.033***
3.16 2.36 3.89
ROA -0.317* -0.179 -0.107
-1.81 -1.29 -0.79
Market to book ratio -0.018 -0.018* -0.023**
-1.62 -1.82 -2.04
ln(Size) 0.022 -0.016 -0.006
1.27 -0.61 -0.23
Leverage -0.119 -0.204* -0.261*
-1.11 -1.82 -1.88
Union 0.126* 0.121*
1.93 1.84
ln(# Firm employees) 0.037* 0.031
1.7 1.44
Employee risk 0.561** 0.550***
2.61 2.71
CEO ownership -0.006
-0.12
CEO tenure 0.004*
1.99
ln(# Establishment employees) 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044***
3.64 3.7 3.72
Female % -0.262*** -0.274*** -0.275***
-3.66 -3.66 -3.66
low qualified % -0.016 -0.012 -0.01
-0.29 -0.22 -0.19
Qualified % 0.220*** 0.213*** 0.212***
5.8 5.83 5.81
Highly qualified % 0.515*** 0.512*** 0.511***
12.31 13.21 13.37
German % 0.255*** 0.253*** 0.256***
5.31 5.44 5.48
Manager % 0.022 0.04 0.043
0.79 1.47 1.5
White collar % 0.159*** 0.174*** 0.176***
6.71 8.31 8.43
Employee age 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**
2.54 2.57 2.59
Close to head 0.028** 0.029** 0.029**
2.24 2.21 2.22
Industry, state, and year FE Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.609 0.613 0.614
Number of observations 103664 103663 103581
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Table 13: Timing and alternative measures of CEO compensation
This table presents results for regressions with the log median annual wage of full-time employees as the dependent
variable. Panel A displays results for regressions with different time lags for independent variables: (1) no lag, (2)
all independent variables are lagged by 1 year (baseline specification), (3) all independent variables are lagged by
2 years, (4) all independent variables are lagged by 3 years, (5) only ln(CEO total) is lagged by 1 year, (6) only
ln(CEO total) is lagged by 2 years. Panel B displays results for regressions when alternative measures of executive
compensation are used as independent variables. All independent variables are lagged by one year. See Table 7 for
a detailed overview of variable definitions. We use the White (1980) robust standard errors clustered at firm level.
The t-statistics are reported below the estimates. ***, ** and * indicate that the value is significantly different from
zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Panel A: Different time lags
Dependent variable: ln(Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(CEO total) 0.021*
1.68
ln(CEO total) (t-1 for all) 0.038***
3.71
ln(CEO total) (t-2 for all) 0.032***
3.36
ln(CEO total) (t-3 for all) 0.039***
3.65
ln(CEO total) (t-1) 0.025**
2.27
ln(CEO total) (t-2) 0.022**
2.06
Firm variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, state, and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.617 0.615 0.606 0.598 0.624 0.62
Number of observations 125173 103581 84815 67029 107880 89112
4.5 Timing and alternative measures of CEO compensation
In order to better understand the relationship between CEO and employee compensation, we analyze
different time lags of CEO total compensation. The most salient measure of CEO compensation
for employees should be the total compensation from the last fiscal year, because that number is
published during year t. The hypothesis is: If the firm anticipates the behindness aversion of its
employees and therefore offers them an increased wage proactively, ln(CEO total)t−1 will have the
largest impact. If instead lengthy negotiations between employees and the firm take place, then a
higher order lag of CEO compensation may be more relevant. Table 13 Panel A shows exactly the
hypothesized result. ln(CEO total)t−1 exhibits the highest t-statistic independent of whether we
use lagged or contemporaneous control variables. In fact, the contemporaneous CEO compensation
only has a marginally significant impact on employee wages. It is consistent with the idea that the
firm anticipates the behindness aversion of its rank-and-file workers and that no lengthy negotiations
are needed.
In a second step, we analyze the impact of different measures of executive compensation. If the
correlation between CEO and employee compensation were to be mainly driven by unobservables
(e.g., some dimension of profitability not captured by our other controls, i.e., ROA, or Market
to book ratio), we would expect a similar correlation between average board or other executive
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compensation and employee wages. However, as shown by Panel B of Table 13, this is not the
case. Other executives than the CEO (ln(Other total)) are insignificantly related to employee
wages. CEO compensation has significantly more explanatory power than alternative measures of
executive compensation. The explanatory power even increases if we use the CEO premium (i.e.,
the difference between CEO and average other executive compensation).
4.6 Subsamples
In Table 13, we have seen that employee wages react more strongly to increases in CEO compensation
than, for example, average management board compensation. However, before 2006, firms were
not required to publish management board compensation individually. Even today, the German
Corporate Governance Code still allows that management board compensation is not disclosed
at the individual level, if the annual general meeting approves the non-publication with a three-
quarter majority. This means that employees cannot observe the CEO’s compensation for many
German firms before 2006 and for some after 2006. If inequality aversion is indeed the driver for the
reason that CEO compensation affects employees’ wages, we expect two effects from the regulatory
change in 2006: (1) for firms that do not disclose management compensation individually before
and after 2006, the impact of ln(Board total) on employee wages is largely unchanged and similar to
the impact of ln(CEO total) for firms that disclose CEO compensation; (2) for firms that disclose
management compensation individually after 2006, ln(Board total) becomes insignificant. That is
exactly what we observe in our subsample analysis in Table 14. Only looking at firms that do
not disclose management compensation individually (column (1)), we find a positive and significant
coefficient on ln(Board total). The economic effect is cut by more than half and statistical significance
disappears, if we look at the sample of firms disclosing management compensation individually
(column (2)). Both effects are even more pronounced for the non-disclosing firms before 2006
(column 4) and the disclosing firms after 2006 (column 5). This result is also confirmed when
we use both measures ln(other total) and ln(CEO total) in the same regression (columns (3) and
(6)). These findings suggest that employees benchmark their own salaries towards the most salient
management compensation figure available. If compensation is disclosed individually, employees
seem to only compare their wage to the CEO’s compensation but not to that of other executives. If
the CEO compensation is not available, the closest proxy, average management board compensation,
is used as a benchmark. In sum, these empirical patterns lend strong support to the hypothesis
that behindness aversion is an important driver in setting wages for rank-and-file employees.
4.7 Wage changes
To further test whether our model is robust, we ask whether the increases in employee wages are
associated with the increases in CEO pay. The regression of changes on changes removes the effect
of time-invariant unobservables. The change of the independent variable ln(CEO total) is the annual
growth rate in CEO total compensation, and the change of the explanatory variable ln(Wage) is
the annual growth rate in employees’ wages. In order to rule out the possibility that the increase
in employees’ wages is driven by fast growing establishments, we drop the observations where the
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Table 14: Subsample analysis
This table presents results for regressions with the log median annual wage of full-time employees as the dependent
variable. The “No disclosure" sample includes all establishment-year observations of firms not disclosing the individual
CEO compensation in a given year, i.e., the sample consists of firms that only disclose the aggregated compensation
of all members in the management board in a given year. The “Disclosure" sample includes all establishment-
year observations of firms disclosing the individual CEO compensation in a given year. Since 2006, the German
Corporate Governance Code requires firms to disclose the individual compensation of all management board members.
The German Corporate Governance Code still allows the firm not to disclose management board compensation
individually, if the firm’s annual general meeting approves the non-publication with a three-quarter majority. All
independent variables are lagged by one year. The firm variables and establishment variables are the same as in
specification (5) of Table 8. See Table 7 for a detailed overview of variable definitions. We use the White (1980)
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The t-statistics are reported below the estimates. ***, ** and *
indicate that the value is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Dep. variable: ln(Wage)
Sample: No disclosure Disclosure Disclosure No disclosure Disclosure Disclosure
all all all before 2006 after 2006 after 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(board total) 0.058** 0.021 0.075** 0.016
2.15 1.64 2.56 0.88
ln(CEO total) 0.099*** 0.111***
3.88 3.82
ln(other total) -0.080*** -0.101***
-2.78 -2.8
Firm variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment
variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, state,
year FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.569 0.612 0.614 0.569 0.62 0.622
Number of obs. 21287 103960 103960 18746 68442 68442
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yearly growth rate of the number of employees in an establishment is above the 95% percentile.
Specifications (2) to (5) in Table 15 show that the coefficients on CEO total increase are still
statistically significant at the 10% level. The coefficient can be interpreted as: when the annual
growth rate of the CEO total compensation is increased by 1 percentage point, then the annual
growth rate of the employees’ wages will increase by 0.004 percentage points.
4.8 Additional controls
While we control for a number of variables in the regressions in Table 8, other, potentially unob-
servable, variables may be driving our results. To minimize any such concerns, we report further
results with additional firm-level controls in Table 16. First in column (1), we add the firm’s an-
nual Stock return as an alternative measure of firm performance. The results show that employees’
wages are hardly influenced by stock returns above and beyond what is already captured in our
other control variables. The statistical and economic significance of the coefficient on ln(CEO total)
is not affected. Second, we add Board size, defined as the number of members on the executive
board. Once more, we do not observe any significant effect on employees’ wages or the coefficient
on ln(CEO total). Third, we add additional CEO characteristics: (1) CEO switch equals one if a
new CEO is appointed in t-1; (2) CEO age in years; (3) CEO out-hiring equals one if the CEO
is recruited from outside the firm. None of these CEO characteristics has a significant influence
on employee pay. Fourth, we add ln(R&D to sales). The results in Table 16 show that firms with
higher R&D expenditures (relative to sales) pay lower employee wages. However, the coefficient on
ln(CEO total) is hardly affected even though we lose more than 60% of the observations. Fifth, we
split up the dummy variable Union into four dummy variables to control separately for the influence
of the four largest German unions (IG Metall, ver.di, IG BCE, and IG BAU). We find that firms
with one of the four largest unions on their supervisory board pay their employees more on average
but there is no significant difference between these four unions. The coefficient for ln(CEO total) is
not materially affected.
5. Employee turnover
Wade, O’Reilly, and Pollock (2006) show that CEO overpayment is related to a higher turnover
for other managers (see also Bloom and Michel (2002)). What does the relation look like for
rank-and-file workers? One important task of the CEO is to keep the employee turnover low
because excessive turnover can result in shareholder value losses. We test this hypothesis us-
ing the employee inflow/outflow data provided by the IAB. We define two employee turnover
variables: (1) Outflow as Outflow of employeest/#Employeest−1 and (2) Inflow as Inflow of
employeest/#Employeest−1.
Table 17 presents the results. We observe that Outflow and Inflow are negatively correlated with
CEO compensation. This result holds for all employees and for the subsample of white-collar
employees. However, it is only significant for Outflow at the 5% level. This finding implies that em-
ployees are, on average, overcompensated for their behindness aversion, thus leading to a reduction
52
Table 15: Increase in CEO compensation and increase in employee wages
This table presents results for regressions with the annual increase in the median annual wage of full-time employees
as the dependent variable. All independent variables are lagged by one year. See Table 7 for a detailed overview of
variable definitions. The variable CEO total increase is the annual increase in CEO total compensation. We only use
the observations where the yearly changes of the numbers of employees at the establishment level is below the 95%
percentile. We use the White (1980) robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The t-statistics are reported
below the estimates. ***, ** and * indicate that the value is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels.
Dependent variable: Wage increase
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CEO total increase 0.005 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004*
1.61 1.68 1.74 1.73 1.68
ROA -0.04 -0.032 -0.026
-1.42 -1.27 -1.11
Market to book ratio 0.002 0.002 0.001
1.15 1.45 0.92
ln(Size) 0.001 0.000 0.001
0.83 0.04 0.33
Leverage 0.008 0.003 0.006
0.53 0.18 0.3
Union 0.014* 0.011
1.98 1.59
ln(# Firm employees) 0.000 -0.001
0.04 -0.17
Employee risk 0.044 0.042
1.13 1.09
CEO ownership 0.020*
1.99
CEO tenure 0.000
0.67
ln(# Estab. employees) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
-4.74 -4.83 -5.1 -5.17
Female % 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023***
3.6 3.14 3.03 2.97
Low qualified % 0.023* 0.022* 0.023* 0.023*
1.88 1.89 1.84 1.88
Qualified % -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010***
-3.58 -3.76 -3.85 -3.84
Highly qualified % -0.015** -0.016** -0.016** -0.016**
-2.17 -2.27 -2.3 -2.32
German % -0.025*** -0.023** -0.024** -0.024**
-2.83 -2.59 -2.58 -2.6
Manager % -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.028***
-4.78 -4.51 -4.5 -4.54
White-collar % 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.010***
3.02 2.86 3.5 4.27
Employee age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
-4.29 -4.32 -4.35 -4.21
Close to head -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
-0.07 -0.19 -0.12 -0.06
Industry, state, and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006
Number of observations 85,660 85,660 85,546 85,546 85,348
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Table 16: Robustness checks with additional controls
This table presents results for regressions with the log median annual wage of full-time employees as the dependent
variable using additional control variables: (1) Stock return, (2) board size, (3) additional CEO characteristics, (4)
R&D to sales, and (5) union variables. All independent variables are lagged by one year. See Table 7 for a detailed
overview of the variable definitions. We use the White (1980) robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The
t-statistics are reported below the estimates. ***, ** and * indicate that the value is significantly different from zero
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Dependent variable: ln(Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(CEO total) 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.034** 0.039***
2.99 3.91 3.23 2.03 4.21
Stock return -0.008
-0.58
Board size 0.005
0.80
CEO switch 0.002
0.14
CEO age 0.001
0.40
CEO out-hiring -0.016
-0.65
ln(R&D to sales) -0.019**
-2.29
IGBAU 0.179**
2.57
IGBCE 0.109*
1.77
IGMetall 0.115
1.48
Verdi 0.133*
1.81
Firm variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, state, and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.605 0.615 0.615 0.496 0.615
Number of observations 100,112 103,581 103,574 40,952 103,581
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in turnover because the outside options are relatively less attractive.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we document a strong positive effect of CEO compensation on the wages of rank-and-
file employees. This pattern is not explained by established determinants of employee wages and
is unlikely to be caused by unobservables at the industry, firm, CEO, establishment, or state level.
Difference-in-difference analysis, triple-diff-in-diff, and the analysis of CEO abnormal compensation
suggest a causal interpretation of our findings. The evidence is most consistent with firms paying
higher wages to their employees in order to compensate them for the disutility caused by the pay gap
to the CEO. The most likely driver underlying this phenomenon is behindness aversion of employees.
This paper also shows that a highly paid CEO keeps the employee turnover low.
An interesting implication would be a cross-country comparison. In countries that experience higher
inequality aversion the executive pay (all else equal) should be lower. Gabaix and Landier (2008) test
this using the World Value Survey. However, they have only 17 observations and find insignificant
results. A promising research project might be to have a larger data set that enables the researcher
to sufficiently control for all known effects on pay levels, e.g., firm size.
Our evidence of employee behindness aversion implies that managerial compensation incurs addi-
tional "inequality costs", which need to be taken into consideration when determining the optimal
contracts for both CEOs and employees. Any additional dollar paid to the CEO for providing
incentives also leads to higher employee wages to compensate employees for their (perceived) losses
from behindness aversion. These costs must be taken into account by shareholders to arrive at the
real cost of CEO compensation.
Appendix A: Proof of the Proposition 1
The Lagrangian is:
L =
∞∫
o
(PT −W cT −WwT ) g (PT | e) dPT
+λPCC
 ∞∫
o
V c (W cT ) g (PT | e) dPT − C (e)− U c

+λICC
 ∞∫
o
V c (W cT ) ge (PT | e) dPT − C ′ (e)

+λPCW
 ∞∫
o
[V w (W cT )− αS (W cT −WwT )] g (PT | e) dPT − Uw

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Table 17: Employee turnover
This table presents results for regressions with different employee turnover variables as dependent variables. All
independent variables are lagged by one year. See Table 7 for a detailed overview of the variable definitions. We use
the White (1980) robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The t-statistics are reported below the estimates.
***, ** and * indicate that the value is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Dependent variable: Outflow Outflow white-collar Inflow Inflow white-collar
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(CEO total) -0.023** -0.016** -0.041 -0.045
-2.59 -2.61 -0.58 -0.66
ROA -0.028 -0.038 -1.18 -1.123
-0.44 -0.8 -1.04 -1.06
Price to book ratio 0.007 0.006* 0.106 0.108
1.39 1.84 1.05 1.07
ln(Size) 0.008 -0.005 0.019 0.067
0.68 -0.63 0.14 0.53
Leverage -0.094 -0.062* -1.277 -1.274
-1.64 -1.76 -1.55 -1.57
Union 0.018 0.009 0.14 0.142
0.82 0.48 0.61 0.63
ln(# Firm employees) 0.011 0.021** 0.092 0.03
1.43 2.62 0.74 0.27
Employee risk -0.158 -0.008 0.607 0.674
-1.41 -0.08 0.74 0.84
CEO ownership 0.015 0.046* -0.155 -0.203
0.4 1.77 -0.47 -0.63
CEO tenure -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
-1.05 -1.17 -0.54 -0.41
ln(# Estab. Employees) -0.041*** -0.029*** -0.307*** -0.245***
-22.7 -9.08 -4.48 -3.51
Female % -0.043 -0.008 -0.336*** -0.242***
-1.59 -0.9 -4.51 -3.26
Low qualified % 0.01 0.031* 0.234 0.095
0.4 1.97 0.66 0.38
Qualified % -0.031*** -0.01 0.021 -0.007
-3.16 -0.84 0.12 -0.04
Highly qualified % -0.028 -0.068*** 1.154** 1.049**
-1.56 -3.91 2.45 2.31
German % -0.155*** -0.069*** -0.846* -0.702
-3.56 -4.8 -1.77 -1.46
Manager % -0.007 -0.004 0.453 0.484
-0.27 -0.18 0.73 0.81
White collar % 0.055 0.325*** 0.174 0.314***
1.6 23.51 1.49 2.69
Employee age -0.002* -0.001 0.007* 0.006*
-1.78 -0.99 1.98 1.91
Close to head 0.006 0.005 0.185 0.18
1.34 1.35 1.36 1.35
Establishment and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.395 0.015 0.014
Number of observations 56922 56922 57601 57601
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To use the implicit function theorem, we define
G(W cT ,W
w
T ) =
dL
dWwT
= −1 + λPCW
[
V w′ (WwT ) + αS
′ (W cT −WwT )
]
.
∂G
∂WwT
= λPCW
[
V w′′ (WwT )− αS′′ (W cT −WwT )
]
∂G
∂W cT
= λPCWαS
′′ (W cT −WwT )
⇒ dW
w
T
dW cT
= − ∂G/∂W
c
T
∂G/∂WwT
=
αS′′ (W cT −WwT )
αS′′
(
W cT −WwT
)− V w′′ (WwT )
This expression is positive if S (·) is convex, which proves Proposition 1.
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Chapter IV
Wage gap and stock returns
1. Introduction
In recent years, pay inequality between managers and workers has received increasing attention from
academics, regulators, and the media13. Notably, on October 17, 2015, the Securities and Exchange
Commission adopted a new rule, effective from January 1, 2017, that requires U.S. companies to
disclose the ratio of CEO pay to the median employee wage. In this regard, on May 11, 2016, the New
York Times pointed out that “(t)he strong case for the rule (...) keeps getting stronger”, providing
support to the idea that corporations should “rein in” the difference in pay between managers and
workers.
Interestingly, the populist anger that meets high executive premia does not seem to be justified
by the facts at hand, at least on purely economic grounds. Recent research shows that high pay
inequality does not hinder firm performance (Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos,
2009), and actually seems to improve it (Faleye, Reis, and Venkateswaran, 2013; Mueller, Ouimet,
and Simintzi, 2017), which is in line with the conjecture that a larger wage gap reflects higher
managerial skills. The stock market, however, does not seem to price this information correctly. In
a study on British companies, Mueller, Ouimet, and Simintzi (2017) show that stocks with low pay
inequality yield negative risk-adjusted returns, and argue that this might be due to the inability
of arbitrage forces to observe the wage gap. In this paper, we shed new light on this issue, both
theoretically and empirically.
We propose an asset pricing model with unsophisticated traders and short-sales constraints, in
which the optimal wage gap between the CEO and rank-and-file workers increases with managerial
effort. In equilibrium, we show that firms with low wage gaps should be overpriced. Using a unique
data set on German firms’ employee compensation, we provide strong support for the model’s
predictions. We find that a long-short portfolio of stocks with high and low wage gaps, respectively,
yields positive and robust risk-adjusted returns. We also show that the results are partly driven by
the fact that some investors exhibit inequality-averse preferences. The empirical evidence suggests
that high wage gap firms are indeed better managed, but investors do not fully incorporate this
information into the stock price.
In our theoretical analysis, we consider a three-period economy. At time zero, the representative firm
appoints a manager to hire workers and carry out a project. The firm engages in efficient contracting,
and chooses the optimal level of managerial effort by solving the following trade-off: high effort costs
more, but improve both the firm’s productivity, through a more efficient employment of resources,
and the outcome of wage negotiations with workers, through a tougher attitude in bargaining. At
time one, the firm seeks funding on the stock market to pay workers’ wages and start production.
13See, e.g., Graef (1991), Pfeffer and Langton (1993), Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1995), Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2000), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Bloom and Michel (2002), and Wade, O’Reilly, and Pollock (2006).
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At time two, the firm liquidates.
Investors can be either sophisticated (arbitrageurs) or unsophisticated (noise traders), where the
latter face short-sales constraints14. Arbitrageurs use the wage gap as a signal for managerial effort,
and have unbiased evaluations. Noise traders, instead, do not recognize the informativeness of
the wage gap. Their evaluation of low wage gap stocks is then above the fundamental value, and
vice versa for high wage gap stocks. However, the presence of short-sales constraints only enables
them to take long positions on low wage gap stocks, thereby inflating prices. In the final period,
sophisticated investors arbitrage the mispricing away, generating lower returns. The error correction
should be particularly pronounced for stocks with the lowest wage gaps.
In the empirical analysis, we take these predictions to the data. The major hurdle to overcome in
this respect is the lack of publicly available data on rank-and-file workers’ compensation. In the U.S.,
disclosure of workers’ wages before January 1, 2017, was only discretionary, with low coverage. In
this paper, we overcome this issue by using the “Establishment History Panel” database, maintained
and made available by the German Federal Employment Agency. This is a unique data set that
contains the annual gross wage for all workers in Germany from January 2001 to December 2011,
together with information on the establishment they work for.15
Given the nature of workers’ compensation data, one important point to address is whether investors
are able to observe the wage gap. In Germany, we argue that this is possible through at least three
channels. First, companies are under the scrutiny of labor unions, who release information on
compensation schemes. Second, companies with extreme wage gaps are subject to extensive me-
dia coverage, which constitutes public information (see, e.g., Wade, O’Reilly, and Pollock (2006)).
Third, some sophisticated investors may have preferential access to firm-specific information, in-
cluding managers and workers’ pay.
To construct our test portfolios, we divide stocks into pay inequality quantiles. Then, we rebalance
them at the beginning of each year, and define high and low wage gap portfolios, respectively, as
the stocks that lie at the top and the bottom 30%, 20%, and 10% of the distribution. We define the
dependent variable as monthly excess returns on the top, bottom, and top-minus-bottom portfolios,
calculated during the year following portfolio formation. To estimate risk-adjusted returns, we run
time series regressions of the CAPM and Carhart (1997) four-factor model, using the European risk
factors from Kenneth French’s website.
We find strong support for the model’s predictions. In the European four-factor model, we find
that the top 30% wage gap stocks earn an insignificant alpha of 0.10% per month, while the bottom
30% wage gap stocks yield negative and significant risk-adjusted returns of 0.90% per month. This
results in a profitable long-short investment strategy. Consistent with the hypothesis that the
error correction is larger for extreme wage gaps, we find that the long-short strategy becomes more
profitable when considering the 20% portfolios (1.30% per month) and the 10% portfolios (1.80%
14One way to make this distinction practical is to think of them as hedge funds and mutual funds, respectively
(Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2002).
15While the panel is publicly available, employees of the German Federal Employment Agency provided an anony-
mous match between 100 large firms and establishments, making it accessible only to us.
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per month). This empirical pattern is robust to a number of empirical specifications.16.
To provide further evidence that it is indeed unsophisticated investors that drive the results, we
identify companies that are difficult to evaluate and/or arbitrage. Notable examples are those with
low market capitalization and extreme book-to-market ratios (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Baker
and Wurgler, 2007). With lower arbitrage activity, we expect the mispricing of the wage gap to
be particularly pronounced among these stocks. Consistent with the conjecture, we find that the
negative risk-adjusted returns of low wage gap stocks are entirely concentrated around small stocks
(i.e., below-median market capitalization) and stocks with extreme book-to-market ratios (i.e., top
and bottom 30%).
Next, we acknowledge the fact that some individuals may exhibit inequality aversion Fehr and
Schmidt (1999). We conjecture that this type of preferences could also characterize investor be-
havior, and then affect the evaluation of the wage gap. A recent Eurosif study suggests that this
might indeed be the case for German investors.17 First, Germany is one of the European countries
that invest the most in SRI stocks (only second to France), and labor rights constitutes one of
the dimensions through which firms are evaluated. Second, there is large participation of institu-
tional investors with a focus on societal values. Pension funds account for nearly half (48%) of all
assets under management invested in SRI, followed by religious institutions and charities (24%),
and foundations (12%). In light of this, it is plausible that some of these investors may indeed be
inequality-averse, either to cater to their clientele’s preferences, or because they may actually be
prone to such a bias themselves.18
To look into this hypothesis from a theoretical perspective, we introduce inequality-averse traders
in the model. We define them as an additional type of investors who dislike pay inequality within
firms, and therefore exhibit what we refer to as an inequality-aversion bias. In particular, they
acknowledge the economic meaning of the wage gap, but also consider non-monetary arguments
when investing (e.g., society’s welfare), which leads them to evaluate low wage gap firms in a more
favorable way than they do high wage gap firms. If more investors exhibit this bias, the overpricing
of low wage gap stocks increases.
The presence of inequality-averse traders has three testable implications. In our model, an increase
in noise trader demand increases the overpricing of low wage gap stocks, due to binding short-sales
constraints (see, e.g., Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012)). On the other hand, however, it also dilutes
the impact of inequality-averse demand, which leads to less overpricing. These two effects are in
opposite directions, and the latter dominates if the inequality-aversion bias is large enough.
Our first test, then, is to analyze the relation between noise trader demand and the returns on our
arbitrage strategy. We identify times of large noise trader demand as those in which beginning-
16We find similar results when considering the German four-factor model, cash rather than total CEO compensation,
the wage gap of the other members of the board excluding the CEO, and all establishments rather than only those
located in the same state as the company headquarters. We also form the test portfolios in April rather than January,
to acknowledge the fact most companies issue their reports at the end of the first quarter, and find analogous results.
Finally, we estimate panel regressions from Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and find again a positive
relation between wage gap and stock returns.
17http://www.eurosif.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/SRI-study-2016-HR.pdf.
18See, e.g., Hong and Kostovetsky (2012), and DeVault, Sias, and Starks (2014), for a discussion of biases in
institutional investor behavior.
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of-period investor sentiment is high (Yu and Yuan, 2011; Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2012). We
capture the level of sentiment of German investors by considering the consumer confidence index for
Germany. We find that low wage gap stocks are overpriced only in times of low sentiment, while the
mispricing disappears in times of high sentiment. For high wage gap stocks, risk-adjusted returns
continue to be close to zero in times of both high and low sentiment. As a result, arbitrage returns
are higher when noise trader demand is low. This pattern lends support to the inequality-aversion
story.
Second, we argue that if some investors exhibit a bias related to pay inequality, then the effect of such
a bias should be stronger when the wage gap is salient, i.e., when it is disclosed by firms and covered
by the media. This would be a peculiar trait of inequality-averse traders, because arbitrageurs are
unbiased, and noise traders simply neglect the wage gap at all times during the year. To test for
this, we identify April as the month in which the wage gap is typically disclosed and covered by the
press. The increase in attention towards pay inequality should then lead inequality-averse investors
to trade more. Consistent with the conjecture, we find that our long-short strategy yields positive
risk-adjusted returns only in the second quarter, and mostly in the month of April.
Third, we argue that if inequality aversion is a genuine behavioral bias, then it should not be related
to economic fundamentals. In particular, it should not matter whether high CEO pay is justified or
not by the manager’s contribution to the firm’s value. To test this hypothesis, we decompose CEO
pay into an economically justified and an unjustified component, following Rouen (2017), where
the justified component is a linear combination of firm characteristics. As noise traders neglect the
wage gap but observe the other fundamentals of the firm, their pricing error should be confined to
the unjustified wage gap. The inequality-aversion bias, instead, should apply to both the justified
and the unjustified wage gap. Our results show that the mispricing is symmetrically present in both
specifications of CEO pay, which lends support to the inequality-aversion hypothesis.
Our story hinges on the assumption that there is a positive relation between the wage gap and
managerial effort. High pay inequality, however, might also be the result of rent extraction. In this
case, the fundamental value of high wage gap firms is lower than that of low wage gap firms. Since
unsophisticated investors do not distinguish between these two types, firms with a high wage gap
should exhibit overpricing, and therefore negative risk-adjusted returns. Under efficient contracting,
instead, this mechanism applies to low wage gap firms. Our empirical results on risk-adjusted returns
lend support to the efficient contracting story.
Overall, the evidence we provide is consistent with the idea that the wage gap is not fully priced
in the stock market. Our paper sheds new light on this issue in three ways. First, we provide a
theoretical framework to analyze the economic meaning of the wage gap. Second, we show that the
overpricing of low wage gap stocks is driven by unsophisticated investors, because pay inequality
is priced correctly in stocks where arbitrage forces are likely to be at play. Third, we find that
investors trade in a way that is consistent with inequality-averse preferences. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper that finds evidence that inequality aversion is a type of behavior
among investors.
Our findings speak to a more general literature on market learning. Previous work shows that the
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market is unable to correctly evaluate intangibles, such as R&D (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Chan,
Lakonishok, and Sougiannis, 2001), advertising (Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis, 2001), patent
citations (Deng, Lev, and Narin, 1999), software development costs (Aboody and Lev, 1998). Sim-
ilarly, Edmans (2011) finds that investors do not fully incorporate public information on employee
satisfaction into the stock price. We show that pay inequality is a further mechanism.
Our findings speak to the literature on market learning. Previous work shows that the market is
unable to correctly evaluate intangibles, such as R&D (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Chan, Lakon-
ishok, and Sougiannis, 2001), advertising (Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis, 2001), patent cita-
tions (Deng, Lev, and Narin, 1999), software development costs (Aboody and Lev, 1998). Similarly,
Edmans (2011) shows that investors do not fully incorporate public information on employee satis-
faction into the stock price. These stocks, indeed, all trade below their fundamental values, and earn
positive risk-adjusted returns in the long-run. In this paper, we unveil a different mechanism. The
market evaluates high wage gap stocks correctly but overvalues low wage gap stocks, and the mis-
pricing comes from the trading activity of unsophisticated investors rather than arbitrageurs.
This paper also contributes to the literature that studies the impact of values on investor behavior
(Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Bhattacharya and Groznik, 2008; Morse and Shive, 2011; Kaustia
and Torstila, 2011). Previous research shows that investors consider nonmonetary variables in their
trading strategies, such as moral issues (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009), or political affiliation (Hong
and Kostovetsky, 2012). Our results extend these findings by providing evidence that investors,
much like the general public, dislike pay inequality within firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 illustrates
the data. Section 4 explains the methodology. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6
concludes.
2. Model
We consider a three-period economy. At time zero, the representative firm appoints a manager who
exerts effort e to negotiate workers’ wages w, hire L workers, and carry out a project of size K. The
manager receives a salary W based on his effort. At time one, the firm seeks funding on the stock
market to pay workers’ wages and start production. At time two, the firm liquidates and pays off
investors.
Under efficient contracting, the firm maximizes profits by eliciting the level of effort that is also
individually optimal for the manager:
max
e,L
pi(e, L) = y(e, L)− w(e)L−W (e), (29)
where y(e, L) ≡ θ(e)K1−αLα is the firm’s output, with θ(e) indicating productivity. The firm’s
choice of optimal managerial effort (e∗) reflects the following trade-off: high effort costs more,
(W ′(e) > 0), but also makes the firm’s employees more valuable (θ′(e) > 0), and yields better
outcomes in salary negotiations (w′(e) < 0). In Appendix A, we show that a high wage gap
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between CEO and regular workers is an indication of high effort and high profitability.
The CEO type varies across firms. The stock market then evaluates managers using the wage gap
as a signal for effort. Investors have unit mass and can be either sophisticated (arbitrageurs) or
unsophisticated (noise traders). As such, they can be thought of as hedge funds and mutual funds,
respectively, where the latter face short-sales constraints (Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2002).
We identify two types of unsophisticated investors: noise traders and inequality-averse traders,
whose populations are of size λU and λI , respectively, with λU , λI ∈ (0, 1) and λU + λI < 1. The
former neglect the wage gap, but do take into account other fundamental information about the
firm. The latter acknowledge the economic meaning of the wage gap, but dislike pay inequality
within firms. Therefore, they exhibit an inequality-aversion bias: their evaluation of low wage gap
firms is higher than the evaluation of arbitrageurs, and vice versa for high wage gap firms.
We consider a stock market from Hong and Sraer (2013), as investor i is risk-neutral and solves:
max
nij
(
nij(Ei(vj)− pj)− 1
2
n2ij
γ
)
, (30)
where nij is the number of shares traded by investor of type i in stock j, Ei(vj) is investor i’s
subjective evaluation of the stock’s cash flow, pj is the price of stock j, and γ captures transaction
costs.19 The discount rate is set to zero, without loss of generality.
Following Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), we define returns as the difference between price and
fundamental value. Given the presence of short-sales constraints, the equilibrium price depends on
whether the true value of profits per unit of capital, φ(e), is above or below the flat prior φ.
Propostion 1. Wage gap and stock returns.
a) For high wage gap stocks (φ(e¯) > φ), short-sales constraints are binding. Therefore, given supply
q, high wage gap stocks are correctly priced :
p∗(e¯) = φ(e¯)K − q
γ
, (31)
then returns on high wage gap stocks only reflect compensation for transaction costs:
r∗(e¯) =
q
γ
. (32)
b) For low wage gap stocks (φ(e) < φ), short-sales constraints do not bind. The equilibrium price is
then:
p∗(e) = φ(e)K + λU (φ− φ(e))K + λI(φ− φ(e))bK − q
γ
, (33)
where b > 0 is a parameter that captures the inequality-aversion bias. This implies lower re-
19A type of transaction cost that is characterized by such a convex function is the bid-ask spread, as larger trades
are typically associated with more unfavorable price movements.
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turns:
r∗(e) =
q
γ
−λU (φ− φ(e))K − λI(φ− φ(e))bK︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
, (34)
c) Stocks with high wage gaps outperform stocks with low wage gaps:
r∗(e¯)− r∗(e) = λU (φ− φ(e))K + λI(φ− φ(e))bK. (35)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 2. Inequality-averse investors.
a) An increase in noise trader demand has an ambiguous effect on the return differential between
high and low wage gap stocks:
d (r∗(e¯)− r∗(e))
dλU
= (φ− φ(e))K −
∣∣∣∣ dλIdλU
∣∣∣∣ (φ− φ(e))bK. (36)
The derivative is positive if b < bˆ ≡
(∣∣∣ dλIdλU ∣∣∣)−1, and negative otherwise.
b) The difference in valuations between stocks with high and low wage gaps is ambiguous in the
presence of inequality-averse investors:
p∗(e¯)− p∗(e) = (φ(e¯)− φ)K + (1− λU )(φ− φ(e))K︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0
−λI(φ− φ(e))bK︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
. (37)
The difference in valuations between high and low wage gap stocks in Equation (37) reflects two
opposite effects. The first effect incorporates the trading of arbitrageurs and noise traders, which
leads to a positive difference between the prices of high and low wage gap stocks. The second effect
is the presence of inequality-averse traders, whose demand increases the price for low wage gap
stocks. This additional effect can mitigate or eliminate the price differential altogether.
2.1 Alternative settings
We acknowledge that the wage gap can also reflect two alternative stories. First, there might be no
relation between the wage gap and managerial effort. In this case, the wage gap bears no information
on the quality of management. This implies that noise traders, who neglect pay inequality, evaluate
firms correctly, and therefore the overpricing of low wage gap stocks only comes from inequality-
averse demand. As a result, stock returns follow a pattern that is essentially identical to the one
from the efficient contracting story.
Second, a high wage gap might be the result of rent extraction. For example, an entrenched CEO
might set a higher wage gap. In this case, pay inequality is negatively related to the quality of
management. If so, high wage gap firms exhibit a lower fundamental value due to agency issues,
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while low wage gap firms are efficient. Arbitrageurs recognize this information. Inequality-averse
traders do too, but trade against high pay inequality. Noise traders continue to neglect the wage
gap, thereby evaluating all firms equally. As a result, it is firms with a high wage gap, rather than
a low one, that exhibit overpricing.
These three scenarios can be distinguished by testing our assumption that the relation between
wage gap and firm performance is positive.
2.2 Testable implications
Using Propositions 1a, 1b, and 1c above, we derive the following hypotheses on stock returns:
Hypothesis 1a. Stocks with high wage gaps yield zero risk-adjusted returns.
Hypothesis 1b. Stocks with low wage gaps yield negative risk-adjusted returns. The magnitude
of the mispricing decreases with the wage gap.
Hypothesis 1c. A portfolio of stocks with a long-short position in high and low wage gap stocks,
respectively yields positive risk-adjusted returns. The profitability of the trading strategy increases
with the difference in wage gaps.
These hypotheses reflect the fact that short-sales constraints should be binding for high wage gap
stocks, but not for low wage gap stocks. In particular, the lower the wage gap, the greater the
pricing error.
From Proposition 2a, we derive:
Hypothesis 2. If investors exhibit high inequality-aversion, an increase in noise trader demand is
followed by a decrease in the return differential between high and low wage gap stocks.
The intuition behind Hypothesis 2 is as follows. In standard asset pricing models, an increase in
noise trader demand is followed by greater overpricing, and therefore higher arbitrage returns. This
result also finds strong empirical support (see, e.g., Stambaugh et al., 2012). In the presence of
inequality-averse investors, however, we show that there is an additional mechanism. An increase in
noise trader demand also dilutes the impact of inequality-averse demand, which implies a decrease
in overpricing and arbitrage returns. The dilution effect dominates if the inequality-aversion bias is
large enough.
In the empirical analysis, we take these predictions to the data.
3. Data
The main hurdle in studies of workers’ wages is the lack of publicly available data. In this paper,
we overcome this issue by using the “Establishment History Panel” database, maintained and made
available by the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesargentur für Arbeit, BfA). This is a
unique data set that reports the annual gross wage for all rank-and-file workers in Germany, along
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with information on the local establishment they work for. The data set was then matched with
stock market data for 100 large firms from the two stock market indices DAX and MDAX in years
2004 to 2006 by the agency itself.20
The database also contains individual characteristics such as nationality, age, gender, qualification,
and type of work. While the complete database contains all these variables for each employee,
the data set made available to researchers aggregates these variables across all workers at the
establishment level. Our data set then contains the median and quartiles of the wage distribution
in any given establishment, but not the wage of each individual worker.
In addition to workers’ wages, we complement our data set using company-level accounting and stock
market data from Worldscope and Datastream, and CEO compensation data from the companies’
annual reports. The sample period is from January 2001 to December 2011, and therefore includes
the recent German reform on executive compensation disclosure. Before the reform, listed companies
only had to report the aggregate pay of their key corporate executives. Since corporations were not
keen on providing information on individual managers’ pay, the Federal Government of Germany
passed a regulation in 2005 that made such disclosure mandatory.
The number of firms at the start of the sample period is 66, peaking to 100 in 2005, and slowly
decreasing to 84 by 2011. On average, the number of firms in our sample is 95 per year. The number
of establishments follows a similar pattern, starting at 16,471, peaking to 25,767 in 2006, only to
slowly decrease to 15,607 by the end of the sample period.
The industry breakdown shows that the most represented sector in the sample is post and telecom-
munication (24%), followed by financial intermediation (17%), and retail trade (9%). The distri-
bution of establishments by states, on the other hand, shows that the most represented regions
are “Nordrhein-Westfalen” (18%), followed by Bayern (16%), and Baden-Württemberg (12%). A
significant proportion of establishments is located in the same state as the firms’ headquarters
(18%).
The data set includes 146 CEOs and 734 executive board members overall. The representative
CEO in our sample is 54 years old, with a tenure of approximately six years, and an average annual
compensation of BC2.62 million, of which BC2.06 million in cash (see Table 18). CEO turnover is
relatively low (9%), and a substantial portion of CEOs is hired inside the firm (43%). The average
management board includes five members. Each member receives an average total compensation
of BC1.45 million per year, of which BC1.17 million in cash. The pay of non-CEO managers is highly
correlated with that of the CEO (80%).
The average firm employs 52,124 workers overall, and around 60 full-time employees per establish-
ment, with a median age of 41 years. The overwhelming majority of such workers is German (97%).
Most of them are highly qualified (73%), and have a white-collar job (61%). Women are well-
represented in the sample (43%). In 95% of the cases there is a labor union within the firm.
The median wage at the establishment level for full-time rank-and-file workers is BC35,167 per year,
20At the time of matching establishments to firms, establishment data was not available for 2007 and subsequent
years.
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Table 18: Summary statistics
Summary statistics for board (Panel A) and firm-level (Panel B) variables in our sample. CEO and managers’ pay
are defined as the total annual compensation, including cash and stocks. Wage gaps are calculated with respect to
workers wages, which we measure as the average annual wage paid in establishments that are located in the same
state as the firm’s headquarters, weighted by the number of employees in each establishment. The statistics for
compensation and total assets are expressed in euros. The sample period is from January 2002 to December 2011.
Panel A
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
CEO pay 6,161 2.62 2.42 0.02 16.60
CEO cash 6,161 2.06 1.68 0.02 12.90
Manager pay 6,149 1.45 1.08 0.02 8.17
Manager cash 6,149 1.17 0.79 0.00 6.87
CEO wage gap (logs) 5,981 3.89 1.01 -0.61 8.42
Manager wage gap (logs) 5,969 3.41 0.88 -0.40 7.80
CEO cash wage gap (logs) 5,981 3.71 0.95 -0.61 7.73
Manager cash wage gap (logs) 5,933 3.26 0.77 1.56 7.33
Panel B
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
ROA 9,353 4.51 8.44 -46.39 78.81
ROE 9,403 7.06 40.97 -724.97 444.25
Tobin’s q 9,427 2.32 2.55 0.21 28.57
Total assets 9,415 57.87 207.67 29.78 2,193.95
Employees 9,439 52,124 93,462 2 536,350
Returns 13,144 -0.0019 0.1231 -1.8971 0.8450
while the first and third quartiles of the distribution are, respectively, BC31,678 and BC37,301. There-
fore, the average ratio between CEO and workers’ pay is 73.6, which is high, but still six times
lower than the average wage gap in the U.S. (see, e.g., (Faleye, Reis, and Venkateswaran, 2013)).
For non-CEO managers, the average wage gap is 40.8.21
4. Methodology
Following previous literature, we define the wage gap as the log-difference between managers’ pay
and rank-and-file workers’ wages. In our baseline specifications, we primarily define managerial
compensation as the overall pay of the CEO, including both the variable and the fixed compo-
nent. For robustness, we alternatively define it as the overall pay of the other members of the
management board. On the other hand, we define workers’ compensation in a given company as
the average establishment-level median wage, weighted by the number of employees in each estab-
lishment.22
To construct our test portfolios, we rank all stocks in pay inequality quantiles, as measured in the
previous year. Then, we rebalance them at the beginning of each year, and define high and low wage
gap portfolios, respectively, as the stocks that lie at the top and the bottom 30%, 20%, and 10% of
the distribution. We define our dependent variable as excess returns on the top portfolios, excess
21For our summary statistics, we consider the wage gap without logs. In the empirical analysis, however, we express
the wage gap in log-differences.
22All the results that follow are robust to using a simple arithmetic average across establishments.
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returns on the bottom portfolios, and returns on the top-minus-bottom portfolios. We consider
equally-weighted returns all throughout.23.
In our baseline specifications, we follow Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos (2009)
and calculate the wage gap only using the establishments that are located in the same state as the
firm’s headquarters. In addition to their argument on proximity and ease of interaction between
the management and employees, we acknowledge the fact that political and economic heterogeneity
across German states may create noise in our wage gap estimates. With this restriction, we make
sure that managers and workers face the same local government and costs of living.
To test the model’s assumption that high wage gap firms are better managed, we estimate the
following panel regressions:
yit = αi + αt + β1wit−1 + γSit + it, (38)
where yit is the return on assets or Tobin’s q for company i in year t, αi and αt are firm and year
fixed effects, wit−1 is the wage gap of stock i in the previous year, and Sit is the logarithm of the
company’s number of employees as a proxy for size. Standard errors are clustered by firm and
year.
To test the hypotheses from the model, we primarily run time-series regressions using European
financial data from Kenneth French’s website.24 Our main test equation is Carhart’s four-factor
model, which allows us to control for a number of well-known risk-factors:
Rit = αi + βiMKTt + siSMBt + hiHMLt + uiUMDt + it, (39)
where the dependent variable is the excess returns on portfolios of stocks with high (i = H) or low
(i = L) wage gaps, or the returns on the long-short portfolio (i = H−L). The independent variables
are excess returns on the market portfolio (MKT), and the size (SMB), book-to-market (HML), and
momentum factor (UMD), respectively. The intercept captures abnormal risk-adjusted returns. In
the analysis below, we also report the estimates from simple CAPM regressions (including the
market factor only). Standard errors are calculated following Newey and West (1987) to correct for
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Hypothesis 1a implies no pricing errors for high wage gap stocks, and therefore αH = 0. Hypothesis
1b predicts that low wage gap stocks trade at a premium, i.e., αL < 0. In turn, Hypothesis 1c implies
αH−L > 0. Following the theoretical guidance, we estimate the equation for all three thresholds
(30%, 20%, 10%), and expect the mispricing to become stronger as we move towards the tails of
the distribution.
Of particular importance is also the coefficient of the size factor, because pay inequality seems to
be related to firm size. The idea is that executive ability is worth more to firms that own a larger
amount of resources. This mechanism leads to “assortative matching”, where better managers are
23The results that follow are weaker for value-weighted returns, as large firms are less affected by mispricing (Baker
and Wurgler, 2006).
24All the results that follow are robust to using German risk factors from the Humboldt University of Berlin.
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hired by larger firms (Tervio, 2008; Gabaix and Landier, 2008). Therefore, we need to make sure
that any difference in returns between high and low wage gap stocks does not simply reflect a size
premium, but rather constitutes a separate effect. Following this line of reasoning, we expect the
following loadings on the size factor: sH < 0, sL > 0, sH−L < 0.
To test Hypothesis 2, we consider investor sentiment as a proxy for the size of noise trader demand
(Yu and Yuan, 2011; Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2012). High sentiment then identifies an increase
in λU in Equation (35), which allows us to empirically test Equation (36). We capture the level
of sentiment of German investors by considering the consumer confidence index for Germany. For
robustness, we also consider consumer confidence for the euro area and the OECD. Given the high
persistence of all three indices, we consider them in changes. To identify periods with high or low
sentiment, for each of the indices we construct a dummy variable that takes on value one if the
index has increased in value over the previous month, and zero otherwise. Then, we re-estimate
Equation (39) conditioning on high and low sentiment periods:
Rit = αi + δiDt−1 + βiMKTt + siSMBt + hiHMLt + uiUMDt + it, (40)
where Dt−1 represents the sentiment dummy. If investors exhibit a large inequality-aversion bias,
high sentiment should be followed by less overpricing for low wage gap stocks, which implies a
decrease in arbitrage returns. Therefore, we should observe δL > 0 and δH−L < 0.
In robustness checks, we also estimate the following panel regressions:
Rit = β0 + β1dit−1 + δ
′
Zit + it, (41)
where Rit is the return on stock i in month t; dit−1 is a dummy variable that takes on value one if
the wage gap of stock i in the previous year is among the top 30% of the distribution; and Zit is a
vector of firm characteristics from Brennan et al. (1998), which includes: size (defined as the log
of market capitalization at the end of month t− 2), the log of the book-to-market ratio (calculated
each July and held constant through the following June), the ratio of dividends in the previous
fiscal year to market value at calendar year-end (calculated each July and held constant through
the following June), the log of cumulative returns over months t − 3 through t − 2, months t − 6
through t− 4, and months t− 12 through t− 7, the log of the dollar volume of trading in the stock
in month t − 2, and the log of the stock price at the end of month t − 2. To compare extreme
wage gaps, we leave out the stocks that lie in the middle 40% of the wage gap distribution. In this
specification, the model’s predictions imply β1 > 0.
5. Empirical results
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we provide empirical support to the idea that a high wage
gap represents compensation for better management skills. In the second subsection, we estimate our
baseline regressions from Equation (39). In the third subsection, we look into whether the results are
driven by sophisticated or unsophisticated traders. In the fourth subsection, we distinguish noise
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traders from inequality-averse traders, estimating Equation (40). The fifth and final subsection
provides results for a variety of alternative specifications, including panel regressions from 41.
5.1 ROA and valuations
As a preliminary test, we check the assumption of the model that high wage gap firms are run
better than low wage gap firms. This is an important test also to rule out the alternative hypotheses
that the wage gap might be uninformative or represent agency issues. To this purpose, we estimate
Equation (38) for returns on assets. The results are in Table 19, Panel A. We find that the coefficient
of the wage gap is positive and significant. The results then provide support to the idea that high
wage gap firms are indeed better managed.
Proposition 2b predicts that the difference in valuations between high and low wage gap stocks is
not clear if there are inequality averse traders. To test for this, we estimate Equation (38) using
Tobin’s q as a dependent variable. The results are in Table 19, Panel B. We find that the coefficient
of the wage gap is not significant. This pattern is consistent with the presence of inequality-averse
demand.
5.2 Wage gap between CEO and workers
In our first batch of time series regressions, we consider the wage gap between CEO and workers. The
results are in Table 20. In Panel A, we construct the portfolios using the 30% threshold. In columns
(1) and (2), we consider the high-inequality portfolio. We find that the regression constant is small,
negative, and marginally significant in the CAPM (-0.6%), but close to zero both in magnitude and
significance in the full four-factor model (-0.1%). The coefficient of size, instead, is negative and
highly significant (-0.767), which shows that high-inequality stocks tend to co-move positively with
the returns on large firms. This is consistent with the idea that pay inequality is positively related
to firm size.
In columns (3) and (4), we consider the low-inequality portfolio. We find that the alpha is indeed
negative and highly significant both in the CAPM (-1.2%) and in the four-factor model (-0.9%).
Among the other regressors, the size factor has a positive but insignificant coefficient (0.192), which
is consistent with the assortative matching hypothesis. In columns (5) and (6), we consider the
long-short portfolio on top and bottom pay inequality stocks, respectively. We find that the alpha
is positive and significant both in the CAPM (0.7%) and in the four-factor model (0.8%).
In Panel B, we construct the portfolios using the 20% threshold. The results are similar, and become
statistically stronger. For high wage gap stocks, the regression constant is no longer significant in
the CAPM (-0.8%), and drops to zero both in magnitude and significance in the full four-factor
model (0.1%). The alpha on the low inequality portfolio is negative and highly significant both
in the CAPM (-1.6%) and in the four-factor model (-1.2%). As a result, the alpha on the long-
short portfolio is positive and significant both in the CAPM (0.8%) and in the four-factor model
(1.3%).
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Table 19: Wage gap, firm performance, and valuations
Panel regressions of firms’ returns on assets (Panel A), and valuations (Panel B), defined as
Tobin’s q, on the wage gap between CEO and workers, lagged one year and expressed in logs,
and the logarithm of the firm’s employees. CEO compensation is measured as total annual
pay, including cash and stocks, in columns (1) and (2), and as cash only in columns (3) and (4).
Workers’ pay is measured as the annual wage paid in establishments that are located in the
same state as the firm’s headquarters, calculated as a weighted average across establishments,
where the weights are represented by the number of employees in each establishment. All
specifications include firm and year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by firm
and year. Data on workers’ wages are from the “Establishment History Panel” database.
Company-level accounting and stock market data from Worldscope and Datastream, and
managerial compensation data from the companies’ annual reports. Observations are monthly.
The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. t statistics are below the coefficients, * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A
Dep. variable: ROA Total pay Cash pay
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage gap 0.025** 0.025** 0.027** 0.027**
2.03 2.01 2.19 2.20
Employees -0.016 -0.015
-0.53 -0.50
Constant 0.037 0.201 0.029 0.185
0.43 0.61 0.35 0.52
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Clustering Firm-Year Firm-Year Firm-Year Firm-Year
Adj. R-squared 0.726 0.727 0.727 0.727
Observations 505 505 505 505
Panel B
Dep. variable: Tobin’s q Total pay Cash pay
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage gap -0.268 -0.264 -0.267 -0.267
-0.52 -0.52 -0.47 -0.49
Employees -1.049 -1.056
-1.16 -1.16
Constant 13.843*** 24.771* 13.794*** 24.832*
3.21 1.93 2.94 1.84
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Clustering Firm-Year Firm-Year Firm-Year Firm-Year
Adj. R-squared 0.623 0.628 0.623 0.628
Observations 507 507 507 507
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Table 20: CEO-workers wage gap
CAPM and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model regressions of equally-weighted returns on a portfolio of stocks with
high inequality between CEO and workers’ pay (columns 1 and 2), a portfolio of stocks for which such inequality
is low (columns 3 and 4), and a portfolio with a long position in high-inequality stocks and a short position in
low-inequality stocks (columns 5 and 6). Pay inequality is defined as the log-difference in earnings between CEO
and workers. CEO compensation is calculated as the overall annual pay, including cash and stocks, while workers’
pay is measured as the average annual wage paid in establishments that are located in the same state as the firm’s
headquarters, weighted by the number of employees in each establishment. To construct our test portfolios, we rank
all stocks in pay inequality quantiles as measured in the previous year, and rebalance them at the beginning of each
year. In any given year, we define high and low wage gap stocks, respectively, as the stocks that lie at the top and the
bottom 30% (Panel A), 20% (Panel B), and 10% (Panel C) of the distribution. All the regressors are from Kenneth
French’s website and refer to Europe. Observations are monthly, and the sample period is from January 2002 to
December 2011. t statistics are below the coefficients, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A
30% Threshold (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha -0.006* -0.001 -0.012*** -0.009** 0.007* 0.008**
-1.85 -0.18 -2.67 -2.26 1.87 2.34
MKT 1.048*** 0.998*** 0.907*** 0.814*** 0.141* 0.184***
5.54 9.59 5.58 6.60 1.89 3.62
SMB -0.767** 0.192 -0.960**
-2.08 0.65 -2.23
HML -0.393* -0.249 -0.144
-1.91 -0.72 -0.60
UMD -0.260* -0.379** 0.119**
-1.96 -2.46 2.19
Adj. R-squared 0.627 0.692 0.539 0.576 0.024 0.176
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
Panel B
20% Threshold (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha -0.008 0.001 -0.016*** -0.012*** 0.008* 0.013***
-1.59 0.26 -3.22 -2.96 1.76 2.81
MKT 1.128*** 1.060*** 0.905*** 0.831*** 0.222 0.230**
3.58 6.32 5.06 6.03 1.05 2.41
SMB -1.444** 0.368 -1.812***
-2.25 1.29 -2.82
HML -0.831** -0.406 -0.425
-2.35 -1.10 -1.60
UMD -0.452** -0.407*** -0.045
-2.16 -2.77 -0.47
Adj. R-squared 0.446 0.594 0.484 0.529 0.024 0.268
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
Panel C
10% Threshold (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha 0.000 0.002 -0.016*** -0.016*** 0.017*** 0.018***
0.14 0.62 -2.83 -3.60 3.44 6.48
MKT 0.819*** 0.703*** 0.843*** 0.712*** -0.024 -0.009
9.79 7.74 4.07 4.64 -0.12 -0.05
SMB -0.582*** 0.775** -1.357***
-3.60 2.36 -3.80
HML 0.363 0.270 0.093
1.47 0.78 0.35
UMD -0.185 -0.238*** 0.053
-1.49 -2.60 0.57
Adj. R-squared 0.530 0.571 0.347 0.376 -0.009 0.112
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108
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The result become even stronger in Panel C, where we construct the portfolios using the 10%
threshold. The regression constant for the high inequality portfolio is not significant and close to
zero both in the CAPM (0.0%) and the four-factor model (0.2%). The alpha on the low inequality
portfolio is negative and highly significant both in the CAPM (-1.6%) and in the four-factor model
(-1.6%). Therefore, the arbitrage portfolio yields positive and significant risk-adjusted returns both
in the CAPM (1.7%) and in the four-factor model (1.8%).
Overall, the evidence is in line with the model predictions. Consistent with Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and
1c, low wage gap stocks trade at a premium, high wage gap stocks are priced correctly, and the
arbitrage portfolio yields a positive and significant alpha, which is entirely driven by the short leg
of the investment strategy. Also, the negative coefficient of size provides support to the assortative
matching hypothesis.
5.3 Informed vs. uninformed traders
To provide further evidence that it is indeed unsophisticated investors that drive the results, we
identify categories of firms that are difficult to evaluate and/or arbitrage. Examples of such compa-
nies are those of small size, defined as low market capitalization, and with extreme book-to-market
ratios (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Baker and Wurgler, 2007). With lower arbitrage activity, we
expect the mispricing of the wage gap to be particularly pronounced among these stocks. To test
this conjecture, we double-sort our stocks in portfolios formed on these measures.
We start from firm size. In the first sort, we distinguish between stocks with above- and below-
median market capitalization, respectively. In the second sort, we identify stocks with top and
bottom 30% wage gaps. To avoid using market prices for both sorts, we consider CEO cash com-
pensation for these tests. Due to little firm coverage at the beginning of the sample period, we
construct these portfolios from 2005.
The results are in Table 21. For small stocks (Panel A), we find that an empirical pattern that is
strikingly similar to our estimates from the full sample. Risk-adjusted returns are positive but not
significant for high wage gap stocks (1.1%), negative and significant for low wage gap stocks (0.7%),
and positive and highly significant for the arbitrage portfolio (1.8%). For large stocks (Panel B),
instead, none of these coefficients are significant.
Next, we consider the book-to-market ratio. We form our first sort using stocks with middle 40%
and extreme 30% book-to-market, respectively. As above, we identify stocks with top and bottom
30% wage gaps in the second sort, and again begin our analysis in 2005.
The estimates are in Table 22. For extreme book-to-market stocks (Panel A), we find that risk-
adjusted returns are near-zero for high wage gap stocks (0.2%), negative and significant for low
wage gap stocks (0.9%), and positive and highly significant for the arbitrage portfolio (1.1%). For
middle book-to-market stocks, instead, these coefficients are all outside the rejection region.
The results are then in line with our conjecture.
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Table 21: CEO-worker wage gap: portfolios double-sorted on wage gap and market capitalization
CAPM and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model regressions of equally-weighted returns on a portfolio of stocks with
high inequality between CEO and workers’ pay (columns 1 and 2), a portfolio of stocks for which such inequality is
low (columns 3 and 4), and a portfolio with a long position in high-inequality stocks and a short position in low-
inequality stocks (columns 5 and 6). In Panel A we consider stocks whose market capitalization is below the median,
while in Panel B we consider stocks whose market capitalization is above the median. Pay inequality is defined as
the log-difference in earnings between CEO and workers. CEO compensation is calculated as the cash salary, while
workers’ pay is measured as the average annual wage paid in establishments that are located in the same state as the
firm’s headquarters, weighted by the number of employees in each establishment. To construct our test portfolios,
we rank all stocks in pay inequality quantiles as measured in the previous year, and rebalance them at the beginning
of each year. In any given year, we define high and low wage gap stocks, respectively, as the stocks that lie at the
top and the bottom 30% of the distribution. The regressors are from Kenneth French’s website and refer to Europe.
Observations are monthly, and the sample period is from January 2005 to December 2011. t statistics are below the
coefficients, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A
Small stocks (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha 0.010 0.011 -0.008** -0.007** 0.018** 0.018***
1.19 1.60 -2.24 -2.19 2.21 2.69
MKT 1.016*** 0.991*** 0.631*** 0.499*** 0.385*** 0.493***
7.42 14.18 6.34 6.25 5.50 4.11
SMB 0.399 0.182 0.217
1.24 0.62 0.81
HML -0.321 0.493* -0.814
-0.61 1.70 -1.50
UMD -0.284** -0.116 -0.168**
-2.16 -0.99 -1.98
Adj. R-squared 0.551 0.561 0.446 0.463 0.150 0.175
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84
Panel B
Large stocks (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 0.004 0.002
-0.93 -0.94 -0.78 -0.66 0.62 0.45
MKT 0.773*** 0.748*** 0.934*** 0.822*** -0.161 -0.074
13.48 12.31 5.72 6.54 -1.17 -0.70
SMB -0.298*** 0.383** -0.682***
-2.59 2.02 -4.37
HML 0.186 0.351 -0.165
0.94 0.95 -0.58
UMD 0.023 -0.129 0.152
0.20 -0.96 0.92
Adj. R-squared 0.683 0.684 0.59 0.598 0.034 0.100
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84
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Table 22: CEO-worker wage gap: portfolios double-sorted on wage gap and book-to-market ratio
CAPM and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model regressions of equally-weighted returns on a portfolio of stocks with
high inequality between CEO and workers’ pay (columns 1 and 2), a portfolio of stocks for which such inequality is
low (columns 3 and 4), and a portfolio with a long position in high-inequality stocks and a short position in low-
inequality stocks (columns 5 and 6). In Panel A we consider stocks whose book-to-market ratio lies in the extreme
(i.e., top and bottom) 30% of the distribution, while in Panel B we consider stocks whose book-to-market ratio lies
in the middle 40%. Pay inequality is defined as the log-difference in earnings between CEO and workers. CEO
compensation is calculated as the cash salary, while workers’ pay is measured as the average annual wage paid in
establishments that are located in the same state as the firm’s headquarters, weighted by the number of employees
in each establishment. To construct our test portfolios, we rank all stocks in pay inequality quantiles as measured
in the previous year, and rebalance them at the beginning of each year. In any given year, we define high and low
wage gap stocks, respectively, as the stocks that lie at the extreme 30% of the distribution. The regressors are from
Kenneth French’s website and refer to Europe. Observations are monthly, and the sample period is from January
2005 to December 2011. t statistics are below the coefficients, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A
Extreme B/M (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha 0.001 0.002 -0.011*** -0.009** 0.012*** 0.011***
0.70 0.80 -2.77 -2.33 3.79 3.58
MKT 0.789*** 0.791*** 0.675*** 0.553*** 0.114 0.238***
12.59 13.29 5.33 6.62 1.23 3.30
SMB -0.341** -0.074 -0.268
-2.34 -0.28 -1.18
HML -0.068 0.422 -0.490*
-0.33 1.26 -1.75
UMD -0.058 -0.144 0.086
-0.47 -1.26 1.14
Adj. R-squared 0.646 0.646 0.455 0.466 0.015 0.041
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84
Panel B
Middle B/M (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 0.002 0.001
-1.19 -0.92 -0.89 -1.00 0.40 0.41
MKT 0.856*** 0.762*** 0.851*** 0.738*** 0.005 0.024
13.16 11.43 6.12 5.68 0.05 0.17
SMB -0.069 1.063*** -1.131***
-0.57 6.61 -7.62
HML 0.419 0.345 0.075
1.63 1.10 0.23
UMD -0.048 -0.101 0.053
-0.45 -0.95 0.43
Adj. R-squared 0.671 0.675 0.521 0.591 -0.012 0.170
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84
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5.4 Inequality aversion
To tease out which category of unsophisticated (i.e., noise and inequality-averse) traders drives the
results, we proceed in three ways. First, we propose a formal test of Hypothesis 2, by estimating
Equation (40). The intuition is as follows. Noise trader demand is high if the market has positive
sentiment (Yu and Yuan, 2011; Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2012). Without inequality-averse traders,
Equation (36) implies that an increased presence of noise traders results in an increased return
differential between high and low wage gap stocks. With inequality-averse traders, instead, the
return differential decreases when the inequality bias is large.
The results are in Table 23. In Panel A, we consider the consumer confidence index for Germany.
In columns (1) and (2), we find that high wage gap stocks exhibit no significant variation in risk-
adjusted returns in times of high sentiment, either in the CAPM (-0.2%) or the four-factor model
(1.1%). In columns (3) and (4), low wage gap stocks exhibit an interesting pattern. In times of low
sentiment, they yield negative and highly significant risk-adjusted returns (-2.1%; -2.0%). In times
of high sentiment, instead, their risk-adjusted returns increase significantly (1.6%; 2.3%), which
implies less overpricing. In columns (5) and (6), the long-short portfolio exhibits a similar pattern.
Risk-adjusted returns are positive and significant in times of low sentiment (1.7%; 1.4%), only to
decrease sharply in times of high sentiment (-1.8%; -1.1%).
In Panels B and C we consider consumer confidence for the euro area and the OECD, respectively,
and obtain similar results. The alpha of high wage gap stocks continues to be close to zero all
throughout. Low wage gap stocks exhibit negative and significant risk-adjusted returns in times of
low sentiment, but most of the overpricing goes away in times of high sentiment. Symmetrically, the
long-short portfolio yields positive and significant risk-adjusted returns in times of high sentiment,
but the alphas significantly decrease in times of high sentiment. The negative coefficient of senti-
ment in specifications (5) and (6) across all three Panels indicates that we have inequality-averse
traders.
Second, we argue that if some investors exhibit a bias related to pay inequality, we expect such a
bias to be stronger when the wage gap is salient, i.e., when it is disclosed by firms and covered by
the media. This is a peculiar implication of inequality aversion, as noise traders neglect the wage
gap at all times during the year, while arbitrageurs always trade on it. To test for this, we identify
April as the month in which the wage gap is typically disclosed and covered by the press25. The
increase in attention towards pay inequality should then lead to more trading of inequality-averse
investors. To test for this, we split our regression constant into two sets of dummy variables that
take on value one for each quarter and calendar month, respectively.
Note that the tests from our arbitrage portfolio are particularly important here. Calendar anomalies
that are not specific to pay inequality should equally affect high and low wage gap stocks, and then
cancel out in the long-minus-short portfolio. On the contrary, the attention effect from the inequality
aversion story, if present, should affect high and low wage gap stocks in different ways, and therefore
should not wash away in the arbitrage strategy.
25For 91 firms, the fiscal year-end is on December 31, and the annual meeting is generally in April. Only 9 firms
have fiscal years that do not coincide with the calendar year.
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Table 23: CEO-workers wage gap and sentiment
CAPM regressions (columns 1, 3, and 5) and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model regressions (columns 2, 4, and 6)
of equally-weighted returns on a portfolio of stocks with high inequality between CEO and workers’ pay (columns 1
and 2), a portfolio of stocks for which such inequality is low (columns 3 and 4), and a portfolio with a long position
in high-inequality stocks and a short position in low-inequality stocks (columns 5 and 6). The regressions include
a dummy variable that equals one if sentiment has increased over the previous month and zero otherwise, where
sentiment is defined as the measure of consumer confidence published by the OECD for Germany (Panel A), the
eurozone area (Panel B), and the OECD area (Panel C). Pay inequality is defined as the log-difference in earnings
between CEO and workers. CEO compensation is calculated as the overall annual pay, including cash and stocks,
while workers’ pay is measured as the average annual wage paid in establishments that are located in the same state as
the firm’s headquarters, weighted by the number of employees in each establishment. To construct our test portfolios,
we rank all stocks in pay inequality quantiles as measured in the previous year, and rebalance them at the beginning
of each year. In any given year, we define high and low wage gap stocks, respectively, as the stocks that lie at the
top and bottom 30% of the distribution. All the regressors are from Kenneth French’s website and refer to Europe.
Observations are monthly, and the sample period is from January 2002 to December 2011. t statistics are below the
coefficients, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Sentiment -0.002 0.011 0.016* 0.023*** -0.018** -0.011**
-0.12 1.28 1.76 2.81 -2.48 -1.97
Alpha -0.005 -0.007 -0.021*** -0.020*** 0.017*** 0.014**
-0.82 -0.90 -4.97 -3.66 2.87 2.47
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj. R-squared 0.624 0.694 0.546 0.593 0.049 0.182
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Sentiment -0.006 0.004 0.019*** 0.021*** -0.026*** -0.016**
-0.62 0.68 2.74 4.14 -3.36 -2.55
Alpha -0.002 -0.003 -0.024*** -0.020*** 0.022*** 0.017***
-0.38 -0.52 -4.85 -4.81 3.92 3.01
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj. R-squared 0.625 0.690 0.549 0.588 0.078 0.194
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
Panel C (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Sentiment -0.004 0.010 0.018** 0.020** -0.023*** -0.010*
-0.39 1.28 2.22 2.29 -2.93 -1.95
Alpha -0.003 -0.006 -0.022*** -0.019*** 0.019*** 0.013***
-0.70 -1.03 -4.59 -3.33 3.56 2.85
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj. R-squared 0.624 0.693 0.548 0.587 0.067 0.179
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
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Table 24: CEO-workers wage gap: quarter breakdown
CAPM and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model regressions of equally-weighted returns on a portfolio of stocks with
high inequality between CEO and workers’ pay (columns 1 and 2), a portfolio of stocks for which such inequality
is low (columns 3 and 4), and a portfolio with a long position in high-inequality stocks and a short position in
low-inequality stocks (columns 5 and 6). Pay inequality is defined as the log-difference in earnings between CEO
and workers. CEO compensation is calculated as the overall annual pay, including cash and stocks, while workers’
pay is measured as the average annual wage paid in establishments that are located in the same state as the firm’s
headquarters, weighted by the number of employees in each establishment. To construct our test portfolios, we rank
all stocks in pay inequality quantiles as measured in the previous year, and rebalance them at the beginning of each
year. In any given year, we define high and low wage gap stocks, respectively, as the stocks that lie at the top and the
bottom 30% of the distribution. We replace the regression constant with a set of dummies that take on value one for
each quarter. All the regressors are from Kenneth French’s website and refer to Europe. Observations are monthly,
and the sample period is from January 2002 to December 2011. t statistics are below the coefficients, * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
1st Quarter 0.005 0.029 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.020*
0.61 1.53 0.42 0.80 0.16 1.88
2nd Quarter -0.009 -0.007 -0.022*** -0.023*** 0.012** 0.016***
-0.92 -0.92 -2.93 -2.76 2.14 3.59
3rd Quarter -0.013*** -0.009 -0.018* -0.015* 0.005 0.007
-2.70 -1.60 -1.72 -1.71 0.57 0.97
4th Quarter 0.002 -0.002 -0.006 0.003 0.008 -0.004
0.19 -0.19 -0.74 0.25 0.69 -0.43
MKT 1.054*** 1.013*** 0.920*** 0.810*** 0.133* 0.202***
5.27 8.78 5.46 6.96 1.68 3.38
SMB -0.955** 0.16 -1.115***
-2.29 0.43 -2.87
HML -0.419** -0.222 -0.197
-2.13 -0.64 -0.87
UMD -0.284** -0.443*** 0.158*
-2.15 -2.89 1.68
Ad. R-squared 0.62 0.706 0.539 0.592 0.018 0.197
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
The results are in Tables 24 and 25. Consistent with our conjecture, we find that the overpricing of
low wage gap stocks takes place especially during the second quarter, where alpha is positive and
significant (2.3%). As a consequence, the long-short strategy exhibits positive and highly significant
risk-adjusted returns only in that period (1.6%). The results are similar for the calendar month
breakdown, as the long-short strategy yields a positive and highly significant alpha only in the
month of April (3.1%).
Third, we argue that if inequality aversion is a genuine behavioral bias, then it should not be related
to economic fundamentals. In particular, it should not matter whether high CEO pay is justified
or not by the manager’s contribution to the firm’s value. To test this hypothesis, we follow Rouen
(2017) and decompose CEO pay into an economically justified and an unjustified component, where
the former is a linear combination of firm characteristics. In particular, we regress log CEO pay on
log total assets, the market-to-book ratio, the earnings-to-assets ratio, CEO tenure, and industry
and year fixed effects, and define the fitted values and the residuals as justified and unjustified pay,
respectively. As noise traders neglect the wage gap but observe the other fundamentals of the firm,
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Table 25: CEO-workers wage gap: calendar month breakdown
CAPM and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model regressions of equally-weighted returns on a portfolio of stocks with
high inequality between CEO and workers’ pay (columns 1 and 2), a portfolio of stocks for which such inequality
is low (columns 3 and 4), and a portfolio with a long position in high-inequality stocks and a short position in
low-inequality stocks (columns 5 and 6). Pay inequality is defined as the log-difference in earnings between CEO
and workers. CEO compensation is calculated as the overall annual pay, including cash and stocks, while workers’
pay is measured as the average annual wage paid in establishments that are located in the same state as the firm’s
headquarters, weighted by the number of employees in each establishment. To construct our test portfolios, we rank
all stocks in pay inequality quantiles as measured in the previous year, and rebalance them at the beginning of each
year. In any given year, we define high and low wage gap stocks, respectively, as the stocks that lie at the top and
the bottom 30% of the distribution. We replace the regression constant with a set of dummies that take on value one
for each calendar month. All the regressors are from Kenneth French’s website and refer to Europe. Observations
are monthly, and the sample period is from January 2002 to December 2011. t statistics are below the coefficients, *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
January 0.01 0.042* 0.012 0.015 -0.002 0.027*
0.92 1.70 0.90 0.86 -0.11 1.69
February 0.000 0.016 -0.004 0.004 0.004 0.012
-0.07 1.29 -0.48 0.41 0.36 1.16
March -0.008 -0.004 -0.020** -0.017** 0.012 0.014
-0.98 -0.41 -2.53 -2.38 1.20 1.25
April -0.003 -0.002 -0.025 -0.033** 0.022* 0.031***
-0.25 -0.25 -1.29 -2.32 1.96 2.88
May -0.017 -0.016 -0.021 -0.021 0.004 0.005
-1.03 -1.33 -1.08 -1.07 0.4 0.46
June -0.007 0.004 -0.007 0.001 0.000 0.002
-0.68 0.41 -0.42 0.09 0.00 0.21
July -0.023** -0.022*** -0.039*** -0.036*** 0.016* 0.015
-2.47 -2.72 -3.31 -4.21 1.78 1.28
August -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.012 -0.002 0.004
-0.84 -0.87 -0.37 -0.72 -0.08 0.26
September -0.027 -0.02 -0.015 -0.004 -0.012 -0.016
-1.18 -1.33 -0.71 -0.26 -0.83 -1.29
October 0.016 0.003 -0.013 -0.003 0.028 0.007
0.63 0.21 -1.09 -0.21 1.20 0.38
November 0.016 0.01 0.01 0.016 0.006 -0.005
1.04 0.71 0.59 0.87 0.37 -0.43
December -0.017 -0.007 -0.021 -0.007 0.004 0.000
-1.34 -0.91 -1.50 -0.54 0.29 0.01
MKT 1.053*** 1.018*** 0.946*** 0.818*** 0.106 0.200***
5.94 9.66 6.64 7.33 1.51 3.89
SMB -0.998*** 0.103 -1.101***
-2.62 0.27 -2.92
HML -0.397** -0.15 -0.247
-2.21 -0.48 -1.18
UMD -0.264** -0.442*** 0.178***
-2.14 -2.92 3.19
Adj. R-squared 0.617 0.703 0.531 0.581 -0.010 0.167
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
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their pricing error should be confined to the unjustified wage gap. For inequality-averse traders,
instead, the bias should apply to both the justified and the unjustified wage gap.
The results are in Table 26. In Panel A, we consider the justified wage gap. We find risk-adjusted
returns are not significant and close to zero for high wage gap stocks (0.1%), while negative and
significant for low wage gap stocks (0.7%), and positive and significant for the arbitrage portfolio
(0.8%). In Panel B, we consider the unjustified wage gap. Similarly, we find risk-adjusted returns
are not significant and close to zero for high wage gap stocks (0.2%), negative but not significant
for low wage gap stocks (0.4%), while positive and marginally significant for the arbitrage portfolio
(0.7%). The results lend support to the behavioral bias hypothesis.
5.5 Robustness checks
Next, we test a variety of alternative specifications, in which we consider: non-CEO managers,
cash-only compensation, portfolio formation in April rather than January, all establishments rather
than same-state establishments only, and panel regressions.
In Table 27, we repeat the analysis for non-CEO managers. The results are similar, both in mag-
nitude and significance. We find that high wage gap stocks yield near-zero risk-adjusted returns
for the portfolios with 30% (0.1%), 20% (-0.1%), and 10% (0.2%) thresholds. On the contrary, low
wage gap stocks yield negative and significant risk-adjusted returns, increasing in absolute value
across the thresholds of 30% (-0.8%), 20% (-1.0%), and 10% (-1.9%). As a result, the long-short
portfolios yield positive and significant alphas, as hypothesized, increasing from 0.9% for the 30%
portfolios to 2.1% for the 10% portfolios.
Among the other coefficients, as expected, the size factor is the one which retains the highest
explanatory power. High wage gap stocks exhibit a negative and significant loading across the 30%
(-1.200), 20% (-1.318), and 10% (-0.551) thresholds. For low wage gap stocks, the loading on size is
again positive but not significant for the 30% (0.351) and 20% (0.336) portfolios, while it is positive
and highly significant for the 10% portfolios (0.866). The difference between these two coefficients,
however, is negative and significant for all thresholds, which is in line with the assortative matching
hypothesis.
One potential concern is that the variable component of CEO pay makes the wage gap a function of
the firm’s past performance. To allay this concern, we redefine pay inequality using managers’ cash
compensation only. The results are in Table 28, and look quite similar. The alpha on high wage gap
stocks is close to zero for the portfolios with 30% (0.1%), 20% (0.3%), and 10% (-0.1%) thresholds.
Low wage gap stocks, instead, yield negative and significant risk-adjusted returns, increasing in
absolute value across the thresholds of 30% (-0.8%), 20% (-1.0%), and 10% (-1.7%). As a result,
the long-short portfolios yield positive and significant risk-adjusted returns increasing from 0.9%
for the 30% portfolios to 1.6% for the 10% portfolios.
Since company reports are typically released around the end of the first quarter, one additional
concern is that our portfolios are formed too early. To address this issue, we move the formation
period from January to April. The results are in Table 29, and again hardly change. The alpha
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Table 26: CEO-worker wage gap: justified vs. unjustified CEO pay
CAPM and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model regressions of equally-weighted returns on a portfolio of stocks with
high inequality between CEO and workers’ pay (columns 1 and 2), a portfolio of stocks for which such inequality
is low (columns 3 and 4), and a portfolio with a long position in high-inequality stocks and a short position in
low-inequality stocks (columns 5 and 6). Pay inequality is defined as the log-difference in earnings between CEO
and workers. CEO compensation is calculated as the overall annual pay, including cash and stocks, while workers’
pay is measured as the average annual wage paid in establishments that are located in the same state as the firm’s
headquarters, weighted by the number of employees in each establishment. Following Rouen (2017), we regress log
CEO pay on log total assets, the market-to-book ratio, the earnings-to-assets ratio, CEO tenure, and industry and
year fixed effects. Then, we define the fitted values as justified pay, and the residuals as unjustified pay. In turn,
we construct an economically justified wage gap (Panel A) and an unjustified one (Panel B). To construct our test
portfolios, we rank all stocks in pay inequality quantiles as measured in the previous year, and rebalance them at the
beginning of each year. In any given year, we define high and low wage gap stocks, respectively, as the stocks that lie
at the top and the bottom 30% of the distribution. The regressors are from Kenneth French’s website and refer to
Europe. Observations are monthly, and the sample period is from January 2005 to December 2011. t statistics are
below the coefficients, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A
Justified wage gap (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha -0.004 0.001 -0.009** -0.007** 0.005 0.008**
-1.44 0.45 -2.11 -1.97 1.26 2.49
MKT 1.091*** 0.978*** 0.938*** 0.835*** 0.153 0.143**
5.78 9.58 8.52 10.48 1.24 2.42
SMB -0.848*** 0.347 -1.195***
-2.65 1.38 -3.20
HML -0.28 -0.044 -0.236*
-1.22 -0.17 -1.84
UMD -0.377*** -0.325*** -0.051
-3.12 -3.56 -0.92
Adj. R-squared 0.631 0.719 0.599 0.630 0.023 0.237
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
Panel B
Unjustified wage gap (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha -0.003 0.002 -0.012** -0.004 0.008** 0.007*
-0.75 0.63 -1.99 -1.11 2.19 1.79
MKT 1.140*** 1.032*** 1.157*** 1.066*** -0.016 -0.034
6.45 10 4.91 6.58 -0.24 -0.43
SMB -0.576 -0.330 -0.246
-1.59 -1.14 -1.01
HML -0.297 -0.669 0.372
-1.41 -1.59 1.26
UMD -0.389*** -0.520*** 0.131
-3.69 -2.93 1.35
Adj. R-squared 0.669 0.731 0.602 0.680 -0.008 0.023
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
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Table 27: Managers-workers wage gap
CAPM and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model regressions of equally-weighted returns on a portfolio of stocks with
high inequality between managers’ and workers’ pay (columns 1 and 2), a portfolio of stocks for which such inequality
is low (columns 3 and 4), and a portfolio with a long position in high-inequality stocks and a short position in low-
inequality stocks (columns 5 and 6). Pay inequality is defined as the log-difference in earnings between managers and
workers. Managerial compensation is calculated as the overall annual pay of the members of the board, excluding
the CEO, while workers’ pay is measured as the average annual wage paid in establishments that are located in the
same state as the firm’s headquarters, weighted by the number of employees in each establishment. To construct our
test portfolios, we rank all stocks in pay inequality quantiles as measured in the previous year, and rebalance them
at the beginning of each year. In any given year, we define high and low wage gap stocks, respectively, as the stocks
that lie at the top and the bottom 30% (Panel A), 20% (Panel B), and 10% (Panel C) of the distribution. All the
regressors are from Kenneth French’s website and refer to Europe. Observations are monthly, and the sample period
is from January 2002 to December 2011. t statistics are below the coefficients, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A
30% Threshold (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha -0.007 0.001 -0.010** -0.008** 0.003 0.009**
-1.60 0.30 -2.48 -2.02 0.68 2.15
MKT 1.193*** 1.107*** 0.900*** 0.810*** 0.293 0.297**
4.47 6.80 6.43 7.67 1.40 2.41
SMB -1.200** 0.351 -1.551**
-2.04 1.42 -2.54
HML -0.689* -0.131 -0.559**
-1.89 -0.50 -2.36
UMD -0.459*** -0.328*** -0.131
-3.06 -3.10 -1.45
Adj. R-squared 0.547 0.673 0.569 0.601 0.066 0.333
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
Panel B
20% Threshold (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha -0.010** -0.001 -0.015*** -0.010** 0.005 0.010*
-2.07 -0.12 -2.70 -2.37 1.11 1.87
MKT 1.207*** 1.128*** 0.906*** 0.815*** 0.301 0.312***
4.03 6.88 4.90 5.64 1.51 3.14
SMB -1.318** 0.336 -1.653**
-1.99 1.12 -2.36
HML -0.743** -0.370 -0.373
-2.12 -0.97 -1.38
UMD -0.455** -0.433*** -0.023
-2.27 -2.94 -0.22
Adj. R-squared 0.482 0.603 0.471 0.517 0.051 0.245
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
Panel C
10% Threshold (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha -0.000 0.002 -0.018*** -0.019*** 0.018*** 0.021***
-0.02 0.48 -3.15 -4.55 3.61 5.88
MKT 0.855*** 0.705*** 0.697*** 0.649*** 0.158 0.056
11.86 9.20 3.97 5.04 0.90 0.35
SMB -0.551*** 0.866*** -1.416***
-2.84 3.67 -5.26
HML 0.477** 0.021 0.457
2.19 0.06 1.16
UMD -0.225* -0.112 -0.114
-1.94 -0.98 -0.64
Adj. R-squared 0.539 0.590 0.320 0.354 0.010 0.163
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108
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Table 28: CEO-workers cash wage gap
CAPM and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model regressions of equally-weighted returns on a portfolio of stocks with
high inequality between CEO and workers’ pay (columns 1 and 2), a portfolio of stocks for which such inequality
is low (columns 3 and 4), and a portfolio with a long position in high-inequality stocks and a short position in
low-inequality stocks (columns 5 and 6). Pay inequality is defined as the log-difference in earnings between CEO and
workers. CEO compensation is calculated as the annual cash salary, while workers’ pay is measured as the average
annual wage paid in establishments that are located in the same state as the firm’s headquarters, weighted by the
number of employees in each establishment. To construct our test portfolios, we rank all stocks in pay inequality
quantiles as measured in the previous year, and rebalance them at the beginning of each year. In any given year,
we define high and low wage gap stocks, respectively, as the stocks that lie at the top and the bottom 30% (Panel
A), 20% (Panel B), and 10% (Panel C) of the distribution. All the regressors are from Kenneth French’s website
and refer to Europe. Observations are monthly, and the sample period is from January 2002 to December 2011. t
statistics are below the coefficients, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A
30% Threshold (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha -0.004 0.001 -0.012** -0.008** 0.008** 0.009***
-1.38 0.44 -2.50 -2.24 2.09 2.91
MKT 1.011*** 0.936*** 0.897*** 0.798*** 0.114 0.137**
5.28 8.54 5.50 6.45 1.34 2.07
SMB -0.815** 0.189 -1.004**
-2.23 0.67 -2.38
HML -0.355 -0.237 -0.118
-1.61 -0.70 -0.61
UMD -0.309** -0.388** 0.079
-2.54 -2.46 0.99
Adj. R-squared 0.610 0.693 0.533 0.572 0.013 0.180
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
Panel B
20% Threshold (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha -0.006 0.003 -0.014*** -0.010** 0.008 0.012**
-1.20 0.48 -2.60 -2.28 1.57 2.43
MKT 1.082*** 1.056*** 0.925*** 0.826*** 0.156 0.230**
3.31 5.97 5.19 6.29 0.67 2.19
SMB -1.331** 0.211 -1.543**
-1.97 0.67 -2.06
HML -0.934** -0.354 -0.580*
-2.52 -0.95 -1.91
UMD -0.389* -0.441*** 0.052
-1.65 -3.25 0.40
Adj. R-squared 0.424 0.558 0.486 0.532 0.008 0.189
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
Panel C
10% Threshold (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha -0.003 -0.001 -0.018** -0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016***
-0.89 -0.27 -2.37 -2.78 2.66 4.11
MKT 0.909*** 0.800*** 0.721*** 0.537*** 0.188* 0.263***
9.98 9.96 4.62 5.93 1.82 3.35
SMB -0.300* 0.591* -0.891**
-1.76 1.69 -2.32
HML 0.252 0.472 -0.220
1.18 1.17 -0.64
UMD -0.220* -0.297*** 0.077
-1.90 -2.78 0.95
Adj. R-squared 0.581 0.600 0.270 0.304 0.021 0.068
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108
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on high wage gap stocks is near-zero for the portfolio thresholds of 30% (0.0%), 20% (0.2%), and
10% (0.3%). Low wage gap stocks, instead, yield negative and significant risk-adjusted returns,
increasing in absolute value across the thresholds of 30% (-0.9%), 20% (-1.1%), and 10% (-1.3%).
As a result, the long-short portfolios yield positive and significant risk-adjusted returns increasing
from 0.9% for the 30% portfolios to 1.7% for the 10% portfolios. The results are virtually unchanged
when reestimating these coefficients using April cash-only wage gaps (unreported).
Restricting the wage gap calculation to same-state establishments implies that we only consider
compensation for 18% of workers in the sample. For robustness, then, we repeat the analysis
using workers from all establishments to calculate wage gaps. The results are in Table 30, and
remain unchanged. High wage gap stocks exhibit near-zero risk-adjusted returns for all thresholds
including 30% (0.1%), 20% (0.3%), and 10% (0.4%). Low wage gap stocks, instead, yield negative
and significant risk-adjusted returns, moderately increasing in absolute value from the 30% (-0.9%)
to the 10% threshold (-1.3%). As a result, the long-short portfolios yield positive and significant
risk-adjusted returns increasing from 1.0% for the 30% portfolios to 1.7% for the 10% portfolios.
For robustness, we repeat the analysis using only wages from workers from establishments in states
other than the headquarters’, and obtain the same results (unreported).
We also look into the relation between wage gap and stock returns in the panel, by estimating
Equation (41). The results are in Table 31. In columns (1) and (2), we run Fama-MacBeth
regressions, with unadjusted and robust standard errors, respectively. In both cases, we find that
the top 30% wage gap stocks earn 1.2% higher returns than the bottom 30%. In columns (3) and (4),
we estimate simple ordinary least squares once without and once with year fixed effects regressions.
The coefficients are still positive, but outside the rejection region. The results, then, are in line with
the previous tests.
6. Conclusion
We explore the hypothesis that the difference in pay between managers and workers constitutes a
signal on the quality of management, and ultimately of the company. We propose an asset pricing
model with unsophisticated traders and short-sales constraints, in which the wage gap between the
CEO and rank-and-file workers is set efficiently and increases with managerial skills. In equilibrium,
we show that firms with lower wage gaps should trade at a premium. The overpricing should be
even more pronounced in the presence of investors who dislike pay inequality within firms.
Using a unique data set on German firms’ employee compensation, we find strong evidence for
the model’s predictions. Stocks with low pay inequality earn negative and highly significant risk-
adjusted returns, both in CAPM regressions and in Carhart’s four-factor model. The magnitudes
are also economically large, ranging between 0.9% per month for the 30% threshold and 1.6% per
month for the 10% threshold. Stocks with high pay inequality, instead, exhibit no mispricing. As a
result, a portfolio with a long position in stocks with high wage gaps and a short position in stocks
with low wage gaps earns positive and significant risk-adjusted returns.
The empirical evidence suggests that the wage gap arises from efficient contracting, thus ruling out
85
Table 29: CEO-workers wage gap: April portfolios
CAPM and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model regressions of equally-weighted returns on a portfolio of stocks with
high inequality between CEO and workers’ pay (columns 1 and 2), a portfolio of stocks for which such inequality
is low (columns 3 and 4), and a portfolio with a long position in high-inequality stocks and a short position in
low-inequality stocks (columns 5 and 6). Pay inequality is defined as the log-difference in earnings between CEO
and workers. CEO compensation is calculated as the overall annual pay, including cash and stocks, while workers’
pay is measured as the average annual wage paid in establishments that are located in the same state as the firm’s
headquarters, weighted by the number of employees in each establishment. To construct our test portfolios, we rank
all stocks in pay inequality quantiles as measured in the previous year, and rebalance them in April each year. In
any given year, we define high and low wage gap stocks, respectively, as the stocks that lie at the top and the bottom
30% (Panel A), 20% (Panel B), and 10% (Panel C) of the distribution. All the regressors are from Kenneth French’s
website and refer to Europe. Observations are monthly, and the sample period is from January 2002 to December
2011. t statistics are below the coefficients, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A
30% Threshold (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha -0.005* -0.000 -0.013** -0.009** 0.008** 0.009**
-1.76 -0.00 -2.50 -2.48 2.00 2.43
MKT 1.052*** 0.992*** 0.905*** 0.822*** 0.148* 0.170***
5.49 9.37 5.75 6.40 1.87 3.17
SMB -0.781** 0.234 -1.015**
-2.14 0.79 -2.26
HML -0.378* -0.301 -0.078
-1.82 -0.81 -0.30
UMD -0.281** -0.375*** 0.095*
-2.10 -2.79 1.79
Adj. R-squared 0.627 0.697 0.537 0.575 0.025 0.176
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
Panel B
20% Threshold (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha -0.007 0.002 -0.015*** -0.011*** 0.008* 0.013***
-1.40 0.30 -3.03 -2.86 1.80 2.67
MKT 1.125*** 1.072*** 0.896*** 0.830*** 0.229 0.242**
3.49 6.03 4.83 5.84 1.03 2.24
SMB -1.467** 0.347 -1.814***
-2.20 1.23 -2.71
HML -0.838** -0.431 -0.407
-2.23 -1.21 -1.54
UMD -0.415** -0.394** -0.021
-1.97 -2.42 -0.21
Adj. R-squared 0.452 0.600 0.466 0.506 0.026 0.268
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
Panel C
10% Threshold (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha -0.006 0.003 -0.012 -0.013** 0.007 0.017***
-1.00 0.69 -1.48 -2.05 0.58 3.59
MKT 1.129*** 1.021*** 0.757*** 0.696*** 0.371 0.325
3.30 4.72 4.18 4.75 0.86 1.11
SMB -1.580** 0.953*** -2.533***
-2.50 3.31 -3.31
HML -0.714 0.214 -0.928*
-1.63 0.83 -1.95
UMD -0.523** -0.132** -0.391*
-2.24 -2.00 -1.79
Adj. R-squared 0.423 0.586 0.309 0.353 0.036 0.322
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 117
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Table 30: CEO-workers wage gap: All establishments
CAPM and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model regressions of equally-weighted returns on a portfolio of stocks with
high inequality between CEO and workers’ pay (columns 1 and 2), a portfolio of stocks for which such inequality
is low (columns 3 and 4), and a portfolio with a long position in high-inequality stocks and a short position in
low-inequality stocks (columns 5 and 6). Pay inequality is defined as the log-difference in earnings between CEO
and workers. CEO compensation is calculated as the overall annual pay, including cash and stocks, while workers’
pay is measured as the average annual wage paid in all establishments, weighted by the number of employees in each
establishment. To construct our test portfolios, we rank all stocks in pay inequality quantiles as measured in the
previous year, and rebalance them at the beginning of each year. In any given year, we define high and low wage gap
stocks, respectively, as the stocks that lie at the top and the bottom 30% (Panel A), 20% (Panel B), and 10% (Panel
C) of the distribution. All the regressors are from Kenneth French’s website and refer to Europe. Observations are
monthly, and the sample period is from January 2002 to December 2011. t statistics are below the coefficients, *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A
30% Threshold (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha -0.004 0.001 -0.014*** -0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010***
-1.44 0.31 -2.71 -2.73 2.70 3.40
MKT 1.019*** 0.949*** 0.931*** 0.845*** 0.088 0.104*
5.21 8.26 5.81 6.86 0.85 1.68
SMB -0.891*** 0.180 -1.071***
-2.70 0.60 -3.09
HML -0.307 -0.339 0.032
-1.42 -0.84 0.12
UMD -0.269** -0.398** 0.129*
-2.08 -2.56 1.88
Adj. R-squared 0.618 0.700 0.544 0.586 0.004 0.182
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
Panel B
20% Threshold (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha -0.006 0.003 -0.017*** -0.013*** 0.011** 0.016***
-1.16 0.65 -3.37 -3.17 2.19 3.16
MKT 1.111*** 1.014*** 0.963*** 0.867*** 0.148 0.147
3.48 5.67 5.37 6.36 0.61 1.19
SMB -1.626*** 0.373 -1.999***
-2.69 1.18 -3.20
HML -0.704* -0.307 -0.397
-1.90 -0.78 -1.54
UMD -0.466** -0.422*** -0.043
-2.30 -2.81 -0.41
Adj. R-squared 0.435 0.605 0.498 0.539 0.005 0.276
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
Panel C
10% Threshold (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H H L L H−L H−L
Alpha 0.002 0.004 -0.016** -0.013* 0.018*** 0.017***
1.18 1.54 -2.37 -1.91 2.81 3.01
MKT 0.739*** 0.669*** 0.980*** 0.880*** -0.241 -0.211
7.77 5.65 4.40 5.11 -0.98 -0.94
SMB -0.827*** 0.843** -1.670***
-5.56 2.15 -4.10
HML 0.249 -0.322 0.571
1.00 -0.63 1.56
UMD -0.109 -0.493 0.385
-1.06 -1.45 1.19
Adj. R-squared 0.547 0.619 0.354 0.403 0.021 0.179
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108
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Table 31: CEO-workers wage gap: Panel regressions
Panel regressions from Brennan et al. (1998) of returns on German stocks on a dummy variable that takes on value
one if firm i’s wage gap is among the top 30% in the previous year, and a vector of firm characteristics, which includes:
the log of the book-to-market ratio (calculated each July and held constant through the following June), the ratio
of dividends in the previous fiscal year to market value at calendar year-end (calculated each July and held constant
through the following June), the log of cumulative returns over months t − 3 through t − 2, months t − 6 through
t− 4, and months t− 12 through t− 7, size (defined as the log of market capitalization at the end of month t− 2),
the log of the dollar volume of trading in the stock in month t − 2, and the log of the stock price at the end of
month t − 2. We estimate Fama and MacBeth regressions in columns (1) and (2), ordinary least square regressions
in column (3), and regressions with year fixed effects and robust standard errors in column (4). In all specifications,
we exclude the middle 40% wage gap stocks. CEO compensation is measured as the CEO pay, including cash and
stocks, while workers’ pay is measured as the annual wage paid in establishments that are located in the same state
as the firm’s headquarters, calculated as a weighted average across establishments, where the weights are represented
by the number of employees in each establishment. Data on workers’ wages are from the “Establishment History
Panel” database. Company-level accounting and stock market data from Worldscope and Datastream, and CEO
compensation data from the companies’ annual reports. Observations are monthly, and the sample period is from
January 2002 to December 2011. t statistics are below the coefficients, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ret Ret Ret Ret
Wage gap (d) 0.012* 0.012* 0.003 0.005
1.74 1.80 0.41 1.19
Book-to-market -0.025 -0.025 0.043 0.007
-1.04 -1.10 1.37 0.25
Dividend yield -0.004 -0.004 -0.008** -0.003
-0.94 -0.90 -2.23 -1.46
CumRet (2,3) 0.011 0.011 0.027* -0.031
0.48 0.49 1.87 -0.69
CumRet (4,6) 0.032** 0.032** 0.056*** 0.031
1.99 1.99 4.65 1.68
CumRet (7,12) 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.004 0.015
3.43 3.33 0.46 0.75
Size (-2) 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000
0.21 0.25 -0.35 -0.07
Trading volume (-2) -0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.001
-1.02 -1.25 0.62 -0.25
Stock price (-2) -0.007 -0.007* -0.004 0.000
-1.56 -1.81 -0.97 -0.01
Constant 0.006 0.006 -0.052 -0.027
0.16 0.17 -1.30 -1.05
R-squared 0.598 0.598 0.015 0.006
Observations 2,331 2,331 2,331 2,450
Fama-MacBeth Y Y Y Y
Robust st. errors N Y N Y
Year fixed effects N N N Y
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two alternative stories. First, the wage gap might be uninformative, and the mispricing might be
entirely driven by inequality-averse investors. However, we show that there is a positive relation
between the wage gap and firm performance. Second, a high wage gap might be the result of rent
extraction. This implies a reversal of the types, as high wage gap firms exhibit agency issues while
low wage gap firms are efficient. As a result, high wage gap stocks should be overpriced, which is
at odds with our findings.
The present work contributes to the debate over pay inequality within firms, which has received
significant attention from academics, regulators, and the media (see, e.g., Wade, O’Reilly, and Pol-
lock (2006)). Recent research shows that pay inequality does not hinder firm performance (Cron-
qvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos, 2009), and actually improves it (Faleye, Reis, and
Venkateswaran, 2013; Mueller, Ouimet, and Simintzi, 2017). However, this information is not fully
impounded in the stock price. In this paper, we show that a story on limits of arbitrage does not
fully explain the wage gap.
In particular, the findings suggest that at least some sophisticated market participants are able to
infer information on salaries, and correctly incorporate it into their evaluations. Given the ample
coverage that pay inequality receives in the media, however, this information may also be available
to some unsophisticated investors, who could use it to discriminate against firms with high wage
gaps and reward firms with low wage gaps. We refer to this as an inequality-aversion bias. The
empirical evidence is consistent with this conjecture that investors exhibit inequality-aversion.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to show that investors exhibit inequality
aversion. This finding contributes to the recent literature on values in asset pricing, which shows
that investors also consider nonmonetary values in their trading strategies (see, e.g., Hong and
Kostovetsky (2012)). The mechanism through which investors incorporate intangible information
in the stock price also adds new insights to the literature on market learning (see, e.g., Edmans
(2011)).
This paper can pave the way to future studies. It will be instructive to conduct this type of research
on U.S. data in a few years’ time, in light of the SEC new rule requiring firms to disclose the pay
ratio between CEO and employees as of January 1, 2017. This regulatory change will also allow
researchers to work with a much larger set of stocks.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
A.1. Firms’ first-order conditions
If contracting is efficient, the objective function can be expressed as:
max
e,L
pi(e, L) = θ(e)K1−αLα − w(e)L−W (e), (42)
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The first-order condition with respect to e is:
dpi(e, L)
de
=
θ (e)
de
K1−αLα − w (e)
de
L− dW (e)
de
= 0 (43)
Using the following elasticity definitions:
θ ≡ ∂θ(e)
∂e
e
θ(e)
> 0, (44)
W ≡ ∂W (e)
∂e
e
W (e)
> 0, (45)
w ≡ ∂w(e)
∂e
e
w(e)
< 0, (46)
then optimal managerial compensation is:
W (e∗) =
θy (e
∗, L)− ww (e∗)L
W
≡ θy (e
∗, L) + |w|w (e∗)L
W
, (47)
where W represents the price of managerial effort. Note that the optimal compensation for the
manager has both a variable and a fixed component, calculated as a fraction of the firm’s cash flow
and labor costs, respectively.
The first-order condition with respect to labor is:
∂pi(e, L)
∂L
= αLα−1θ(e)K1−α − w(e) = 0, (48)
which yields
L∗ =
(
αθ(e∗)
w(e∗)
) 1
1−α
K. (49)
Optimal managerial compensation can then be expressed as
W (e∗) =
θ
W
θ (e∗)K1−α
(
αθ (e∗)
w (e∗)
) α
1−α
Kα︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ y(e∗, L∗)
+
|w|
W
w (e∗)
(
αθ (e∗)
w (e∗)
) 1
1−α
K︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ w(e∗)L∗
=
= K (θ (e∗))
1
1−α
(
α
w (e∗)
) α
1−α θ + |w|α
W
,
(50)
which is an increasing function of e, and therefore represents a signal for managerial effort. In
particular, the firm chooses the optimal level of effort e∗ by trading off the cost of managerial effort
(W ) with its benefits (θ, |w|).
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Using the two first-order conditions, the firm’s profits can be expressed as:
pi(e∗, L∗) = θ(e∗)K1−α
(
αθ(e∗)
w(e∗)
) α
1−α
Kα︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ y(e∗, L∗)
−w(e∗)
(
αθ(e∗)
w(e∗)
) 1
1−α
K︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ w(e∗)L∗
+
−K (θ (e∗)) 11−α
(
α
w (e∗)
) α
1−α θ + |w|α
W︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡W (e∗)
=
= K (θ (e∗))
1
1−α
(
α
w (e∗)
) α
1−α
(
1− α− θ + |w|α
W
)
≡ φ (e∗)K,
(51)
where φ(e∗) represents the profits per euro invested. Note that φ(e∗) ≥ 1 for the project to be
started. From Equations (50) and (51), it is easy to see that high managerial effort leads to
higher total compensation, a higher wage gap with respect to rank-and-file workers, and higher
profitability.
A.2. Investors’ first-order conditions
The first-order condition yields the following demand function for investor i in stock j:
n∗ij = γ(Ei(vj)− pj), (52)
Investors’ evaluations are as follows. Arbitrageurs infer e∗ from the wage gap, and correctly esti-
mate:
EA(pi(e, L)) = φ(e
∗)K. (53)
Noise traders neglect wage gaps and therefore have “flat” evaluations, using φ as an unconditional
estimate instead:
EU (pi(e, L)) = φK. (54)
Inequality-averse traders do observe wage gaps but exhibit a cognitive bias, as they perceive stocks
with high (low) wage gaps less (more) favorably than noise traders. This translates into a bias
towards firms with extreme profitability:
EI(pi(e, L)) = φ(e
∗)K + b(φ− φ(e∗))K, (55)
where b > 0 is a parameter that captures the degree of inequality aversion, and the (unconditional)
average wage gap φ is used as a reference point.
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A.3. Equilibrium prices
The market clearing condition for a generic stock is:
q = γ(φ(e∗)K − p(e∗))(1− λU − λI) + γ(φK − p(e∗))λU+
+γ(φ(e∗)K + b(φ− φ(e∗))K − p(e∗))λI .
(56)
Solving out for the equilibrium price:
p(e∗) = Kφ(e∗) + (φ− φ(e∗))KλU + b(φ− φ(e∗))KλI − q
γ
. (57)
It is easy to see that when φ < φ(e∗), short-sales constraints are binding and the equilibrium price
reduces to Equation (31).
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Chapter V
Conclusion
Executive compensation is a tool to align the interest of shareholders and managers. High CEO
compensation also arouses great attention from different groups of people in the society. Although
previous studies provide abundant results concerning the optimal design and potential effects on
executive compensation, there are still some phenomenon remains unsolved. In this thesis, I pro-
vide models and empirical analysis to explain the questions that are not answered by previous
literature.
The first question is why stock option is a component of the CEO compensation packages. Previous
literature shows that if the CEO is risk-averse, firms should provide low fixed salary and no options
to CEOs (Dittmann and Maug, 2007). I provide an answer to this question by incorporating
the probability weighting into the model. I approximate the probability weighting function with
parameters that shift the shape of the normal distribution. I show that the optimal general contract
contains options. I also calibrate the model with a wide range of parameters using the observed
U.S. CEO compensation contracts. I find that the model with the probability weighting can explain
the shape of the observed contracts better than the normal CRRA model. My finding gives an
explanation to the option component in CEO’s compensation packages.
The second question is what is the effect of CEO compensation on rank-and-file employee’s pay. I
establish a principal-agent model with one principal and two agents: the CEO and the employee
who is behindness averse. I find that the wage of the employee is increasing in the CEO pay. This
relationship is proved, both across firms and across time, by empirical tests on data set for German
firms. I also find that the workers receive a significant increase in wage when CEO compensation
is made public for the first time. The results suggest that the envy of workers associated with high
CEO compensation brings extra costs to the firms.
The third question is whether the pay inequality between CEO and workers are priced on the stock
markets. I set up an asset pricing model with noise traders and short-sales constraints, in which
the optimal wage gap between the CEO and rank-and-file workers increases with managerial skills.
In equilibrium, I show that firms with low wage gaps should be overpriced, and the effect should
be even stronger in the presence of inequality-averse investors. The empirical tests show that a
long-short portfolio of stocks with high and low wage gaps yields positive and robust risk-adjusted
returns. This finding suggests that investors do trade on the pay inequality, and show that the
mispricing comes from the overvaluation of low wage gap stocks.
To conclude, the CEO compensation not only acts as a tool to incentivize the CEO to maximize
the shareholders’ profits, but it also has effects on workers’ wages and investors’ decisions. All of
these factors finally affect the value of the firm. The findings in this thesis can be a guidance to
shareholders when they design the CEO compensation packages.
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